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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Decades of Soviet rule have left a heritage of environmental and social problems 
in Central Asia. The demise of an entire ecosystem at unprecedented pace, the 
"Aral Sea Syndrome", is the most prominent of the undesired outcomes of the 
focus on agricultural production that has dominated land and resource use and  
continues till today. The international outcry over this ecological crisis has delegated  
other – and maybe more urgent – problems to a second pane. Rural livelihoods 
are rapidly deteriorating, unemployment is high, and rural poverty widespread. 
Ecological aspects, although strongly affecting everyday life in rural areas – such as  
water and soil salinity and environmental pollution – are not the fore most concern 
to the local population, as the economic survival is the more pressing need.  
Nevertheless, it is exactly in this situation where the larger part of the population 
exploits the natural resources further rather than preserving the ecological basis 
as a natural means of the local land’s productivity.  
Since their independence in 1991, the five countries of Central Asia have dealt 
with these challenges in different ways. Uzbekistan has opted for slow, gradual 
reforms, keeping a strong government control over agricultural production. Its agri-
cultural sector is still characterized by a dominance of state ordered crops, mainly 
cotton and winter wheat which are sold to state agencies. State control and the 
lack of land ownership, true privatization (land is leased, not owned) and skills are 
widely seen as the major causes for the rural poverty and rampant environmental 
degradation. According to common opinion, the slow pace of reforms and the 
strong government control have aggravated environmental degradation and social 
problems. Careful analysis shows that the real picture is more complex and less 
straightforward than a quick look at the system would suggest, however. 
It is here that the Center's for Development Research (ZEF) project on "Economic 
and Ecological Restructuring of Land- and Water Use in the Region Khorezm 
(Uzbekistan)" sees its role. In this rural economy the use of natural resources, 
economic performance and the related social dimensions are closely linked. The 
innovative approach of the project is to tackle the issues at stake with a strongly 
interdisciplinary approach. Economists, social scientists and natural scientists are 
working together to analyse the on-going changes in land and water use, allowing 
a deeper insight into the causal change between land use, poverty and environ-
mental degradation. The results of some of the individual research projects – 
some of them surprising – are the subject of this book and will provide the basis Continuity and change: Land and water use reforms in rural Uzbekistan  II 
for recommendations and solutions for decision-makers that address the ecological 
deterioration as well as its economic and social consequences. The project aims 
at providing a comprehensive, science-based plan for restructuring, at three nested 
intervention levels: Markets, policies and institutions, and technologies. Modelling 
will assist in developing scenarios of different levels of resource use and provide 
decision makers with information as to the future consequences of the decisions 
taken today. 
These concepts are being developed in a long-term scientific research program 
with the ultimate goal of improving rural livelihoods through judicious and sus-
tainable land and water resource management. There is a specific regional focus 
on the Khorezm district of Uzbekistan, and the main partner is the State University 
of Urgench (capital of the Uzbek region Khorezm). The co-operation is based on 
strong links built with local partners and international agencies for technical co-
operation. Most prominent in this context are the collaborative agreements with 
UNESCO and with the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources Management 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The cooperation with both partners is essential, 
not least because they will further ensure a strong embedding in national policy 
making and capacity building efforts. 
Khorezm is a district of the Republic of Uzbekistan, located in the irrigated low-
lands of the Amu Darya River, which is the major tributary to the Aral Sea. It is 
in many ways an example of all of the irrigated lands along the rivers that cut 
through the Middle Asian deserts – mostly flatland, former desert areas that are 
irrigated for hundreds – if not sometimes even thousands of years – which have 
been subjected to huge changes in the last 40-50 years by means of immense  
irrigation projects that represent a very strong path dependency for today’s efforts 
to manage the resources in the region. 
From the outset the main donor of the project, the Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF) of Germany, understood that such a project can be deve-
loped only with a long-term perspective. The project was laid out for 10 to 12 
years, structured into four phases of which the first two have been completed so 
far. Phase I saw the establishment of central databases and infrastructure, and 
Phase II field surveys and trials for understanding institutions and processes, 
that allowed the development of simulation and optimization models. Phase III 
will be dedicated to testing an integrated concept for restructuring land use in a 
typical area of the region, on-farm, which will lead in Phase IV to the develop-
ment of policy recommendations and a contribution to informed decision making 
by Uzbek policy makers, by the water administration, and by farmers. 
The present volume represents preliminary results of the research undertaken 
mainly in the social and economic realm during project phase I and part of 
phase II. It combines the contributions from a workshop held at Bonn University 
in April 2005. Its intention is manifold: First it provides basic information related Peter Wehrheim, Anja Schoeller-Schletter, Christopher Martius  III
to ongoing changes in land and water use and thereby enhances the knowledge 
base for judging the effects of further change. Second, it describes those research 
tools which have been adapted by colleagues to become suitable for this region 
in transition and for the given historical background. One other goal was to 
enhance the analytical capacity on the basis of which solutions and/or recom-
mendations are to be developed. As the articles are the result of phase I and, to 
some extent, of phase II of the project, they are "work in progress".  
This book should be seen in the context of two forthcoming volumes: One on the 
diverse aspects of tree intercropping systems in the Central Asian regions, and 
another that will provide an integrative view of the research undertaken in the 
first years of this project.  
We would like to thank all partners, and particularly our colleagues from Uzbe-
kistan, for having made this book possible. Without the close cooperation in this 
international, multicultural research team, the achievement would not have been 
possible. Most prominently we would like to thank Prof. Dr. Alimboy Sadullaev, 
Dr. Ruzumboy Eshchanov and Prof. Dr. Bahtiyor Ruzmetov from the State 
University of Urgench who have always supported this project unfalteringly and 
with great enthusiasm and continue to do so. 
Furthermore, we would like to thank those who have helped in editing the text. 
In that respect the special attention given to this volume by our colleague   
Jennifer Franz is greatly appreciated. Thanks also go to Guzal Matniyazova, 
Elena Kan, and Vefa Moustafaev for their support and the provision and correction 
of Russian abstracts. We finally would like to acknowledge the never failing 
efforts by Sandra Staudenrausch, Eva Niepagenkemper and Kirsten Kienzler with 
editing, formatting and endless bug-chasing. Without them, the edition of this 
book would have been delayed much more! And of course our most sincere thanks 
go to Paul. L.G. Vlek, Director at ZEF, who initiated this project. Without his 
guidance and support, his unwavering efforts for raising the necessary funds and 
his readiness to always openly discuss the topics and problems of agriculture in 
Central Asia, this book would never have been possible. Last but not least, we 
also are greatly indebted to the BMBF for its continuous efforts to provide the 
project funds, and we would like to thank especially Dr. Jürgen Heidborn and 
Dr. Susanne Kieffer at BMBF, as well as Dr. Ingo Fitting from Project Manage-
ment Jülich for their never failing support.  
 
 
Peter Wehrheim (Brussels)  
Anja Schoeller-Schletter (Madrid)  
Christopher Martius (Bonn)   
Table of contents 
Preface and acknowledgements ...................................................  I 
Peter Wehrheim, Anja Schoeller-Schletter, Christopher Martius 
 
Section 1:  Introduction     
Chapter 1:  Farmers, cotton, water, and models – Introduction and  
overview............................................................................................  1 
Peter Wehrheim, Christopher Martius 
Chapter 2:  Organizing agricultural production – Law and legal forms  
in transition........................................................................................  17 
Anja Schoeller-Schletter 
 
Section 2:  Land use patterns     
Chapter 3:  A model-based analysis of land and water use reforms in  
Khorezm: Effects on different types of agricultural producers......................  43 
Nodir Djanibekov 
Chapter 4:  Optimal crop allocation and consequent ecological benefits  
in large scale (shirkat) farms in Uzbekistan's transition process....................  63 
Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers 
 
Section 3:  Water allocation     
Chapter 5:  Where has all the water gone?...............................................  89 
Marc Müller 
Chapter 6:  Analysis of water use and allocation for the Khorezm region in  
Uzbekistan using an integrated economic-hydrologic model........................  105 
Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai 
Chapter 7:  Problems and perspectives of water user associations in  
Uzbekistan.........................................................................................  129 
Darya Hirsch (Zavgorodnyaya) Peter Wehrheim, Anja Schoeller-Schletter, Christopher Martius  VI 
Section 4:  Policies, technology adoption, and agricultural 
                   markets     
Chapter 8:  Barriers to technological change and agrarian reform in  
Khorezm, Uzbekistan...........................................................................  145 
Caleb Wall 
Chapter 9:  Analysis of agricultural markets in Khorezm, Uzbekistan.........  165 
Ihtiyor Bobojonov, John P. A. Lamers 









  Continuity and change: Land and water use reforms in rural Uzbekistan  
PETER WEHRHEIM, ANJA SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER, and CHRISTOPHER MARTIUS (editors 2008), Chapter 1, pp. 1-15. 
CHAPTER 1 
FARMERS, COTTON, WATER AND MODELS –  
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
PETER WEHRHEIM
 ∗ AND CHRISTOPHER MARTIUS
∗∗ 
1 RATIONALE FOR THE BOOK 
Uzbekistan became independent in 1991 and since then has been characterised 
by continuity and a process of change. The country inherited a multi-facetted 
legacy from the Soviet era which continues to determine decisions in politics, 
economics and in every day’s life of the local population. At the same time, the 
cultural identity of the Uzbek nation stems from the long history and cultural 
richness of Central Asia. The cities along the former Silk Road such as Khiva,  
Bukhara and Samarkand which flourished in ancient times continue to be witnesses  
of the cultural achievements of the past. Part of the advancement was the ability  
of the people to make use of the water from the Amu and Syr Darya by building 
and using a rather sophisticated irrigation and agricultural production system. 
Much earlier than in other regions of the world, the intelligent use of land and  
water enabled the local population to harvest decent yields and to nourish them-
selves. The resources extracted from irrigated agriculture seem to have been one 
factor explaining the cultural richness of this region.  
An important change of the system came with the advent of the Soviet era. The 
irrigation and agricultural production system which had been utilised to serve 
the needs of the local population for many centuries all of a sudden had to face a 
completely new demand. A popular quote often heard in the region and attributed 
to Stalin is the following: "Any drop of water flowing down the Syr and Amu 
Darya, that reaches the Aral Sea, is a drop of wasted water"; it is indicative for 
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the magnitude of the change associated with the Soviet regime. Due to economic 
and military expansion, the Former Soviet Union had an ever increasing demand 
for natural resources and Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular 
became the cotton chamber of this growing empire. The increasing demand for 
cotton between 1930 and 1990 by far exceeded what the region could sustainably 
produce. A second change came with the advancement of medical science in the 
second half of the 20
th century: A significant growth of the local population in-
creased the pressure on the natural resources land and water.  
While the Soviet regime is today history, the vast irrigation system which it put 
in place continues to exist and to determine much of today’s land and water use 
patterns in the land. This includes the physical part of the system, i.e. the irrigation 
channels, as well as the institutional arrangements decisive for agricultural produc-
tion: Cotton continues to be the most important agricultural crop and is subject 
to a restrictive policy regime.  
It is this combination of continuity and change which the new nation-state   
Uzbekistan was faced with after independence. Since then, many changes in land 
and water use in Uzbekistan have been put in place. However, it is often questioned 
whether these changes have been far-reaching enough to provide for a better living 
of the population that continues to grow at high rates. Instead many of the reforms 
related to land and water use seem to have been path-dependent: The policy-mix 
continues to favour high intensive agricultural production and the use of high 
amounts of water per land unit is standard practice. In fact, the dominance of con-
tinuity over change in the use of land and water use seems to be indicative for Uz-
bekistan’s transition process as a whole: Political and legal reforms were kept at a 
minimum and the profound changes to a market based system and a more demo- 
cratic political system which constituted the major elements of the transition process  
in other former socialist countries in eastern and central Europe as well as many of 
the republics of the Former Soviet Union were rather the exception than the rule.  
Against this background the Aral Sea basin has been declared an "ecological 
disaster area" by international development agencies. This disaster can be sum-
marised as follows (VLEK et al., 2001: 4): "The extreme specialisation of Uzbe-
kistan’s agricultural sector in cotton production associated with large scale flood 
irrigation of the arable land used for agricultural production and the arid climate 
of the country resulted in ever fewer water reaching the Aral Sea. The major source 
for irrigating the respective agricultural land has been water from the two major 
central Asian rivers, Amu and Syr Darya, which fe(e)d into the Aral Sea. Due to 
the inefficient use of water, high evaporation on the irrigated land, and the 
mono-cultural production pattern at least three major ecological disasters have 
been observable: First, salination of the agricultural land, substantial contamination 
of the agricultural land with pesticides, and a significant reduction of the water 
quantity arriving at the Aral Sea and henceforth a decline in the lake’s water level."  Farmers, cotton, water and models – Introduction and overview  3
In 2001 the Center for Development Research (ZEF) took the initiative to launch 
an interdisciplinary research project on this topic (VLEK et al., 2001: 4 ff.). Focu-
sing on causes of the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea rather than on its symptoms, 
the three departments of this research institute jointly developed an integrative re-
search approach together with partners in Uzbekistan and other research institu-
tions in Germany. Different disciplines started to combine their research efforts 
and their respective findings on possible alternatives of land and water use in the 
region. The research focused since the beginning of the project in 2001 on one case 
study region, namely the region Khorezm which is one major agricultural pro-
duction region in Uzbekistan located along the Amu Darya.  
The papers presented in this book are all based on research carried out in the first 
phase of this project which aims to be operational over a period of twelve years. 
The intention is to first analyse the underlying causes of the unsustainable use of 
natural resources, then look into the alternatives of resource use which may help to 
improve the standard of living of the local population and to reduce the ecological 
unsustainability. A third and essential element of the research strategy is to start 
early on with testing essential research findings by putting them into practice; e.g. 
by on-farm implemention of some of the new approaches to land and water use. 
Research on the intricate process of doing so is part of the concept.  
This collection of articles entirely builds on research conducted in the context of 
this research project. It is a "young book" because it presents the first results of the 
socio-economic research initiated under the umbrella of this multi-dimensional 
project. Furthermore, most researchers who contributed to this book are young 
in the sense that they obtained part of their formal University education in the 
course of this research project. In fact, most contributions are part of the formal 
academic work of Master or Ph.D. students who were involved in the project 
and or co-operations with their supervisors. It is important to note not only that 
many of the researchers involved in the project and in the studies presented here 
are from Uzbekistan, but also that each chapter of the book is truly grounded in 
field research. All authors have greatly benefited from having been welcomed by 
the officials and by the local population of the region Khorezm in North-western 
Uzbekistan in a very friendly and open-minded way. Another characteristic of the 
book is a rather wide variety of economic and social science approaches to look at 
certain aspects of land and water use in this region. Some of these methodological 
approaches are rather sophisticated and advanced; others are based on standard 
economic tools that are applied to the context of the Uzbek or Khorezmian agri-
cultural sector. Others again are rather descriptive and provide qualitative insight 
on specific aspects related to land and water use.  
Furthermore, another similarity of the chapters in the book is that they ask two 
different sets of questions: The first set of questions asked is rather positive in 
kind: What is the socio-economic situation that emerges from current land and Peter Wehrheim, Christopher Martius   4
water use patterns in Uzbekistan? This question related to the fact that in the first 
part of this research project the main aim was to get a better understanding of the 
actual patterns of land and water use and their socio-economic implications. 
The basic mission of that stage of the research project was "fact-finding". This 
objective was accomplished only due to the co-operation with many colleagues 
from the Uzbek academic system in general and with those from the local Univer-
sity of Urgench in the case study region of Khorezm in particular. The cooperation 
with these local partners and the possibility for many of the junior and senior  
researchers from abroad to stay longer in the region allowed extensive field surveys.  
These in fact played a crucial role because data often is not readily available. 
This is why data issues are frequently dealt with and why data mining in the form 
of field surveys and analyses of various sources of official data was an important 
task in the context of all chapters of the book. In fact, in many articles the issue 
of consistency of the data is dealt with explicitly.  
A second group of questions addressed in most of the articles is more normative. 
For instance, it is asked "What type of policies should be implemented to reach 
more optimal land and/or water use patterns?" This type of questions comes up 
whenever simulation models are being used which is the case in three chapters 
of the book (i.e. Chapters 3, 4 and 6). At the same time some of the articles are 
asking what objectives the local people and policy-makers had throughout the 
reform period.  
In the next section of the book we will provide an overview of the agricultural 
sector in Uzbekistan before presenting a brief synthesis of each paper in the 
third section.  
2 BACKGROUND: AGRICULTURE IN UZBEKISTAN AND THE 
KHOREZM REGION
1  
Uzbekistan covers an area of 447.4 thousand km
3, of which 4.2 million ha are 
irrigated arable land. With a population of 23.7 million in 1997 only 0.17 ha of 
arable land are available per capita (the same ratio as in China). The ever growing 
population rate in the Aral Sea Basin during the last century was strongly corre-
lated with the enormous increase of the irrigated area in this region.  
During the period of the Former Soviet Union, Uzbekistan’s primary agricul-
tural role was to produce cotton, fruits and vegetables largely for export to other 
Soviet republics. Agriculture continues to be the key sector of the Uzbek economy 
with a share in GDP of over 30 percent (IMF, 1994, 1998; WORLD BANK, 1993). 
As part of the Government’s policy to achieve national food sufficiency, the 
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wheat production was drastically increased during the past 6 years. Now, cotton 
and wheat account for about 70 percent of the area under cultivation. According 
to official data, approximately 3.5 million persons are employed in agriculture, 
equivalent to about 40 percent of the total work force.  
Cotton is the world’s most important natural fibre (MUNRO, 1994). In Uzbekistan, 
cotton, as an exported arable crop, has a high significance for the national 
budget. In 1970, 70 % of the irrigated land was used for cotton, but this declined 
to 56 % in 1990 (before independence), and has declined since then in favour of 
the increase in wheat production mentioned above. The annual cotton production 
today amounts to roughly 3.6 million t unprocessed cotton, which after ginning 
yields 1.15 million t raw fiber, of which 960.000 t are exported and 190.000 t are 
processed within Uzbekistan (estimates for 2007; Baumwollbörse 2007). With this, 
Uzbekistan remains the second largest cotton exporter globally, after the USA 
(which exports 3.69 million t).  
World market prices for cotton have continuously decreased over the past years and 
amounted to around US$ 1000 per t ex farm in 2003. Cotton trading in Uzbekistan 
is strictly state-controlled. Law allows other buyers to establish themselves, but 
in practice farms are selling their cotton to the state ginneries and are paid at fixed 
rates according to quality, which average at about one third the price for processed 
cotton. The price difference between the world market price and the price at farm-
gate which is often perceived as "unjust" in the literature can thus be attributed 
to the mass ratio of unprocessed to processed cotton which is approximately 1:3. 
MÜLLER (2006) and ongoing work by RUDENKO (2008, forthcoming) are demon- 
strating that Uzbekistan – maybe surprisingly so, given the often reported 
"exploration of the cotton farmer" – pays for the cotton production at least in 
some years and gets little surpluses.  
An important part of the agricultural production system in Central Asia consists 
of the irrigated lowlands in the Aral Sea Basin. The Aral Sea's largest tributaries 
are the rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya. The irrigated lowlands of the Amu Darya 
comprise the whole of the intensely irrigated agricultural lands between the 
Tuyamuyun reservoir and the Aral Sea, approximately 400 km of river including 
the adjacent, irrigated croplands. This region belongs to two countries and consists 
of three administrative areas. The province of Khorezm and the Autonomous 
Republic of Karakalpakstan are part of Uzbekistan and make up 265,000 and 
500,000 ha of irrigated area, respectively, while the district of Dashoguz (310,000 ha 
irrigated) belongs to Turkmenistan. In total this area corresponds to about 13 % 
of the total irrigated land (8 million ha) in the Aral Sea Basin. In total, 3.5 million 
people live in these lowlands, corresponding to roughly 10 % of the Aral Sea 
Basin population. These lowlands contrast to the upland irrigated regions such 
as the Ferghana Valley which have different biophysical as well as social-
economic settings, and also are much more intensively studied. Peter Wehrheim, Christopher Martius   6 
This book is therefore focusing on the Khorezm region, which serves as a case 
study for the irrigated lowlands. Of the 1.3 million people that live in Khorezm, 
about 70 % are rural and about 27.5 % live below the poverty line of 1 US$ per 
day; unemployment rates especially in rural areas are high (MÜLLER, 2006). 
Hidden unemployment in agriculture, i.e. a vast number of people employed in 
rather unproductive jobs, is a substantial problem. Hence, breaking the vicious link 
between increasing rural poverty and the misuse of the region's natural resources 
must be one of the main regional development objectives.  
With an average annual precipitation of only 92 mm (varying between 40 and 
160 mm/year), all agriculture in Khorezm needs irrigation. The summer is extre-
mely arid with an average precipitation of less than 5 mm. This translates into a 
highly unfavourable ratio of rainfall to potential evapo-transpiration (PET) 
which in the cropping season amounts to 750-775 mm (CONRAD, 2006) which 
again explains the high irrigation water consumption for the cultivation of cotton. 
Cotton has an annual water demand of 700-800 mm. Together with losses due to  
inefficient irrigation procedures (most commonly flood irrigation is applied because 
of which not every drop of water actually reaches the plant) and conveyance  
losses (high infiltration losses in the deteriorated and dysfunctional canals; 
SARYBAEV, 1991; TISCHBEIN, 2007) this amounts to the average irrigation water 
needs of 2000-2300 mm for cotton determined by MÜLLER (2006). Actual water 
needs for the region are still higher due to excessive leaching of soil salinity in 
the winter and prior to the cropping season. These figures which are more or less 
similar in other districts of the country and show the urgent need for an integrated 
water management program (MARTIUS et al., 2007). 
At present, cotton, wheat, rice, and fodder maize dominate the crop portfolio of 
the farmers in the region. This project has seen successful work on alternative 
crops, such as potatoes, sorghum (BEGDULLAEVA, 2005), indigo (a cash crop), 
and several native tree species (KHAMZINA, 2006; KHAMZINA et al., 2005; 2006; 
LAMERS et al., 2005) that are suited to the region and that could provide new  
sources of income while at the same time being more favorable for the environ-
ment. Rice plays an increasing role in the local system as cash crop (RUDENKO 
and LAMERS, 2006), but, due to its high demand for irrigation water does not 
have any ecological benefits. Nevertheless, the potential of aerobic (dry) rice is 
actually being explored in cooperation with the Uzbek Rice Research Institute.  
As opportunities for alternative crops are limited in the short run, the cropping 
systems of the present dominant crops must be improved for more rational resource 
use. Production methods such as Conservation Agriculture (CA) work very well 
for the Uzbek standard crops, cotton and wheat. They reduce water use, save 
costs by reducing the number of necessary plowings, and help control the soil 
salinity. If combined with mulching, CA conserves soil moisture and builds up soil 
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Furthermore, CA proves to be of great interest to farmers. Even without resorting 
to CA, the efficiency of the standard cropping systems (cotton-wheat rotation) 
can be improved (KIENZLER, 2008 forthcoming). Proper fertilization improves 
crop yields, and more importantly, also crop quality, which is important, given 
the low quality of Uzbek wheat at present.  
Macroeconomic analyses have furthermore shown that animal husbandry is rapidly 
gaining in importance and presently provides the second largest income source 
in the agricultural production of Khorezm (MÜLLER, 2006). However, to a large 
extent animal husbandry is carried out by the small-scale dehqon farms and the 
products are used either for consumption in the household or sold at local markets. 
In short, options for improvements are manifold. 
This book will show that careful analysis is the first step to finding solutions that 
work and are efficient. Two examples: The Soviet heritage and the extensive 
irrigation and drainage systems built up over decades of central planning created 
a strong "path dependency" of the agricultural production on central administrative 
systems. Due to the importance of agriculture, the Uzbek government maintains 
its strong control on agricultural production, and it is often said that this creates 
strong disincentives for development and more rational resource use; however, 
the picture is much more complex. The state order system, in which farmers have 
to meet production targets while receiving the inputs for free or at low costs, more 
likely represents a subsidization than a taxation of the farmer, and adhering to it is 
often a risk-minimizing strategy (MÜLLER, 2006; RUDENKO and LAMERS, 2005). 
As the farmers often are poorly capitalized and non-state markets are still under-
developed, the system functions as an effective credit system for important 
production resources (seeds, fertilizer, diesel, machines, water), guarantees stable 
input prices (although fuel prices have soared in late 2005), and ultimately works 
as a risk avoidance strategy. For instance, state organizations were instructed to 
cancel debts incurred by farmers during the droughts of 2000 and 2001. 
Likewise, it is often stated that Uzbekistan’s state budget depends largely on cotton 
revenues generated from the difference between state-order prices and world 
market prices. However, this role of cotton seems greatly overestimated if the state 
budget earnings from selling cotton on the world market are balanced against the 
maintenance and subsidy costs the government covers from the state budget, too 
(MÜLLER, 2006). Our data point to the fact that the state order policies seem to 
have different goals; I.e. they may be aiming in part at providing jobs for the 
rural population. These different and conflicting interests need to be taken into 
account when policy recommendations are designed. 
In the complex issue of land use in Uzbekistan, sound scientific analysis is needed 
at different levels of decision-making regarding land and water use. Recommen-
dations and interventions must be based on the sound analysis of policies, insti-
tutions, and technologies that have an impact on the use of land and water.  Peter Wehrheim, Christopher Martius   8
Introducing efficient land use or water-saving technologies depends on an "enabling 
policy environment" for which institutions are needed which help to "translate" 
and implement these policies. In turn, institutional change by itself would have 
little effect if no real options would be made available to the farmers which 
would help him to increase the efficiency, sustainability, and profitability of his 
business. Developing and testing innovations and successfully out-scaling these 
to a number of farmers or farmer groups will make policy-makers more open to set 
policies and develop institutions that facilitate change. The interplay of the inter-
ventions at the various levels can be modelled with modern computer tools which 
incorporate information about the long-term effects that different possible develop-
ment scenarios might have on developmental and environmental indicators. 
In this context, this book represents a first step, the beginning of sound economic 
analysis of the regional land use system and its economic underpinnings, as a basis 
for discussion and decision, for a world which makes better use of endable resources 
to the benefit of both nature and people.  
3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
Against this background the intention of this book is to describe change related to 
land and water use in Uzbekistan and more specifically in the region Khorezm. 
For this purpose, the studies presented describe the most important changes which 
already have been implemented in the agricultural production system in the first 
decade of the Uzbek transition process. Second, and based on their individual 
analyses, they analyze some "windows of opportunities" for enhancing economic 
and ecological sustainability of land and water use patterns.  
The book is structured as follows: This introductory section first provides this 
general introduction and an overview of the structure of the book and synthesis 
of all chapters (Chapter 1, WEHRHEIM and MARTIUS). Secondly, a synopsis of 
the most important features of legal reform related to the agricultural production 
is given in Chapter 2. SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER introduces the institutional aspects 
of the book from a lawyer’s and social scientist’s point of view by providing an 
overview of the organizational forms of agricultural production and the institu-
tional environment in which it functions. Pointing to the structuring effect of the 
legal settings, SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER presents a summary of legislative activity 
in Uzbekistan since independence. She continues with a synthetic overview of the 
legal basis for agricultural production in general, of the administrative environment 
and of the legal basis for the three major farm types that have emerged in the 
transition process: First, the agricultural cooperatives (shirkat), that were created 
as a transitory successor of former kolhozes and sovkhozes; second, the dehqon 
farms, which are the Uzbek version of the small, subsistence-oriented household 
plots that were and are the basis for many million of families in rural areas of the Farmers, cotton, water and models – Introduction and overview  9
countries that used to be part of the Former Soviet Union
2; third, the fermer enter-
prises, a new type of farm that has emerged during the past five years and that is 
established on the basis of long-term leases and that has a commercial orientation. 
Subsequently the author discusses some of the problems inherent in the present 
regulatory framework and highlights some of the challenges for future reform, 
among them resolving the ambiguity of the farmer enterprise between private 
farming and out-sourcing of state-run production and further developing the  
system of administrative justice to control administrative acts. In a final section 
SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER addresses the environment in which development coopera-
tion has to operate. She points out that the recent shift in attention towards the 
structure and the functioning of the governmental system and the distribution 
between competences is a step in the right direction. Continuing this process in 
close cooperation with the Uzbek government and the Uzbek research commu-
nity will also be a pre-requisite for a transition towards long-term sustainable 
land and water use patterns that can count on the support of the international 
community.  
Section 2 provides an overview of continuity and change in "Land Use Patterns". 
It discusses the effects of the land use reforms set into force since independence 
started and explains the associated steps of farm-level reforms. Thereby, this 
section focuses on the essential causes for the high water use: Land allocation 
determines water use and not vice versa. The two papers in this section are partially 
descriptive but both also provide some quantitative analysis.  
In Chapter 3 DJANIBEKOV presents a quantitative and economic model which 
will become a tool for analyzing the allocative effects of change related to land use. 
The model is firmly based in neo-classical theory but accounts for some of the 
rigidities inherent in the present agricultural policy regime, particularly in the 
cotton sector. The non-linear model is employing an optimization procedure based 
on which regional production decisions are determined. However, the optimisation 
mechanism is not driven by an omni-potent external power but within the model 
via a price-endogenous solution mechanism. Hence, prices determine where the 
highest rate of return for specific forms of land use may be obtained. The model 
rests on the assumption that the implicit actors of the model, i.e. farmers, are  
rational agents who are free to allocate land within the limits determined by the 
system. Hence, farmers are assumed to maximise profits. The most important 
rigidity which the model takes into account is the "state order system" for cotton. 
                                           
2  For instance, in Russia the so-called LPH household, small-scale and subsistence-oriented 
agricultural producers had and still have a major role to play in securing the living of many 
rural families. In the beginning of Russia’s transition process they were a buffer against the 
risk to fall into poverty but also constituted an important "labor sink" in rural areas. A vast 
literature on their role in the transition process of the former Soviet republics exits (e.g. 
LERMAN and SCHREINEMACHERS, 2005; WEHRHEIM, 2003; QAIM and VON BRAUN, 2000).  Peter Wehrheim, Christopher Martius   10
The state order implies that a pre-determined share of agricultural land has to be 
used for cotton production which is sold at pre-determined prices to parastatal 
agencies. The paper is also providing an outline of the most important features 
of the three major types of agricultural producers, i.e. dehqon
3, shirkats and private 
fermer, which have emerged over the past decade. The model incorporates these 
producers, the major production activities and has a regional breakdown to the 
district level (10 different sub-regions are represented in the model). The model  
focuses on the production side and remains stylized on the demand side. Never-
theless, the base-run solution, with which the model was calibrated, and some 
first simulations provide interesting insights into some causal relationships of 
the agricultural production system. For instance, the model comes up with esti-
mates of shadow prices for land and water which is very relevant for one of the 
most controversial internal policy debates in Uzbekistan: How and with which 
prices should the privatisation of land and water be implemented? Regarding 
water this raises further questions about the institutional design of such user fees: 
Should there be flat rats, or should they be crop-based and/or differ between 
districts etc. Finally, the results of some first and cautious simulations runs are 
presented. One simulation looks into the effects of introducing water user fees, a 
second one addresses the abolishment of the state procurement system for cotton 
and a third one looks into the effects of completing the farm restructuring process. 
The results of theses model simulations always have to be seen against the  
sometime restrictive features of the underlying model economy. Hence, they should 
be considered as complements but not substitutes of one's own mental arithmetics 
in assessing a vast range of policy instruments.  
This argument also holds for the analysis presented in chapter 4 by BOBOJONOV, 
RUDENKO and LAMERS, which is based on a simulation model as well. While the 
model developed by DJANIBEKOV focused on the entire region of Khorezm, the 
linear programming model presented in this chapter, optimizes farm level pro-
duction decisions. The model was initially developed for the so-called shirkats, 
joint-stock farms originating from former kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Although 
reforms in the very recent past favoured the establishment of private farms at the 
expense of these shirkats, the developed model can be used for similar analyses 
for instance for the private fermers once the necessary numerical data on this 
recently developed private farm type becomes available. In a first step the authors 
explain how they developed a stylized and representative data base for the model. 
In a second step alternative policy alternatives are simulated to assess their im-
pact on farm-level production decisions. The results indicate that the rigidities of 
the current policy-system, mirrored particularly in the state orders and fixed pro-
curement prices, are hindering more efficient forms of land and water use as 
well as income generation. The findings furthermore suggest that no reforms 
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will bring about the urgently needed increase in resource use efficiency when 
introduced as isolated, "sectoral" measures. 
Section 3 deals with the analysis of water use which is associated with the observed 
land use patterns. While the topic of all three papers is "water use", the chosen 
methodological approaches range from being purely economic analyses, to  
employing a inter-disciplinary economic-hydrological optimization model, to using 
New Institutional Economics for the analysis of an important organisational change 
for water use; i.e., the introduction of Water User Associations.  
The first article in Section 3 poses the lyrical question "Where has all the water 
gone?" The author of chapter 5, MÜLLER, starts out with providing an overview 
water balance for the region Khorezm covering the time period 1990 to 2001. 
The discharged water amount at the major up-stream water reservoir on the Amu 
Darya is compared with the extent of the harvested area for irrigated crops. This 
simple analysis already reveals the effects of policies that continue to be in place 
ever since established under the Soviet regime: The harvested rice area declined 
most strongly following the water shortages in 2000 and 2001 not only because 
of the high water demand of this crop but also because cotton and wheat produc-
tion continued to be determined over this entire period by state orders. The novelty 
of this chapter is to quantitatively assess the specific water input levels for the 
various crops produced of this region for the most recent time period for which 
sufficient data has been available (1998 to 2001). Such information has been 
missing to date due to the difficulties in measuring the specific water amounts 
allocated to individual fields. In view of the limited data points available for an 
econometric assessment of this issue the author employs a mixed estimation 
method. He combines readily available data on water use with prior information 
about the input parameters to be estimated. The results indicate that the actual  
crop-specific water use is systematically higher than the hydrological norm values 
determined by the local authorities. Indeed the results suggest that the up-ward 
deviation was highest for cotton while the largest consumer of irrigation water in 
the region during the observed period was rice. Furthermore, the results revealed 
substantial water losses due to sub-optimal management of water distribution 
and to losses of irrigation on the field. The paper concludes by identifying the 
irrigation issues with the highest potential to decrease the region's overall demand 
for irrigation water. While the paper confirms the view that changes related to 
cotton production would be most promising it is stated that enhancing the effi-
ciency of water use in cotton production may be already a very important first step 
in the right direction.  
In the second chapter in this section SCHIEDER and XIMING are presenting another 
method for the quantitative analysis of water use in the Khorezm region which is 
quite different from the one in the first chapter: In the previous chapter a combi-
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method was based on econometrics. In contrast, in this chapter, an optimization 
model composed of a set of non-linear equations which establishes a theoretically 
and empirically comprehensive and consistent description of a baseline situation 
of water use in the region of Khorezm for one year has been developed. Similarly 
to the previous chapter the model makes a distinction between the sub-regions 
(districts) and the crop-specific water use. Being an integrated or, one could 
even say, inter-disciplinary model it not only builds on economic theory but also 
incorporates various ecological relationships in a functional form. After having 
described the major "ingredients" of the model in terms of theory and data, some 
model runs are used to validate the model. A "ground water" simulation reveals 
the monthly groundwater values for all sub-regions of Khorezm over a complete 
year. The levels obtained on the basis of the model were compared with actually 
observed ones and turned out to be in a plausible range. Furthermore, results for 
economic indicators obtained from the model are reported, most importantly for 
shadow prices for water at the district level. While in the past irrigation water was 
basically a public good its supply is currently being changed such that it will be a 
private good: Water user fees are being introduced. In this context the estimates 
of shadow prices for water presented in this paper will be most valuable. Further-
more, a comparison of gross margins for individual crops in the various districts of 
Khorezm with and without water user fees is being made. And, the economic value 
of water is assessed for the various crops without water user fees being introduced. 
The results indicate that the economic returns for water use are comparatively high  
for rice and vegetables, reflecting the high prices producers may get for these  
products given current market conditions. Being work in progress, this is where the 
paper stops. Further simulations will be presented in the forthcoming thesis of 
SCHIEDER. Notwithstanding the chapter indicates how valuable the presented 
model will be for such consecutive analyses of various scenarios of change.  
The third chapter in this section by HIRSCH (al. ZAVGORODNYAYA) is dealing 
with an important institutional change in relation to water use: The most recent 
introduction of Water User Associations (WUA) as the organisational entity respon-
sible for future water allocation. The paper differs from the previous two in as far 
as it is more descriptive and not employing a quantitative model analysis. But it 
presents the results of intensive field-studies conducted by the author in different 
regions of Uzbekistan in an effort to collect first hand information about this 
important organisational innovation. The chapter explains the process of change 
which resulted in the introduction of WUA in Uzbekistan and then assesses their 
functioning on the basis of a standardized survey and semi-structured interviews 
conducted with eight such organisations in different regions of the country. The 
theoretical background for the drafting of the questionnaire is the theory of New 
Institutional Economics. The results indicate various interesting facts relevant for 
the further development of this organisational form and essential for the future 
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the efficiency of the WUA is severely hampered by lack of payments for water and 
often, an unclear mandate and weak rule of law both as regards the design and its 
enforcement. Another important finding was that international development as-
sistance has an important role to play in the setting-up of such organisations.  
Particularly investments into capacity building seem to have been most beneficial 
for the WUA. 
Section 4 deals with a wider set of issues: "Changes in agricultural technologies, 
markets, and policies". The section starts out with chapter 8 by WALL that deals 
with "Barriers to technological change and agrarian reform in Uzbekistan". The 
paper confirms the view stated in other papers of the book already: Farm decision 
making autonomy in Uzbekistan more than 15 years after the country gained 
independence is still severely restricted. However, it is argued further that these 
restrictions are not only binding on the output side but also pose a real constraint 
on the input side. Particularly, the transfer of new agricultural technologies – which 
could improve the economic efficiency as well as the ecological sustainability of 
land and water use – are severely affected. The author argues that the current 
trend towards strengthening the private fermers holds real potential for change 
but needs to be complemented with lifting the existing barriers to technology 
change in order to be exploited fully.  
Chapter 9 by BOBOJONOV and LAMERS complements the previous papers by 
looking at another essential element in the agricultural production system: It 
provides a descriptive overview of the market outlets accessible to the producers 
in the case study region. The chapter adds further indications of the magnitude 
of change that already has taken place since independence started. The authors 
explain that the rigid system of fixed market prices, which prevailed during the 
Soviet era for agricultural products, has been abandoned. Except for cotton and 
wheat, prices of other agricultural products are determined by production and 
demand, price movements in other regions, seasonality, and other factors which 
typically determine (free) market prices. Furthermore, a considerable number of 
market actors, outlets and marketing channels for agricultural commodities have  
emerged since independence. The findings of the commodity flow chain analyses 
showed that many agricultural commodities were primarily produced for own-
consumption and for local and regional sales. However, not only the cash crop 
cotton, but also rice, meat and fruits were exported to some extent to other regions 
of Uzbekistan and other countries underlining at least a certain comparative 
advantage of the Khorezm region for these produces. 
Hence, on the one hand the paper argues that indications for more liberal and 
free markets are gradually emerging: Prices are more responsive to market signals 
and the growing diversity in market outlets is likely to stimulate competition at 
the benefit of consumers. However, on the other hand, the paper also clearly states 
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market distortions. Particularly the national price setting for cotton and winter 
wheat prevent that buyers, sellers and consumers alike can realize the benefits 
from liberalised markets. Furthermore, the analysis confirms the view that market  
failures in Uzbekistan's agricultural marketing system are also the result of under-
developed formal and informal market institutions (e.g. missing price information 
systems).  
In the final chapter of the book MÜLLER asks one of the most classical questions 
of the agricultural economist’s profession: Is the agricultural sector taxed or dis-
criminated against? Most western observers have been of the opinion that the  
Government of Uzbekistan has effectively and substantially taxed domestic cotton 
production over the past decades and thereby withdrawn substantial revenues 
from the agricultural sector. This seems to be perfectly plausible against the 
background that the cotton policy in place more or less dates back to the Soviet 
era and to the associated system of exploiting the agricultural sector of the country.  
MÜLLER, however, argues that taxation of the cotton sector may in the past decade  
not have been as straightforward. Instead he shows that much depends on the 
exchange rate at which foreign exchange earnings from exports of cotton are 
being converted into domestic currency. His view is based on a theoretical partial 
welfare analysis and a quantitative sector analysis. The novelty of the analysis is 
to not only do this analysis for the production of raw cotton but to include also 
the processing of cotton in the analysis. The results are surprising in as far as it is 
shown that rent extraction from cotton production takes place only in some years. 
This raises the question whether the policy regime continues to be "rational"? Or, 
are other objectives than rent extraction being pursued such as shedding labour 
in rural areas in the agricultural sector. If the latter were the case, liberalising 
production decisions of farmers could be beneficial for all major actors involved: 
The government, producers and consumers.  
Summing up, the papers provide evidence that ever since independence Uzbekistan 
has initiated many important steps of change related to land and water use reforms. 
Farm-level reforms such as the restructuring towards private farmers while at the 
same time keeping the small-scale dehqon farmers alive seem to be rational reform 
elements. While the former may be able to increase the sector’s competitiveness 
and substantially enhance the efficiency of land and water use, the latter will 
continue to play a crucial role in buffering the negative effects of structural change 
on the rural labour force. The introduction of water fees and Water User Associations 
are examples of institutional and organisational change that point into the right 
direction because both instruments potentially may help reducing the wastage of 
water. Furthermore, the partial liberalisation of agricultural output markets in 
terms of outlets and price formation is an important and fundamental change: 
Instead of believing that an omnipotent hierachy of decision-makers is capable 
of developing a socially and environmentally optimal system of prices this task 
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However, the articles also point to the fact that many elements of continuity remain 
in place and continue to determine land and water use patterns in rural Uzbekistan. 
Legal reforms seem not to have been sufficiently consistent nor consequent. The 
restrictive system of state orders for cotton production but also the far-reaching 
interventions in wheat production are examples of rigid policies. In fact, the present 
cotton policy seems not to fully serve the objective of extracting rents from the 
agricultural sector. Market failures due to imperfect formal and informal institu-
tions are also frequent and seem to be the source of manifold distortions on the 
input and the output side.  
Hence, much remains to be done! The "windows of change" which the country has 
opened itself need to be pursued further. Support in capacity building, institution-
building and strengthening governance structures from international donors will be 
an essential ingredient in supporting the Uzbek government’s efforts to implement 
change. Finally, research on the topic needs to be continued and deepened in 
order to provide the needed knowledge about the right mix between elements of 
continuity and change.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ORGANIZING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION –  





Introducing the legal-institutional aspects of the book, this chapter provides an 
overview of the organizational forms of agricultural production and the institu-
tional environment in Uzbekistan. After a brief summary of recent legislative 
activities in Uzbekistan and the local administrative system, the chapter focuses 
on the three basic forms of agricultural enterprises: Shirkat, dehqon and fermer. 
In the second part, the chapter describes some of the problems inherent to the 
present regulatory framework and thus highlights some of the challenges for future 
legal reforms. The results suggest that regulations should become less ambiguous, 
i.e. are farming enterprises intended as private farms or as an out-sourcing of state-
run production? Does the hokim have executive or representational powers? In 
addition, an independent system of administrative justice needs to be developed 
in order to control the functioning of the regulatory framework. 
Keywords:  Uzbekistan, law and development, corporate law, local administraion. 
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ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ СЕЛЬСКОХОЗЯЙСТВЕННОГО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА – 






В данной главе книги отражаются правовые-институциональные аспекты, 
а также представлен обзор организационных форм сельскохозяйственного 
производства и институциональной среды в Узбекистане. После краткого 
обзора  правовой  деятельности  и  местной  административной  системы  в 
Узбекистане в течение последних лет, изучены три основные формы сельско-
хозяйственных предприятий (ширкат, дехкан и фермер). Во второй части  
данной главы описываются проблемы, свойственные регулирующей струк-
туре в настоящее время и рассматриваются некоторые вопросы, препятст-
вующие дальнейшим правовым реформам. Результаты исследоваия показы-
вают, что регулирование должно стать более определенным: Цель создания  
фермерских хозяйств – это организация частного хозяйства или привле-
чение внешних ресурсов для государственного производства? Имеет ли 
хоким  исполнительную  или  представительную  власть?  Для  эффективного 
регулирования  необходимо,  необходимо  развитие  независимой  системы 
административной юстиции для обеспечения контроля над функциониро-
ванием регулирующей структуры. 
Ключевые слова:  Узбекистан,  закон  и  развитие,  корпоративный  закон,  
местная администрация. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan has been facing challenges of 
transformation. For more than a decade, international donors (WORLD BANK, 
USAID, EU) have injected large amounts of hard currency into various develop-
ment projects. Nonetheless, the unfavorable outcome of attempts at reform has 
lead to increasing frustration among the international development community. 
While economists call for more market oriented resource management and priva-
tization, other social scientists blame vested interests (JONES LUONG, 2002: 10-27), 
non-transparent network structures and informal ties that dominate over formal 
structures in crisis or conflict situations (WEGERICH, 2004), or consolidated rent-
seeking patterns for failing reforms (RENGER and WOLFF, 2000). 
In development research, only recently has the impact of the regulatory frame-
work and administrative proceedings for achieving development goals received 
increasing attention, while in the debate on "good governance", institutional 
structures and arrangements, as well as interest groups and their conduct, have 
been recognized as decisive factors in transformation processes. However, only 
in the past few years has law "as an instrument in development" risen from the 
pitfalls of the "law and development" debate of the seventies and eighties to be-
come fully acknowledged by a more comprehensive understanding (SCHOELLER-
SCHLETTER, 2003: 277f.). In many countries in transition, a new constitution 
adopted after the fall of the former authoritarian system is now in place. However,  
frequently civil rights, the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and the 
separation of powers – at least nominally called for by most constitutions   
(cf. Constitution of Uzbekistan Art. 7, 11, 13, 15, 32-35) – are not concretized 
accordingly. Parliament might pass laws in accordance with the constitution, but 
acts of administrative bodies "specify", contradict and de facto overrule them in  
violation of constitutional norms. If in addition there is no independent, competent 
and accessible judiciary in which people can trust, governmental branches are 
not limited in the exertion of power and individual rights are not protected effec-
tively. Finally, if the individual cannot be sure that his rights are being pro-
tected, he will be reluctant to take individual responsibility, or make personal 
investment. It is not astonishing therefore, that an Uzbek farmer, to whom "privati-
zation" has entailed above all the "privatization of risk" (TREVISANI, 2007: 176), 
who does not have the certainty that he will work the same fields again in the 
future; who does not have the freedom to choose the crops and the buyer of his 
products; and who does not have a realistic chance to seek and find justice in 
court against administrative acts, will not invest in the soil quality of his fields, 
even if they are allotted to him for his own use. 
A discrepancy between law and reality is frequently stated as a general problem 
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good reason – to a great extent of political, economical or cultural nature, be it 
informal networks, kinship ties and longstanding patterns of behavior that are 
blamed for impeding the system from working (GEISS, 2002; PASHKUN, 2003: 31). 
Meanwhile, the corresponding regulatory structure on all levels, including norms 
and acts of administrative bodies from presidential decrees down to administrative 
acts on the level of the implementing authorities, is hardly looked at as crucial in 
its nature of structuring reality and its function of "translating" overarching prin-
ciples into everyday administrative decisions. Looking at the regulatory system in 
its structuring and "translating" nature may help to shed light on fundamental diffi-
culties inherent in the institutional environment of agricultural production and the  
different forms of agricultural production itself (cf. SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER, 2005). 
The following introduction pursues two aims. First, it intends to give an over-
view of the legal system regulating agricultural production in Uzbekistan today. 
A better understanding of the present regulatory framework is deemed necessary 
for understanding the structure of the agricultural sector of Uzbekistan and thus 
as a reference for the other chapters in this book. Secondly, this chapter summa-
rizes some of the problems inherent in the present regulatory framework and thus 
highlights some of the challenges future reforms will have to face. 
In doing so, the chapter intends to contribute to a theme central to many of the 
other contributions published in this volume – the effect of the central government 
on the social structure and economy of Uzbekistan. In contrast to the chapters by 
WALL (Chapter 8) and HIRSCH (Chapter 7), who describe the effect of political and 
social structures on the use of natural resources and the economy in sociological 
terms, and the contributions by DJANIBEKOV (Chapter 3), BOBOJONOV, LAMERS, 
and RUDENKO (Chapter 4), and MÜLLER (Chapter 10), who describe the effect of 
the state on the agricultural sector in economic terms, the following chapter focuses  
on laws and regulations as the primary means by which the influence of the  
government on social structures and the economy is effected. Directly or indirectly, 
this influence by the central government is responsible for how agriculture makes 
use of natural resources and is thus at the root of the ecological problems  
Uzbekistan faces today, as described by the chapters of MÜLLER (Chapter 5) and 
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2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION 
2.1  Legislative activity in Uzbekistan since independence 
Since Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, its legal system has been subject 
to frequent changes.
1 An enormous amount of legislation and presidential decrees 
have been passed, with phases of stagnation in the face of daunting economic and 
social problems. With the general aim of liberalizing former state owned sectors, 
the new legislation has redefined the legal status of agricultural producers, govern-
mental bodies, supplying and purchasing entities, as well as the relationship 
between them. Market-oriented laws passed by Parliament coincided with resolu-
tions of the ministerial cabinet and presidential decrees regarding the economy.
2  
In various aspects, however, legal reform in Uzbekistan has remained a patch-
work process (cf. SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER, 2005). Although a great amount of 
legislation has been passed since independence, in numerous areas the existing 
Soviet law has remained in force more or less unchanged. Frequently, the legis-
lature has opted for minor amendments or laws changing only specific aspects of  
the existing legal system. For example, Uzbekistan did not adopt the 1991 
Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Republics – like 
Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation did – but instead, the Civil Code of 1963 
was partially replaced and augmented by additional laws on ownership, entrepre-
neurship, enterprises, foreign economic activity, lease, pledge, insurance, trade 
marks and service marks, foreign investment, bankruptcy, the protection of 
electronic computer and database programs, inventions, useful models and   
industrial design, joint-stock societies etc. (cf. BUTLER, 1999: XII). Only step-
by-step have new codes been passed covering complete fields of law, including 
a Criminal Code and a Code of Criminal Procedure (1994), a Civil Code and a 
Code of Civil Procedure (1995-97), a Labour Code (1995), a Tax Code and a 
Customs Code (1997). 
During the transformation process, the focus of legal reform has been on privati-
zation and deregulation of the economy, the establishing of national symbols and 
attributes of an independent state, and the reform of the judicial system. Among 
the other fields in which new legislation has been introduced, the amount of 
                                           
1  A set of compilations of Uzbek laws exists in English, among them most notable those 
with regard to the foundations of market economy by William E. Butler (BUTLER, 1996a, 
1996b, 1998, 1999). Uzbek laws in German are hardly available (except: SCHOELLER-
SCHLETTER, 2005). Although some studies (SAIDOV, 1998; BANTEKAS, 2005) on the legal 
system of Uzbekistan exist, very few of them are related to questions of transformation 
(exceptions: ABA/CEELI, 2002; CAMPELL, AFIA, and AZIZOV et al., 2003).
 
2  An overview of the legislative development is offered by CAMPBELL, AFIA, and AZIZOV et al. 
(2003). A list of the laws passed up to 1999 is contained in (BUTLER, 1999: 933-68). Anja Schoeller-Schletter  22
laws devoted to the protection of the environment is noteworthy and reflects the 
grave problems Uzbekistan faces in this regard.
3 
Changes to the regulation of the economy were enacted well before Uzbekistan 
became an independent state, already as a part of perestroika. In contrast to 
reforms of other sectors of the economy, changes in the agricultural sector were 
delayed for a considerable amount of time, partly because of the importance of 
cotton for export revenue of the state budget. (CAMPBELL et al., 2003: 49) While 
laws regulating the use of land and water were passed early on
4, serious changes 
to the organizational structure of farms began only in 1998, with the Land Code, 
the Law on the Agricultural Cooperative (Shirkat), the Law on the Fermer Enter-
prises, and the Law on Dehqon Enterprises.  
Subsequent to Uzbekistan having become an independent state, a considerable 
amount of legislation has been devoted to national symbols and, still fairly fre-
quently, to changes in denominations of governmental bodies or positions. Since 
the official declaration of independence on August 31, 1991, a new constitution 
was promulgated on December 8, 1992 and laws were subsequently passed 
regulating each of the new organs (for the most part between 1993 and 1995). 
Some changes to the state system have been introduced consecutively – among 
them the transformation of the legislative branch from a Supreme Soviet (1991) to 
an Oliy Majlis (1993), which later was turned into a body with two chambers (2004). 
A direct result of the independence process has also been laws nationalizing the 
anthem, flag, alphabet, state holidays, medals and honors granted by the state, 
the military oath, among other areas. 
Another major field of legal reform has been the judiciary system of Uzbekistan. 
Following the enactment of the constitution, laws have been passed regulating 
the Procuracy (1992), the Courts (1993), the Qualification of Judges (1993), the 
Notary (1996), the Advocacy (1996) and the Ombudsman (1997), as well as 
laws on appeals by citizens (1994 and 1995). Regardless of these new norms and 
regulations, even president Islam Karimov had "to admit frankly that despite un-
doubted achievements, the judiciary system itself is still feeling the legacy of the 
Soviet past" (Address on 29 August 2001, cited by CAMPBELL et al., 2003: 1). 
                                           
3  Chief among them are the laws on the Protection of Nature (1992), on Specially Protected 
Nature Territories (1993), on the Protection of the Atmosphere (1996), on the Protection 
and Use of the Flora (1997) and on the Protection and Use of the Fauna (1997). 
4  Law on Land (1990), Law on Land Tax (1993), Law on Water and Water Use (1993), Law 
on Veterinary Science (1993), Law on Subsoil (1994), Law on Breeding Livestock (1995), 
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2.2  Institutional setting on the local level 
2.2.1 Levels of government  
The Republic of Uzbekistan is divided into fifteen regions – three of which constitute 
the autonomous republic of Karalpakstan – and the city of Tashkent, which has 
the status of a region. Each region (Uzbek viloyat, Russian oblast) is divided 
into several districts (rayon). Aside from Karalpakstan, which has its own govern-
ment, governmental bodies generally exist at three levels, the level of the central 
government in Tashkent, the regional level and the district level. While all major 
policy decisions are taken at the level of the central government, the main purpose 
of the lower levels is to implement the policy decisions of the next higher level. 
Only in certain areas are competences delegated to lower levels of government, 
such as the establishment of local taxes and the execution of a local budget 
(Constitution, Art. 100). 
2.2.2 Institutions and competences 
Local government both on the regional and the district level combines represen-
tative and executive functions (Law on State Power on Local Level). The main 
body representing the people of a region or district is the kengash of People’s 
Deputies, formerly called the Soviet of People’s Deputies. The deputies of the 
kengash are elected every 5 years (Law on the Election of the Kengash). The 
executive body of government at the regional or district level is the hokimiyat, 
comprising a number of different agencies and departments. The highest official 
of a region or district is a hokim, who is the head of both bodies of government 
at the same time – the kengash and the hokimiyat. The hokim therefore combines 
representative and executive powers, making a clear distinction difficult. The 
hokim of a region is appointed by the president and confirmed by the kengash of 
the region for 5 years. The hokim of a district is appointed by the hokim of the 
region and confirmed by the kengash of the district. 
Most decision making power on the regional and district level rests with the 
hokim. He ensures public law and order, fosters the economic, social and cultural 
development of the region or district, proposes the local budget and development 
plan, implements the budget, administers the assets and services of the region or 
district and is responsible for the protection of the environment. On the other 
hand the hokim is responsible for the execution of all decisions taken by higher  
levels of government; he is held personally responsible for all decisions and actions 
of the agencies directed by him (Constitution, Art. 103). The hokim of a region 
may be removed from office by the President, the hokim of a district, or by the 
hokim of the region. In contrast to the hokim, the kengash, or Assembly of 
People’s Deputies, has few competences. The kengash confirms the appointment  Anja Schoeller-Schletter  24 
of the hokim and the local budget and development plan proposed by the hokim. 
The only exclusive competence of the kengash is to determine the local taxes. 
In essence, the hokim, the hokimiyat and the kengash of a region or district are 
organs responsible for the implementation of decisions by the central govern-
ment (Law on Agencies of Self-Government). In order to introduce an element 
of self-government, additional bodies of local government have been created. 
These new bodies of self-government exist on a level below the district level. In  
each settlement, village (kishlak or aul) and city neighborhood (mahalla), meetings 
of all citizens are held. The main function of these meetings is the organization  
of the social life of the settlement, village or neighborhood, including, for example,  
the celebration of weddings, the improvement of sanitary conditions and the 
collection of money for the improvement of public spaces. The assemblies of 
citizens elect a chairperson every 2.5 years, called an oqsoqol, who represents 
the interests of the settlements, village or neighborhood against government 
agencies (Law on Election of Oqsoqol). Bodies of self government do not  
influence the decision making process of higher levels of government. At times,  
bodies of self government have been used as an instrument to implement decisions 
of higher levels of government. Not by chance, the election of an oqsoqol must 
be approved by the hokim of the district. 
2.2.3 Governmental control of land use 
The role of the different levels of government in land allocation and land use 
corresponds to their role in other areas (Art. 4-6, Law on Land). All major policy  
decisions are taken by the central government. The function of local government – 
the hokims of regions and districts – is primarily the implementation of these 
policies. The basis for all acts of government in land allocation and agricultural 
production is the "State Policy on the Rational Use and Protection of Land", 
passed by the central government. The Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for 
implementing this policy by passing regulatory acts on land, developing state 
programs for increasing the fertility, use and protection of land and reorganizing 
land allocation. The hokims of regions and districts implement the guidelines of 
the Cabinet of Ministers through the development of local programs, supervising 
the correct and effective use of the land, monitoring the reorganization of land, 
allocating land to citizens and legal persons and confiscating land where necessary. 
The "representative organs" of local government – the kengash and the Assembly 
of Citizens – have no direct influence over the administration of land and agri-
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2.3  Organizational forms of agricultural production  
In the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan, three organizational forms of production 
are common: The agricultural cooperatives (shirkats), the agricultural produc-
tion business entities in form of fermer enterprises and the farmer households or 
so-called dehqon enterprises. They are the basic, but no longer the exclusive 
business entities in the sector. 
2.3.1 The agricultural cooperative (shirkat) 
The agricultural cooperative (shirkat) is a business entity in the organizational 
form of a cooperative in the agricultural sector. It is a special form of business 
cooperative. The form of business cooperative is distinguished by the fact, that 
the personal labor participation of each member is required. In contrast to other 
business units, each member of a cooperative possesses one vote regardless of 
the amount of their corporate share or the amount of labor contribution. Business 
cooperatives, based on membership, had been popular during the first years of 
transition, but are now increasingly rare types of legal persons. 
The shirkat is a production cooperative. It is a voluntary association of citizens 
under the principle of membership for the purposes of joint agricultural production, 
based on the labor participation of the members, defined by an annual contract 
with the head of a family, i.e., the "family contract". Its regulatory basis is Law 
No  600-I of 30 April 1998 "On Agricultural Cooperatives (Shirkat)", with 
amendments of 30 August 2003 (No 535-II) and 12 December 2003 (No 568-II), 
in the following abbreviated as "Law on Shirkats". Apart from producing agri-
cultural goods, the agricultural cooperative may also process agricultural raw 
material, produce foodstuffs and consumer goods, pursue trading activities, 
maintenance and construction works and offer services. This can be done inside 
or outside the territory of the agricultural cooperative within the limits stipulated 
by the law (Art. 4, Law on Shirkats).  
The agricultural cooperative also has its role within infrastructural development 
of rural settlements. It is supposed to undertake measures to develop the social 
infrastructure, health, living comfort and social environment. These also include 
building measures, measures to expand the provision of electricity, gas and 
drinking water on the territory of the shirkat, support of health care measures, 
and local enterprise and market support (Art. 27, Law on Shirkats). 
Constitutional documents 
The constitutional document of an agricultural production cooperative is its 
charter that serves as the basic document regulating the cooperative activities. 
The founders who want to establish a shirkat have to agree on a charter and  
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meeting of members (Art 6, Law on Shirkats). After official registration at the 
hokimiyat of the district, the shirkat is presumed to be established and holds the 
rights of a legal person, controls its accounts and balances independently, and 
holds its own bank accounts (Art. 5, Law on Shirkats). 
In the charter, the following has to be stipulated:  
•  The name of the shirkat and its location; 
•  The activity of the shirkat and its purpose; 
•  The procedure for joining the cooperative as well as the procedure for ter-
minating membership; 
•  The composition of the founders and the number of members of the shirkat; 
•  The rights and duties of its members; 
•  The internal administrative organs including their organization, competences 
and procedures, size and procedure for establishing the funds, the forms of 
labor contribution and the remuneration of the members for it, the procedure 
for distributing the income (profits) of the shirkat, among them the procedure 
for distributing the dividends according to the share held, and the procedure 
for reorganization or liquidation of the shirkat (Art. 6, Law on Shirkats). 
Members 
The law does not mention a minimum of members required to establish a 
shirkat. Any natural person over the age of sixteen may become a member of the 
agricultural cooperative. Legal persons may become "collective members" on a 
contractual basis. The candidate who wants to join has to hand in a request for  
membership. The decision of the board on accepting a member has to be confirmed 
by the vote at a general assembly by existing members and in the presence of the 
candidate (Art. 7, Law on Shirkats). 
Management  
The highest management body of the shirkat is the general meeting of members. 
The general assembly of members elects the chairman, the board, and the audit 
commission and transfers to each of them their competences with regard to the 
ongoing administration of the agricultural cooperative (Art. 10, Law on Shirkats).  
The general meeting has exclusive powers over certain substantial issues, including: 
Approval of the shirkat’s charter and amendments of the charter according to the 
applicable rules; appointment and dismissal of the chairman; election of the board 
and the audit commission and consideration of their reports; acceptance, expulsion 
and retirement of members; adoption of by-laws, such as the internal business 
regulations of the shirkat and the remuneration of labor; approval of business 
plans and progress reports; evaluation of the contribution of each member and  Organizing agricultural production – Law and legal forms in transition  27
distribution of the respective amount of shares to each member of the shirkat; the 
resolution for the distribution of profits and the utilization of the cooperative’s 
funds; proposals for the distribution of land to citizens for agricultural use in the 
form of fermer and dehqon enterprises, which will then serve as reference for 
the decision to be taken by the district hokim; reorganization and liquidation of 
the shirkat and its acquiring or terminating membership of other associations, 
companies, agricultural enterprises and other associations. Other exclusive com-
petences of the general meeting of the members may be set forth in the charter 
(Art. 11, Law on Shirkats). The general meeting will be convened once a year 
after the closing of accounts for the fiscal year/annual statement of the financial 
accounts. It may convene an extraordinary meeting by decision of the board or 
on the initiative of at least one third of the overall number of members of the 
shirkat. 
All members of the shirkat have equal rights with regard to deliberations in the 
meetings. Each member has one vote, which applies also for the "collective 
members" (see above: b. Members), regardless of the amount of their corporate 
share (Art. 3 and 11, Law on Shirkats). Every person that is being employed by 
the shirkat by terms of a labor contract participates in the general meeting and 
has the right of an advisory voice, but no vote. 
The board of the agricultural cooperative has preparatory and executive functions 
and the number of board members is determined by the charter. The board may 
elect from within a chairperson and a secretary of the board, according to the 
procedures set out in the charter. The board develops business plans for the coope-
rative’s activity and presents them to the general meeting for confirmation. It 
also proposes to the general meeting resolutions regarding the attribution of land 
for the agricultural use as fermer and dehqon enterprises. The board also makes  
the contracts with the head of the families (family contracts) and land leasing  
contracts with the heads of the dehqon enterprises. 
The audit commission is responsible for the inspection of the financial and busi-
ness activity of the cooperative. Apart from the in-house audit commission, the 
general meeting of members can retain an independent auditor (Art. 13, Law on 
Shirkats). 
Attribution of land and conditions for use 
With regard to the agricultural cooperative, two main types of attribution of land 
may be distinguished: The attribution of land by the state to the agricultural coope-
rative and the distribution of this land inside the cooperative among its members. 
To the agricultural cooperative, land from public property classified for agricul-
tural purposes is attributed for lease to a maximum of 50 years time, but no less 
than 30 years. The attributed land has to be used in accordance with the indicated 
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Agricultural cooperatives that use their land appropriately and efficiently may 
lease or be attributed additional territory. On the other hand, territory given to  
the cooperative may be seized "in accordance with the provisions in force, taking 
into consideration the existing guarantees" (Art 14, Law on Shirkats). 
The cooperative may proceed with the land it has been attributed as follows: 
Territory of the cooperative that is not being used may be sub-leased to or given 
for preliminary use to other natural or legal persons for up to three years. Territory 
may also be given to workers in the agricultural cooperative for the use of 
dehqon or farmer household enterprises (Art. 14, Law on Shirkats). 
The agricultural cooperative, after resolution by the general meeting, attributes 
territories to families for a limited time, but no less than five years, for the pur-
pose of agricultural production according to the terms of a contract with the family; 
this territory may not be sub-let (Art. 15, Law on Shirkats). Once the period has  
elapsed the family has a right of prolongation of the contract for a newly set period 
of time. 
Production (Family contract) 
The production of an agricultural cooperative may be described as "planned 
economy by contract". Production is based on a system of annual contractual 
obligations between the agricultural cooperative and the heads of families with 
regard to producing agricultural goods. The family takes over the obligation to 
produce a certain amount and quality of a product and to deliver it on time to the 
agricultural cooperative, who is, on the other hand, obliged to purchase at a price 
fixed in advance (Art. 21, Law on Shirkats). Apart from fixing size, situation 
and present condition of the territory, the contract stipulates what measures each 
side is obliged to undertake in order to raise the quality of the soil and the pro-
ductivity of the plants. It also specifies the provision of water for irrigation and 
the supply of technical and material resources by the cooperative. The contract 
also includes clauses specifying the responsibility of each side in the case of breach 
of contractual obligations. 
After the work is accomplished – usually to be carried out independently by the 
family community – the payment is made according to the product, as stipulated 
by the contract. The payment may be reduced by the value of remaining material 
or technical resources that are not handed back to the cooperative after the work 
has been completed, and remains with the family community. Those family 
members with corporate shares also receive remuneration for work in the form 
of a dividend that is fixed annually according to the profit made by the agricul-
tural cooperative (Art. 21, Law on Shirkats) and dependent on the share held 
(Art. 3, Law on Shirkats). This payment is separate from remuneration for the 
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Liability 
The agricultural cooperative is liable for its aggregate property and overall assets. 
It is not liable for obligations of its members. The members of an agricultural 
cooperative do not bear liability with their assets for obligations of the coopera-
tive. Their liability is limited to the extent of their contribution.  
Termination of membership  
Stated as a basic principle of the shirkat (Art. 3, Law on Shirkats) is the guaranteed 
possibility to end the membership in the shirkat at any time. What procedure to 
follow is to be stated by the charter (Art. 6, Law on Shirkats). Membership may 
be terminated voluntarily, when participation in work ends, or under circumstances 
as stipulated in the charter (Art. 9, Law on Shirkats). 
2.3.2 The DEHQON farm 
The dehqon farm is the smallest business entity for agricultural production and 
is based on the principle of self-sufficiency of a family household on a plot of 
land owned for life. Its regulatory basis is Law No 604-I of 30 April 1998 "On 
Dehqon Enterprises", amended on 15 December 2000 (No 175-II), 12 May 2001 
(No 220-II), 12 December 2003 (No 568-II), 3 December 2004 and 23 May 2005 
(SRU-2), in the following abbreviated as "Law on Dehqons". 
Foundation 
The dehqon farm is a family enterprise that may be founded as a legal entity 
(Art. 1, Law on Dehqons). The plot of land for the enterprise is granted to the 
head of the family for life and may be bequeathed by him to his descendants, 
including the assets of the farm. The land is exclusively cultivated by the members 
of the family household and external workers may not be employed. 
In order to establish a dehqon farm, the enterprise must be registered and land 
must be granted. Any member of a shirkat, of another agricultural enterprise, 
institution or organization, as well as any teacher, medical doctor or specialist 
employed in a rural area for at least 3 years is entitled to apply for a dehqon farm. 
The application is examined by the administration of the shirkat or the employer. 
The final decision regarding land allocation rests with the hokim (Art. 5, Law on 
Dehqons). The farm is finally registered with the hokimiyat and the farmer receives 
a document giving him ownership rights over the land (Art. 6, Law on Dehqons). 
The land granted to a dehqon farm may be used for cultivation and construction 
of a home for the family of the farmer. The agricultural products may be used 
both for private consumption and for sale (Art. 7, Law on Dehqons). Dehqon farms 
may not be larger than 0,35 ha on irrigated land, 0,5 ha on non-irrigated land or 
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Activity 
Regarding agricultural production, the farmer has complete freedom, including 
in the choice of crops and in fixing prices. Like in other fermer enterprises, he is 
not allowed to leave land fallow and must respect laws on the protection of the 
environment (Art. 12, Law on Dehqons). He may lease extra land from a shirkat 
(Art. 8, Law on Dehqons) and mortgage his property. The size of the land cannot 
be changed without the consent of the farmer (Art. 9, Law on Dehqons). The 
dehqon farm may join cooperatives, unions and associations (Art. 22, Law on 
Dehqons). The economic results of the farm must be registered (Art. 26, Law on 
Dehqons). The dehqon farmer is liable with his total private assets (Art. 30, Law 
on Dehqons). 
Liquidation 
The dehqon is liquidated upon the death of the owner if there is no heir; upon 
application by the owner; if the owner systematically does not pay his taxes, or 
if he does not begin cultivating his plot within a year of allocation (Art. 27, Law 
on Dehqons). Confiscation is permissible, but only if a land of the same quality 
is offered in exchange (Art. 9, Law on Dehqons). The dehqon is liquidated by 
decision of the members of the dehqon farm or by a court decision (Art. 28, Law 
on Dehqons). 
2.3.3 FERMER enterprise 
A fermer enterprise is a business entity for agricultural production on leased land 
and is headed by the founder. Its regulatory basis is Law No 602-I of 30 April 1998 
"On Fermer Enterprises", with amendments resulting in the revised version of 
26 August 2004, in the following abbreviated as "Law on Farms".  
Foundation (Participants, constitutive documents) 
In order to found a fermer enterprise the founding farmer must be at least 18 years 
old and have a corresponding agricultural qualification or experience (Art. 4, 
Law on Farms). The founding entails on the one hand the registration with local 
authorities and on the other hand the signing of a leasing contract. Responsible 
for both procedures is the hokim. 
In order to register a fermer enterprise, the farm must have a charter, indicating 
the name of the founder, the location of the land, the purpose of the farm and the 
amount of the charter fund. A standard charter has been adopted by the Cabinet 
of Ministers (Art. 9, Law on Farms). With respect to the purpose of farms, the 
law mentions three types of farms: Animal stock farming/production; cultivation 
of cotton or grain; cultivation of fruits, wine or vegetables and others. Farms for 
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livestock (0.45 ha in Karalpakstan and 2 ha in areas without irrigation). Farms 
for cultivating cotton or grain must be at least 10 ha large, for other crops 1 ha 
(Art. 5, Law on Farms). With regard to the charter fund the law does not mention a 
financial minimum. The farmer should endow the farm with "corresponding funds" 
(Art. 6 and 18, Law on Farms). In practice, however, the amount a farmer is able 
to invest is decisive in whether he receives land for founding a farm or not 
(TREVISIANI, 2007:185 f.) 
Land allocated for the establishment of fermer enterprises is leased to farmers 
for up to 50 years but no less than 30 (Art. 11, Law on Farms). The plots are put up 
for tender by the commission for granting land or, in the case of land previously 
held by a shirkat or other enterprise to be liquidated, the special commission for 
the restructuring of shirkats. Members of shirkats may found fermer enterprises 
on shirkat land on the basis of a tender by the general assembly of the shirkat, 
thus the preliminary decision being taken within the shirkat. In every case the 
final decision rests with the hokim, who also makes the leasing contract with the 
farmer. The foundation of a farm becomes legally effective upon approval by the 
commission for granting land, which is actually chaired by the hokim himself. 
For the plot allocated to him, the farmer pays a lease that is equivalent to the 
property tax (Art. 14, Law on Farms). The leasing contract specifies not only the 
location and quality of the land, but also the type of agricultural production to be 
pursued on the land and the minimum output to be produced. Land may not be 
left fallow. The amount fixed as obligatory minimum output is determined by 
the quality of the land as established in the cadastral plan of the territory. For 
meeting the requirement it is considered sufficient that the average production of 
three years surpasses the amount fixed in the contract (Art. 5, Law on Farms). 
Production and liability 
The land leased to a fermer enterprise may not be sold, exchanged, donated, 
pledged or privatized. The farmer may bequeath the farming to his children and 
extend the leasing contract. He is not allowed to sublease the land, however. In 
his decisions regarding land use and production, the farmer is bound by the charter 
and the leasing contract of the fermer enterprise. Both the charter and the leasing 
contract limit the farmer to a specific type of production. The leasing contract 
furthermore specifies the minimum output to be produced on the land. The 
verification of the compliance of the farmer with the terms of the contract may 
be cause for an examination of the farm (Art. 30, Law on Farms). 
In contrast to the agricultural cooperative (shirkat), where members only bear 
liability with what has been contributed to the cooperative, in a farm enterprise, the 
head of the farm is liable for insuring there are sufficient funds. (Art. 35, Law on 
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Liquidation  
A fermer enterprise is liquidated upon the death of the farmer if there is no heir 
who wants to continue; upon the voluntary renouncement of the right to lease a 
plot of land; and in case of insolvency of the owner or if he does not begin culti-
vating his plot within a year of allocation.  
Table 2-1:  Comparison of different organizational forms of agricultural 
production 
Type  Shirkat  Member of 
shirkat 
Dehqon  
enterprise  Fermer enterprise 









More than 10 ha  
(Pastures: More than  
 9-60 ha) 
2003: Average 13 ha 




Lease for  
30-50 years, or 
assigned 
More than 5 
years, by contract 
with head of 
shirkat 
Ownership for life, 
by application to 
shirkat, approved 
by hokim 
By tender, lease for 




Possible for 3 
years 
Not allowed  Not allowed  Not allowed 
Crop 
choice 
Free  Fixed by contract 
with shirkat 
every year 
Free  Fixed by leasing  
contract, violation 
grounds for liquidation 
of farm 
Liability  Total assets of 
shirkat, state 
for accidents 






No  Allocation of land  Foundation and leasing 
contract, control of 
contract every 3 years 
 
The leasing contract may be terminated and the plot of land confiscated if the 
land is needed for public use. The misappropriate use of the land, including the 
cultivation of crops not mentioned in the contract of lease, is considered a major 
breach of contract, which may entail the confiscation of the land and liquidation 
of the farm (Art. 32, Law on Farms). The farm is liquidated by decision of the 
head of the fermer enterprise or by a court decision (Art. 33, Law on Farms). Organizing agricultural production – Law and legal forms in transition  33
3 CHALLENGES FOR REFORM 
Experience in Uzbekistan has shown that the ancient structures and mechanisms 
in executive power and administration, a legacy of Soviet times, have not been 
modernized as much as expected under the influence of economic reforms.  
Among researchers and donors alike, the reform of state organs and administration 
has been viewed as secondary to the liberalization of prices, privatization and the 
development of entrepreneurship. The restructuring of the governmental system 
has not been perceived as a serious task, partly because state reform simply 
appeared too overwhelming; furthermore, too many expectations have been attached 
to the success of economic reforms, which were expected to lead to democratic 
transformations in legislative, executive and judicial bodies (SIMEK et al., 2003: 9). 
Only recently has a slight shift in focus towards the structure and functioning of 
the governmental system occurred; the distribution of competencies within its 
institutions and procedures may be noticed. While on the political level in bilateral 
cooperation activities an understandable and often necessary reluctance and reserve 
persists in order not to interfere in the other country’s internal affairs
5, interna-
tional donors for development cooperation are slowly trying to consider some 
sensitive structural problems by starting off with cooperation projects in areas 
where the problem manifests itself in the least politically controversial manner. 
As part of these attempts the OSCE, having already set up a legal clinic for jour-
nalists, is also trying to launch a program on training and assistance to restruc-
ture police forces
6. The latter is an important element of executive power and is 
regarded as not effectively law enforcing and remains notoriously unreformed 
since the Soviet period – not only in Uzbekistan but in Central Asia in general 
(INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 2002). Responding to the rising demand for 
more encompassing structural change, such as supervision over law enforcement 
agencies and a more independent judicial system (INTERNATIONAL  CRISIS 
GROUP, 2002: 3), international donors are now trying in some areas to make 
what seems a first feasible step by trying to establish respect for individuals’ 
rights and consciousness of the limits of power. On similar grounds, the EU is 
consolidating plans for cooperation in reforming the judicial system and institu-
tions in Uzbekistan, starting with the defenders and the pre-detention, probation 
                                           
5  This is the position identified in interviews conducted by the author with representatives 
from several German federal ministries and agencies (Ministry of the Interior, Agency for 
Criminal Investigation, Border Guard, Ministry of Justice, Ministry for Development and 
Cooperation) in January and February 2005, on German-Uzbek cooperation. 
6  OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, information by an OSCE 
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and penitentiary system, but also aiming at procuracy, advocacy, administrative 
commissions and courts.
7 
Not surprisingly, and in part as a consequence of the focus of development co-
operation’s set of priorities, research within the international community that 
analyzes problems, reform needs and reform potential of governmental structures is  
rather rare so far.
8 This is – naturally – linked to the fact that such structural  
reforms have to be backed by a respective political will of the countries’ govern-
ments.
9 
The following section intends to give a brief summary of some of the major 
problems persisting in the regulatory framework described in the previous section. 
The emphasis will be on problems relevant to agricultural production and thus to 
the aim of the present publication. This overview is not exhaustive and is meant 
to stimulate further research in this much neglected field. 
3.1  Improving legislative quality 
In spite of wide-ranging legislative activity, major problems persist or have been 
created in the legal system of Uzbekistan. In a survey of recent legislation, 
CAMPBELL et al. (2003: 50) summarize that, "as in other post-Soviet countries, 
the adoption of statutory legislation was not sufficient in establishing the rule of 
law, as the ruling authorities had a tradition of statutory (legal) nihilism." It has 
furthermore become apparent that many problems stem from deficiencies in the 
drafting of the law itself. Among the chief deficits, those that may be called 
"technical" in contrast to deficiencies by substance, are the following: 
•  In certain areas, many laws and regulations have been introduced, creating 
textual collision and conflict of norms. For example, two separate laws 
regulate foreign investment; contracts are regulated both by the Civil 
Code and by the Law on Contractual and Legal Basis of Activity Carried 
out by Economic Establishments; 
                                           
7  TACIS, Central Asia Indicative Programme 2005-2006 (adopted by the European Com-
mission on 20 August 2004). 
8  The rare existing political-institutional, and partly sociological analyses are either dealing 
with regional and local level institutions (e.g., BEKTEMIROV and RAHIMOV, 2000), not seldom 
resulting as an auxiliary by-product of development research projects dealing with resource 
use, or economic restructuring (e.g., WEHRHEIM and WIESMANN, 2003), or specifically with the 
assessment of the national administration (e.g., PASHKUN, 2003; PERLMAN and GLEASON, 2004). 
9  The political situation is also the main reason why in countries of Eastern Europe the literature 
on law and state reform in transformation processes is much more extensive than in Uzbeki-
stan (e.g., BOULANGER, 2002). It is not by chance that studies on Eastern Europe have been 
the main source for the theoretical aspects of the current "law and development" debate. Organizing agricultural production – Law and legal forms in transition  35
•  Within the drafting of laws, uniform terminology is lacking. Identical words 
and phrases are used with different meaning. For example, "resident" is 
defined differently for the purpose of exchange and taxation controls; 
•  Legislation for the implementation of norms is frequently lacking, for example 
in the case of the Law on Evaluating Activity; 
•  The government has tried to pass executive regulations as laws, thus 
transgressing the hierarchy of normative acts and violating the limits to the 
executive power provided by the constitution. Even though the Constitution  
expressly subordinates the regulation of customs, exchange and banking 
issues to Parliament, for example, the Cabinet of Ministers has frequently 
adopted important regulations on banking issues, such as No. 24 of 
15 January 1999 on measures for further reforming the banking system 
(CAMPBELL et al., 2003: 51); 
•  Laws regulating public administrative bodies often do not differentiate 
between functions, tasks and authorities. Formulations like "other functions 
determined by legislation" leave plenty of room for interpretation. The lack 
of clarity and the vagueness of functions of the Cabinet of Ministers allow 
almost all issues to be referred to it (ERGASHEV, 2003: 5-7). 
3.2  Elaborating administrative law and justice 
Aside from the aforementioned challenges to Uzbek legislative activity, the 
regulation of agricultural production exhibits some insufficiencies that are to the 
detriment of Uzbek agriculture. Some of these stem from shortfalls in adminis-
trative law and justice and in the way local institutions are regulated. 
A weak point is the lack of consistent mixing of old and new forms of organization. 
The new laws on farming enterprises combine elements of privatization – such 
as the individual responsibility of enterprise owners – with elements of state 
control, including decisions about the kind and amount of crops produced. The 
laws on local institutions dilute executive power delegated by the central govern-
ment with elements of local self-government.  
With regard to executive power bodies, the fact that there do not exist any general 
criteria differentiating the various types of state administration bodies (such as 
"ministry", "state committee" and "committee", "agency", "republican commission", 
etc.), leads to the difficulty that typology, legal status and operational mandate 
remain unclear. Not always is the status of these bodies legally grounded, and on 
some occasions their formation violates administrative norms related to competence. 
The merging of administrative functions, coordination tasks, and provision of 
administrative services with control functions at a time still is an impediment 
that needs improvement as the unnatural combination of powers can potentially 
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civil servant (KHVAN, 2005: 66-69). While the law has established incompati-
bilities for civil servants between different activities and functions, administrative 
legislation provides us with examples where state officials hold two different 
positions at the same time. In particular, the situation is not legally correct where 
regional and district hokims, as heads of the executive body in their territory, are 
also in charge of representative branch authorities or head of a Republican NGO 
(KHVAN, 2005: 77). 
Attempts at government reform might also want to turn to the provisions by 
which specific rights may be pursued to render the court more effective. In several 
instances, the laws specifically mention the involvement of courts. Actions of 
the hokim, including decisions of hokims on land allocation, may be appealed in 
court (Art. 28, Law on Local Institutions; Art. 11, Law on Farms). The liquida-
tion of farming enterprises without the consent of the owners are allowed only 
by court decisions (Art. 33, Law on Farms). Decisions of electoral committees 
for the election of the Kengash (Art. 18, Law on Election of Kengash) and elec-
tions of the Oqsoqol (Art. 25, Law on Elections of Oqsoqol) may be contested in 
court. The possibility to take recourse in court only makes sense, however, if a 
judiciary exists which is independent of influence from the executive power, so 
to say influence of those officials whose actions are to be controlled. Where an 
executive body applies measures of administrative coercion that significantly 
restrict personal rights and freedoms, there must exist a mechanism that effec-
tively serves as legal defense against such actions. An independent judiciary and  
specifically an independent system of administrative justice still need to be 
established in Uzbekistan (KHVAN, 2005: 58; 85). 
3.3  Improving consistency in legal forms of agricultural production 
In the first years after independence, the shirkat – the successor of the Soviet 
kolkhoz and sovkhoz – was the basic organizational unit of Uzbek agriculture, 
but has since then been replaced by the fermer enterprise. The presidential decree 
of March 2003 postulated a policy of restructuring former shirkats as private 
fermer enterprises. By the end of 2006, 98 % of all shirkats were intended to 
become fermer enterprises (cf. chapter 4 by BOBOJONOV, RUDENKO, and LAMERS). 
The policy was formulated in terms of a privatization of Uzbek agriculture. 
A comparison of the laws regulating shirkats on the one hand and fermer enter-
prises on the other reveals a very different legal situation (cf. chapter 8 by WALL). 
The transition towards fermer enterprises de jure did not entail greater economic  
freedoms for the individual farmer, and in some respects less freedom than before.  
In respect to crop choice, for example, neither form of organization allows the 
farmer much influence as power of decision continues to reside mostly in the 
central state. The freedom of the individual was actually reduced compared with 
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crop applied only to one year, while the leasing contracts of fermer enterprises 
bind the farmer to a specific kind and amount of product for 30 to 50 years. The 
reduction of economic freedoms of the fermer enterprise in comparison with the 
shirkat is also exemplified in the right to sub-lease land: The shirkat was allowed 
to sub-lease land not needed, fermer enterprises are not. 
A further consequence of the transformation of shirkats into fermer enterprises 
is a shift of powers from the shirkat leadership to the local government, specifi-
cally the hokim
10. While in the shirkat agricultural producers made their contracts 
with the board of the shirkat, in fermer enterprises the leasing contracts are made 
with the hokim. Even more importantly, the allocation of land is now administered 
by the hokim, a supervisory committee putting land out to tender with only an 
advisory function. Furthermore, the stipulation that fermer enterprises may "only"  
be reviewed in regard to their compliance with leasing agreements actually implies 
that such examinations are an important instrument of the hokim in controlling  
fermer enterprises. The non-compliance with the leasing contracts – especially the  
terms regarding crop choice and production quotas – are grounds for the confisca-
tion of land and the liquidation of farms. Examinations regarding leasing contracts  
are envisaged for every third year. The shift of power from the shirkat to the 
hokim strengthens his role in implementing policies of the central state, and thereby  
the pressure of the central government on the hokim. 
While the substitution of the shirkat by farming enterprises does increase the 
economic freedoms of the farmer, the risks taken by farmers are increased. 
While the shirkat was liable only up to the amount of the total assets of the 
shirkat, the owner of a fermer enterprise is now liable to pay with his private 
assets as well, in case the funds of the fermer enterprise are not sufficient to 
meet his obligations. In this context, from a sociological perspective, TREVISANI 
(2007: 176) has noted this constitutes a significant "privatisation of risks". 
4 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVES 
The restructuring of the agricultural sector of Uzbekistan has been accompanied 
by fundamental reforms in the legal framework regulating agricultural production. 
Among other changes, new forms of agricultural enterprises have been created: 
The shirkat, the dehqon and the fermer enterprises. In order to understand how 
the agricultural production in Uzbekistan has been developing since 1991, a clear 
understanding of these reforms, their intentions and their implications is essential. 
Without doubt, any changes that will be effected in the future will be effected to 
                                           
10  In the area of water allocation, the relationship between members of the shirkat and its leader-
ship has found continuity in relationship between farmer enterprises and the chairmen of  
Water User Associations (WUA). See chapter by HIRSCH (below). Anja Schoeller-Schletter  38 
a large extent by means of laws: Laws on the rights of farmers, laws on the role 
of the state on agricultural production, as well as laws on the environment. 
The brief analysis of the present regulatory framework presented in this intro-
ductory chapter suggests two main objectives for future reform. First, regulations 
should become less ambiguous. For instance, are fermer enterprises intended as 
private farms which are free to decide what and how to produce or are they 
intended as subcontractors carrying out state orders? Does the hokim have execu-
tive or representational powers? Second, an efficient administrative justice should 
be developed and the judiciary in general must be made more independent and 
able to control the functioning of the executive branch and the regulatory frame-
work. Addressing these and other related problems in the regulatory framework 
would represent an essential step in the creation of a more sustainable agricultural 
production in Uzbekistan. 
Reforming the organization of agricultural production will improve only one aspect 
of the problems currently facing Uzbekistan and one of the factors determining 
the future of the Aral Sea basin. Just as importantly, changes will be necessary in 
the way agriculture makes use of natural resources, in the role the Uzbek govern-
ment takes in the economy, and in the social and political structures of Uzbekistan. 
Such changes will imply the development of alternatives to agriculture and the 
reconsideration of the amount of control exerted by the central government on 
society. How to understand and deal with these further aspects is the subject of 
the following chapters. 
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 Continuity and change: Land and water use reforms in rural Uzbekistan  
PETER WEHRHEIM, ANJA SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER, and CHRISTOPHER MARTIUS (editors 2008), Chapter 3, pp. 43-62. 
CHAPTER 3 
A MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS OF LAND AND WATER USE REFORMS IN 






The focus of this paper is an economic and model-based analysis of the effects 
of agricultural reforms such as commodity market liberalization, land and water 
use reforms on the agricultural sector of the Khorezm region (Uzbekistan). The 
impact analysis of these reforms on the regional crop and livestock production is 
carried out with a price-endogenous mathematical programming model developed 
for the agricultural sector of this region. The general results of various simulated 
scenarios are presented on the basis of a comparative static analysis vis-à-vis the 
base year values of 2003. The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it presents 
the major features of the agricultural sector model of this region which is typical 
for Uzbekistan. Secondly, it discusses the results of the selected simulations. 
Among other results, the model reveals the values for shadow prices for land 
and water in the baseline situation. 
Keywords:  Uzbekistan, agricultural sector model, state procurement system,  
water pricing, farm restructuring. 
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МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЕ И АНАЛИЗ РЕФОРМ ЗЕМЛЕ И 
ВОДОПОЛЬЗОВАНИЯ В ХОРЕЗМЕ: ВЛИЯНИЕ РЕФОРМ НА 





Основное  внимание  статьи  уделено  моделированию  и  экономическому 
анализу  воздействия  сельскохозяйственных  реформ  на  аграрный  сектор 
Хорезмской области Узбекистана. Список рассмотренных реформ включает 
в себя либерализацию рынка товаров и реорганизацию земле- и водополь-
зования, Для анализа воздействия данных реформ на региональное произ-
воство продукции растение- и животноводства была разработана модель 
математического программирования с эндогенными ценами. Главные ре-
зультаты  смоделированных  сценариев  представлены  в  виде  сравнитель-
ного статитеческого анализа с показателями за базисный 2003 год. Статья 
преследует две цели. Во-первых, в ней представлены главные особенности 
моделирования аграрного сектора Хорезмской области, которые могут быть 
применены и в отношении Узбекистана. Во-вторых, в статье проводится  
обсуждение результатов смоделированных сценариев. Среди прочих резуль-
татов, модель позволяет подсчитать показатели теневых цен на землю и 
воду при условиях за базисный год. 
Ключевые слова:  Узбекистан, модель аграрного сектора, система госу-
дарственных  закупок,  ценообразование  на  воду,  
реструктуризация сельскохозяйственных предприяти. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
After 1991, a set of economic reforms was implemented in the agricultural sector 
of Uzbekistan affecting all agricultural production activities, the produced quan-
tities and the commodity prices. This paper addresses a set of agricultural re-
forms such as farm restructuring, land reform, national self-sufficiency for wheat, 
developments in state procurement policy and agricultural subsidization which 
changed the agricultural sector of Uzbekistan since 1991. These changes are as 
sociated with the transition from plan to market which is, however, far from being 
complete. Hence, the continuation of the reforms in the agricultural sector is likely 
not to resemble anything for which historical examples exist in the country. The 
reforms addressed in this study include the continuation of the farm restructuring 
process, the introduction of water charges and the abolishment of the state pro-
curement system for cotton. 
The current farm restructuring process, namely transformation of large scale 
state farms into middle scale private farms has increased the number of individual  
producers in Uzbekistan. After the intensification of the farm restructuring process, 
the fragmentation of large state enterprises into private farms became the most  
tangible element of agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan. The final objective of this  
reform is to entirely transfer land and non-land production assets from so-called 
shirkats to private farms. Like any policy change, the substitution of large scale 
production technologies by medium scale ones will affect the level of production 
activities and thereby commodity prices. In 2003 the agricultural production in the 
Khorezm region was represented by three main types of agricultural producers. 
Each producer type was characterized by a specific set of resource endowments, 
land use rights, production activities and policies. 
The agricultural cooperatives (shirkats) which are the successors of former state 
and collective farms during the farm restructuring process were given land for 
permanent possession. Shirkats were included into the system of state procure-
ment quota and input subsidies. In general, shirkats have inherited the rights, 
obligations, input endowments, production targets and rural employment tasks 
of collective farms. As a result of the shirkat fragmentation in private farms, the 
average size of a shirkat in the Khorezm region decreased from 1,850 hectares in 
1999 to 1,445 hectares in 2003. At the end of the first stage of farm restructuring 
process in 1998, shirkats cultivated 82 % of total sown area in the Khorezm region 
(OBLSTAT, 2004). In 2003, due to the increasing speed of farm restructuring, 
shirkats’ sown area decreased to 50 % of total regional sown area. Nevertheless, 
in 2003 shirkats were still dominating in regional cotton and wheat production 
according to official statistics (OBLSTAT, 2004). 
The second important type of farms is, according to the legislation in Uzbekistan, 
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of families via implementing agricultural activities on land received under a 
long-term lease with a maximum of fifty years. The number of private farms in 
the Khorezm region increased significantly during the second stage of the farm 
restructuring process. This increase was largely due to the state program of abolish-
ment of shirkats rather than improved infrastructure for private entrepreneurship 
in the agricultural sector. In 2003 there were 6,500 private farms in the Khorezm 
region occupying a total area of 85,000 hectares. The average size of a private farm 
in 2003 was around 13 hectares. In relation to the shirkats, these private farms 
are considered to be middle-scale producers.  
In 2003, private farms cultivated 29 % of the total sown area in the Khorezm 
region. In the first year of the farm restructuring process, the private farming in 
the Khorezm region had a more commercial orientation. The area sown with rice 
in private farms amounted to one third of the total sown area of private farms, 
while the shares of cotton and wheat were only 25 % and 10 % of private farm 
land, respectively (OBLSTAT, 2004). Because the number and area of private farms 
grew at the expense of shirkats, private farms have substituted the shirkats’ share 
in cotton and wheat production for state procurement.  
The third type of agricultural producers in Uzbekistan is rural household producers 
(dehqon farm) which base their agricultural production on own labour and small 
household plots received on lifetime inheritable possession rights. The individual 
household, which averages about 6-7 persons in the Khorezm region, can be 
considered as the smallest agricultural entity. The dehqon farms are not included 
into the state procurement system. There were almost 200,000 dehqon farms in the 
Khorezm region in 2003 possessing in total 33,000 hectares of land (OBLSTAT, 
2004). According to the legislation, within the irrigated areas the plot size of a 
dehqon farm can be up to 0.35 hectare. However, the average size of a dehqon 
farm in Khorezm is 0.17 hectare. The total area occupied by dehqon farms has 
been increasing simultaneously with the increase in the rural population in the 
region. In 2003, dehqon farms cultivated 17 % of the total arable area in the 
Khorezm region (OBLSTAT, 2004). 
The reforms aimed at the transition to a market economy and achieving the grain 
self-sufficiency changed the cropping pattern in Khorezm considerably. Four 
major observations regarding the regional cropping pattern can be made for 
1993-2003. First, the area of winter wheat increased significantly. Second, the 
area cultivated with cotton has remained unchanged (OBLSTAT, 2004). Hence, 
the increase in wheat area was achieved at the expense of perennial fodder crop 
production, and in particular lucerne. Fourth, except for the drought period in 
2000 and 2001, the total regional crop area has been increasing steadily. These 
four points will be discussed below. In 2003, 80  % of the crop area in the 
Khorezm region was cultivated for cotton, wheat and rice. The production of 
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significant as they covered only 18 % of total crop area (OBLSTAT, 2004). Animal  
production in Khorezm has been negatively affected by decreasing area of fodder  
production and lack of pastures. Nevertheless, the animal production has remained 
less sensitive to natural conditions, such as droughts in 2000 and 2001, compared 
to crop production. 
Further reforms in the agricultural sector are related to shifts in the system of 
producer incentives via full abolishment of the state procurement system and the 
introduction of water fees in agriculture. 
The management of water is currently transferred entirely to newly established, 
non-governmental organizations which deliver water and maintain and operate 
the irrigation and drainage system (see HIRSCH, Chapter 7 in this volume). At 
the same time, the role of the government in maintaining and operating the irri-
gation and drainage networks in Uzbekistan has been revised. Most importantly, 
the transfer of water management to newly established water user associations 
(WUAs) has been linked to the introduction of water fees. The charging of agri-
cultural producers for water use is expected to affect the agricultural production 
levels towards lower levels of water consumption and possibly even result in the 
adoption of water saving irrigation technologies. 
Concerning the abolishment of the state procurement system, it is believed that it 
will raise incentives for cotton production and lead to more profitable production 
patterns in Uzbekistan. It has been argued by many authors that the implicit 
taxation of the agricultural sector, via the state procurement system, deprived the 
agricultural producers in Uzbekistan of their profits (ROSENBERG et al., 1999; 
GUADAGNI et al., 2005; KHAN, 2005; SPOOR, 1999). However, MÜLLER (2007, 
Chapter 10 in this volume) shows that the taxation of agriculture was not always  
so straight forward, but was significantly influenced by exchange rate alterations, 
and the scenario of full abolishment of the state procurement system may create 
incentives to increase cotton production and lead to more profitable production 
pattern. 
These agricultural reforms may create different questions on their reliability and 
effects on production pattern for different types of agricultural producers and 
districts in the Khorezm region. While the new policies may have a positive impact 
on total agricultural output, the magnitude of their impact is unclear. Furthermore, 
it is unclear how these different policies will affect the regional production of 
specific agricultural commodities. Hence, the issue can be reduced to two main 
questions: How will certain policy reforms affect the income of different types 
of agricultural producers; and what will be the effects of such policy changes on 
regional production? The task, as mentioned above, is to develop a quantitative 
model which will help to assess the direction and approximate magnitude of 
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The policy analysis for the agricultural sector of the Khorezm region is complex 
due to the fact that the regional agriculture includes on the one hand many com-
modities linked through various input-output relationships and, on the other hand, 
several types of agricultural producers and many districts with different resource 
endowments. To allow a well substantiated analysis of reforms, the model has 
to take these specific settings of the agricultural sector of Khorezm into account. 
This analysis can be done using the mathematical programming models which 
are constructed in order to obtain better understanding of the functioning of the 
regional agriculture and to provide a tool for policy analysis. A well defined and 
documented model may provide valuable information to be used in evaluating 
policy effects. 
2 THE KHORASM MODEL 
To evaluate the impact of selected agricultural policies on the regional produc-
tion pattern, a price-endogenous model for agriculture of the Khorezm region 
(KhoRASM) has been developed following closely the guidelines for non-linear 
agricultural sector models as presented by HAZELL and NORTON (1986). 
KhoRASM is a comparative static model assuming that the adaptation of the 
agricultural sector on the intervention is simultaneous with no time lag. In the 
base run solution, the model replicates agricultural production technologies and  
economic conditions in the Khorezm region in 2003. KhoRASM model is a regional 
and partial equilibrium model as it is describes different states of equilibrium at 
endogenous prices and quantities only for the different sub-regional agricultural 
producers. It is not explicitly linked with other regions and other sectors of the 
economy of Uzbekistan.  
The production side of the model includes eight cropping and three animal pro-
ducing activities specified for three producer aggregates in five production   
districts. In the model, the producer aggregates are defined according to the 
legislation of Uzbekistan on the typology of agricultural producers.
1 Therefore, 
for each agricultural production activity the model consists of three different 
sub-models representing the main farm aggregates of the Khorezm region such as 
rural households (dehqon farms), private farms, and large agricultural enterprises 
(shirkats).
2 Following an approach used by WEHRHEIM and WOBST (2004) for 
                                           
1  The legislation on agricultural producers in Uzbekistan has distinguished three main agri-
cultural producers such as large-scale agricultural cooperatives (shirkats), middle-scale 
private farms and rural households (dehqon farms). 
2  The aggregate for shirkats also includes a small number of all other types of large-scale 
agricultural enterprises, such as the remaining collective farms (kolkhozes) and state enter-
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Russia, agricultural producers were differentiated by input-output relationships 
that are characteristic for their specific institutional set-up. This disaggregation 
of the agricultural sector by commodities and types of producers is innovative as 
it allows analysing the aggregated farm-level effects of changes in land and water 
use patterns.  
In order to more explicitly analyze the effects of different exogenous changes on 
the production structure in different areas, the studied region is separated into 
five district aggregates according to their distance from the Amu Darya river. 
There are three different treatments of the demand for outputs of the various 
activities. The first group includes the production of cotton, which is purchased 
by the government at state-determined prices. The second group includes food 
crops with endogenous prices, determined by balancing implicit supply curves 
and explicit linear demand curves. The third group consists of fodder crops, which 
are sold at fixed prices but the demand of which is endogenously determined in 
the relation to the volume of animal production activities. 
For the sake of simplicity and because of data scarcity, the commodity prices 
and balances are defined in a single regional commodity market rather than at a 
district level. Furthermore, it should be noted that this version of the model is 
still a rather stylized representation of the agricultural markets in the Khorezm 
region and is still "work in progress". For instance, no cross-price and income 
effects are yet incorporated in the objective function of the model. Moreover, the 
model does not incorporate the market imperfections, marketing, processing, 
transportation, exporting, importing, or home consumption activities. The struc-
tural framework of the model is presented in Figure 3-1.  
The objective function of the quadratic programming model transforms price-
dependent product-demand schedules into a measure of consumer surplus, plus the 
producer surplus, or maximizing net social benefit (TAKAYAMA and JUDGE, 1971). 
( )
1
max Z =   αβ QQ +w Q p a + c X j j j j j j rfij rfij rfij rfj 2 jj r f i j
⎛⎞ −− ∑ ∑ ∑∑∑∑ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
      (1), 
where: 
The observed values of exogenous constraints and parameters are as follows: 
j α
  Intercept of the regional inverse demand function for food crops; 
j β
  Slope of the regional inverse demand function for food crops; 
arfij Input application per unit of activity, i.e. technology coefficients; 
yrfj  Product yield per unit of activity; Nodir Djanibekov  50 
prfij Exogenous prices of inputs; 
crfij Exogenous constant costs of production; 
wj  Exogenous prices for cotton and fodder crops; 
brfi  Input endowments on farm, district and regional levels; 
srfj  State target area of cotton cultivation. 
rfi λ
  Shadow prices of the input constraints; 
rfj μ
 Shadow prices of the policy instrument constraints; 
j π
  Shadow price of the commodity balances. 
 
The indices are: j, crop and animal products; i, input and production resources;  
f, agricultural producer aggregates; and r, district aggregates. 
Figure 3-1:  Structure of KhoRASM Model 
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Notes: SK  =  Shirkats. PF = Private farms. HH = Dehqon farms. ISK, IPF, IHH = Inputs 
endowments related to producer type. DIST = Producing district. DISTI = Inputs 
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The constraints are imposed due to limited supplies of resources, food consumption 
needs and state policy instruments. In the model, the constraints are classified 
into three groups: 
1. Resource constraints, which refer to the seasonal availability of land, labor,  
water, combine harvesters, nitrogen fertilizers, diesel and vehicles for transport. 
In the model the production technologies are initially specified in fixed propor-
tions of land, labor, nitrogen fertilizer, diesel fuel and combine harvesters and 
vary between farm aggregates: 
 aX     b rfij rfj rfi
j
≤ ∑
       
λrfi
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦       (2) 
2. Commodity balances which are defined as the quantity demanded for each 
commodity is equal to the quantity supplied. In the KhoRASM model, there is 
one single regional market for agricultural products, which means that produc-
tion in every agricultural producer aggregate in the different districts is balanced 
with the regional commodity demand at single set of commodity prices: 
 yX  Q  0 rfj rfj j
rf
−≥ ∑∑
     
π j
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦        (3) 
3. In the model, the policies are determined exogenously and they are static and 
deterministic. Since, the annual land allocation targets for cotton are determined 
centrally, the main state policy implied in the model is the state production 
target for cotton. The state policy instrument constraint of the model requires 
that activity levels for cotton production in shirkat and private farm aggregates 
are not less than the assigned area in 2003: 
X    s rfj rfj ≥
         rfj μ ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦        (4) 
4. Non-negativity constraints for activities: 
X  , Q  0 rfj j≥
                ( 5 )  
where: 
Xrfj Crop growing (in hectares) and animal keeping activities (in heads); 
Qj  Regional production of crop and animal products (in tons), and eggs (in units). 
3 DATABASE 
The database is compiled from values for 2003 and consists of several categories 
such as social and political conditions of the region, regional prices, production 
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resource endowments. Due to the large data requirements for a sectoral model, 
the data base for KhoRASM was constructed in two parts.  
The first part is based on field surveys. Much of the needed data was not available 
from secondary sources and had to be collected by means of farm and household 
surveys. For instance, there is an official record on large state-owned agricultural 
enterprises available in official statistical reports, but the data on households and 
newly emerging private farms is poorly available in the Khorezm region. There 
fore, private farm surveys and household surveys were conducted separately 
covering most production districts. The second part is based on desk research for 
the aggregated values such as regional production levels, input endowments and  
regional input and output prices. The aggregated data was obtained from the litera-
ture and from official statistical sources. The data compilation process and the 
specific sources for the data are described in more detail in DJANIBEKOV (2007, 
forthcoming).  
4 BASE-RUN SOLUTION 
The model was calibrated by modifying the technology parameters of input 
matrices to reproduce in its base run solution the actual observed situation for 
the agricultural activities represented in the model for the Khorezm region in 2003. 
The KhoRASM model was programmed in the GAMS modelling software which 
is adequate to solve non-linear problems using an optimization solver CONOPT3. 
The calibrated KhoRASM’s baseline solution exactly reflects the production 
situation in the Khorezm region in the base year of 2003 where the values of 
prices and production activities for each commodity in various farm types and 
district aggregates are equal to their observed levels.  
In addition to the comparison of production changes, a valuable feature of the 
model is that it allows comparing the shadow prices of input constraints with 
their actual prices. In fact, this can be used as an indicator for the plausibility of 
such optimization models (HAZELL and NORTON, 1986). If the calculated level of 
shadow prices is in a plausible range, this can be considered to be an indication 
of the consistency of the model. Moreover, the shadow prices of input constraints  
and on policy induced constraints provide information which may provide valuable  
information for decision-makers. The shadow prices of KhoRASM model refer 
to the factor utilization, and to the producer and consumer surpluses. Although the 
shadow prices are obtained for all binding production factors, the most interesting 
values refer to three basic production factors such as land, labor and water and 
the state procurement constraint. 
The value of shadow prices for water obtained from the base-run solution of 
KhoRASM are in the range between 9 USD per 1000 m
3 and 58 USD per 1000˙m
3 
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validation of the values of shadow prices for irrigation water is problematic for 
the Khorezm region, since the water charging mechanism is not introduced in 
agriculture of Uzbekistan yet. Nevertheless, the calculated values of shadow 
prices for water are comparable to those calculated by MÜLLER for the same region 
(2006). Additionally, the shadow prices are comparable to those estimated for 
volumetric water pricing in agriculture in Morocco in 2003 (CHOHIN-KUPER et al., 
2003) which was in the range of 20 USD per 1000 m³ to 50 USD per 1000 m³ of 
irrigation water. According to DINAR and SUBRAMANIAN (1997), water charges in 
Namibia (3.8 USD per 1000 m³ to 28 USD per 1000 m³), Algeria (19 USD per 
1000 m³ to 220 USD per 1000 m³), Tunisia (20 USD per 1000 m³ to 78 USD per 
1000 m³), Brazil (4.2 USD per 1000 m³ to 32 USD per 1000 m³), Portugal 
(9.5 USD per 1000 m³ to 19.3 USD per 1000 m³), United States (12.4 USD per 
1000 m³ to 43.8 USD per 1000˙m³) and Spain, all in 1996 (0.1 USD per 1000 m³ 
to 28 USD per 1000 m³).
3 
The value of the shadow price for land obtained from the base-run solution of 
KhoRASM is in the range between 79 USD/ha and 288 USD/ha for arable land. 
The shadow prices for land are validated using the information on unofficial rents 
observed during the farm and household surveys in Khorezm in 2003. According 
to the case-study data, the approximate value of unofficial rent of land for rice 
cultivation in the region was in the range of 100 USD and 300 USD per hectare 
depending on soil quality, field location and water availability. Consequently, 
the shadow prices for land obtained in the model’s optimal solution in the base 
run are in the range of the observed values. 
In most cases, the shadow prices of labour are in the observed range of labour 
wages, i.e. between 0.1 to 0.75 USD per working hour. The labour shadow prices 
are zero for households since they basically have unlimited supply of labour. The 
shadow prices of labour in shirkats and private farms are compared to actual wages 
in the agriculture of the Khorezm region. The actual values for wages were ob-
tained from personal interviews during farm and household surveys in the region in 
2003 and 2004. In some cases the shadow prices for labour are higher which 
may be due to the fact that actual wages were monetary ones without taking into 
account payments in kind which play an important role. The values of shadow 
prices which exceed this range can be explained by the fact that the payments in 
kind are widely used by agricultural producers for remuneration of labour services. 
The shadow price of state procurement has no direct observable values. However, 
the shadow prices of state procurement constraint on cotton production can be 
compared to marginal productivity of land sown under vegetables, melons and 
rice. Additionally, the shadow prices of procurement constraint are in the range 
of the unofficial rents of land for a full year, which may include the possibility 
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of double cropping such as rice cultivation after winter wheat. Since cotton is 
considered as one of the less profitable crops in the Khorezm region, the minimum  
restriction on its production has negative shadow prices, implying that an increase 
in cotton procurement will decrease producer profits. The shadow prices of the 
state procurement constraints for cotton are, as expected, generally negative and 
in the range between -85 USD/ha and -809 USD/ha of arable land which must 
be allocated to cotton production. 
5 AGRICULTURAL POLICY SIMULATION 
The comparative static analysis with the values of the base year of 2003 is used 
to identify the cause and the extent of relationships within the model by exoge-
nously changing individual policy variables. Only the comparison of major aspects 
in the agricultural sector of the Khorezm region is presented in this study. First, 
we present the levels of variables, obtained in the policy simulation runs of 
KhoRASM model and compare them to their level in the basic solution of the 
model. Next, the consumer and producer surplus at regional level, land and water 
use are compared with the model’s base run solution. 
The selected set of agricultural policies includes the most discussed possible 
policies, which have been implemented or will be implemented in the regional 
agricultural sector. First policy simulation is introduction of water charges which 
was discussed recently as a tool for reforming the state budget expenditures. The 
second experiment simulates the abolishment of the state procurement system 
for cotton. The third policy simulation tests a scenario with which a complete 
conversion of shirkat producers into private farms is simulated.  
5.1  Introduction of water charges 
Because the regional irrigation water scarcity is the key constraint for regional 
agricultural production like in the period of 2000-2001, there is a need to achieve a 
substantially more efficient and productive use of water in irrigation. As discussed 
by TSUR et al. (2004), one method for increasing the efficiency of water use is to 
implement water user fees. Water charges can be expected to generate revenue, 
improve efficiency of the supply and supplier, manage demand, facilitate economic 
development and improve public welfare and equity (TSUR et al., 2004). However, 
before implementing such a policy in a given context one should analyze the likely 
effects of such a policy change. The price-endogenous mathematical programming 
model presented here can be used to estimate the impact of such a water charging 
policy on regional crop production and commodity prices as well as on consumer 
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The current institutional set-up does not encourage the efficient use of water in 
Uzbekistan. The irrigation water in Uzbekistan is delivered to agricultural pro-
ducers without any charges to cover water supply costs. According to the present 
legislation, the water charges are included into the land tax, which does not reflect 
the marginal value of water. 
With the intensification of the farm restructuring process, state policies on finan-
cing the maintenance and operation system for irrigation and drainage infra-
structure in Uzbekistan were revised. According to the cost recovery policy, the 
responsibility for operating and maintaining the irrigation system will be partially 
transferred to water user associations (WUAs); these associations will also be 
responsible for the introduction of water user fees (see HIRSCH, Chapter 7 in this 
volume).  
Hence, the main purpose of introducing water charges in the Khorezm region is 
to ensure that the costs incurred by public suppliers of water, such as operation, 
maintenance, replacement costs, and capital costs in the form of amortization 
charges, will be fully or at least partially recovered from agricultural producers.  
With flexibility of its charges, the crop-based charging combines social objectives 
with the economic objective of a water charging policy (HAMDY, 2002). Having  
the main objective of long-term sustainability of the irrigation and drainage system,  
the objective of water charging policy includes economic efficiency, fairness, 
equality, correcting imbalances in the distribution of income and wealth of dif-
ferent groups of agricultural producers. Moreover, the water charging objectives 
include the reduction of administrative costs, conflict resolution and local autonomy 
and control (HAMDY, 2002). Besides, it may provide incentives to economize 
water use if the charged value will be sufficiently high to change the relative 
profitability between crops and, as a result, if producers indeed will be allowed 
to change their production patterns from high to low water consuming crops. 
Hence, it is expected that the introduction of such a charging mechanism may 
lead to shifts in cropping patterns towards more water efficient crops and increase 
the marginal output per unit of water consumed by individual user. Most impor-
tantly for the Khorezm region, the crop-based charges are relatively simple to  
administer, and their transaction costs are low since no volumetric measurement 
or definition of rights is required.  
The difference in the value of the water charge between crops will induce increased 
savings of irrigation water and reduce the production of water intensive crops. 
Furthermore, variations in the values of water charges between districts would 
induce the reallocation of water between upstream and downstream districts. 
The disparity in values of water charges among agricultural producers within a 
district will keep the concept of equitable distribution among producers of different 
production scales and will help to avoid large burdens on small-scale household 
producers.  Nodir Djanibekov  56
5.2  Abolishment of state procurement system 
Like in all transitional countries, which experienced reforms of price and subsidy 
policies, the abolishment of a state procurement system, state control over input 
and output prices, and the practice of selective subsidization has been one of the 
issues discussed since the first years of independence in Uzbekistan. During the 
first years of independence in Uzbekistan, the agricultural output prices were 
administratively increased. Additionally, the output volume sold under state procu-
rement was decreased and the number of private entrepreneurship increased. 
Nevertheless, agricultural markets were not fully liberalized and the state procure-
ment system remained in place for the entire production of cotton and to some 
extent for wheat.  
According to the current state procurement system and subsidization policy, the 
large and medium sized agricultural producers are obligated to fulfil production 
quotas for cotton and wheat at below-market prices, and in return receive inputs 
at subsidized prices. Hence, the main question of the simulation in this section is 
what changes will occur in production activities and prices when the state program 
on agricultural markets liberalization will abolish the state procurement system, 
eliminate price controls on agricultural commodities, phase out subsidies on fer-
tilizer and other inputs.  
The abolishment of the state procurement system is considered to be a substantial 
change in economic policy as it is expected to increase producer surplus while 
reducing the revenues of the state from cotton production.
4 The removal of the 
state procurement quota for cotton would imply that the production level for this 
crop will be purely determined by the optimization behaviour of agricultural 
producers. As a result, cotton prices would not be administered by the state 
anymore but instead be increased to the level of farm-gate prices. For this simu-
lation experiment the cotton and input prices were set at the level of farm gate 
prices observed in Kazakhstan in 2003.  
5.3  Completion of farm restructuring process 
Since 1998, the farm restructuring process became one of the major issues in the 
agricultural sector of the Khorezm region. Indeed, farm restructuring was the 
most notable agricultural reform in the region in 2003. The farm restructuring 
                                           
4  The fact to which extent revenues of the state would change depends on the degree of taxa-
tion/subsidisation of the cotton sector. While most western observers have been of the 
opinion that the Government of Uzbekistan has effectively taxed cotton production and 
thereby withdrawn substantial revenues from the agricultural sector. MÜLLER (2007, in 
Chapter 10 of this volume) argues that taxation of the cotton sector may in the past decade 
not have been as straightforward. Instead he shows that much depends on the exchange 
rate at which foreign exchange earnings from exports of cotton are being converted into 
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process is implemented in Uzbekistan via dissolution of shirkats. Their land and 
other assets will be transferred to newly established private farms. As a final result 
of this farm restructuring process, agricultural production in Uzbekistan will be 
done by two types of agricultural producers: Private farms and household plots. 
Like any policy change, the substitution of large scale producers by middle scale 
ones will bring changes in regional production and commodity prices. There-
fore, the question which arises after the accomplishment of farm restructured 
process is to which extent production patterns, quantities and prices would change 
if shirkats’ production is entirely replaced by production from private farms 
given that all other domestic parameters remain unchanged. Consequently, the 
analysis of the respective policy experiment focuses on the changes in cropping 
pattern and animal keeping activities, commodity quantities and regional prices, 
and land and water use at selected level of farm restructuring.  
6 SIMULATION RESULTS 
In the following section the results of the three simulation experiments which 
have been described above will be presented. Again it should be born in mind 
that the simulation has been carried out with a rather stylized model which 
represents "work in progress". Hence, the results should be interpreted with caution.  
The first policy simulation looks into the effects of introducing water user fees. 
The results support what one would expect a priori: Under the given assumptions 
(e.g. the state procurement system for cotton remains in place) the introduction 
of water pricing will decrease the total production of rice, which is the most water 
intensive crop in the region (Table 3-1). Additionally, production of most crops 
will decrease in the region. As result, there is a price increase for the commodities 
with endogenous prices which also reduces consumer surplus. Moreover, the 
introduction of water charges shifted the regional cropping pattern towards the 
less water demanding crops. While the latter is positive and associated with a 
general decline in the level of water and marginal land use, the results of the 
simulation on economic indicators are rather negative. Higher production costs  
caused by the water charges decrease the producer surplus. Hence the total regional 
welfare decreases (Figure 3-2). However, these results are strongly determined 
by the rigid structure of the model economy. If in reality the economy would be 
more open and, hence, more flexible, such policy changes could be accommodated 
more easily by a restructuring of respective trade flows. Furthermore, the economic 
welfare function in this model does not take into account the social benefits 
which are expected from discontinuation of high-intensive agricultural production 
on marginal land and the reduction of scarce water resources.  Nodir Djanibekov  58 
Table 3-1:  Deviation of regional production in scenarios compared to  
observed values, %. Simulation with KhoRASM model 








Cotton 0,0 -1,7 7,2
Wheat -1,4 -0,3 -11,3
Rice -13,4 -2,0 -7,8
Potato -0,7 0,4 0,1
Vegetables -0,6 0,4 -0,2
Melons -0,5 0,4 -0,4
Maize 26,2 71,2 175,8
Fodder maize 8,1 1,6 -9,1
Milk 0,6 0,2 1,9
Eggs 0,1 1,5 -0,3
Meat -0,3 -0,3 -1,0  
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Policy simulation 2 deals with the abolishment of the state procurement system 
and input subsidies for the cotton sector. Technically this is done by increasing 
cotton and input prices to the level of farm gate prices in Kazakhstan. The results 
show that the cotton production area would remain almost at the observed level 
in the base year (2003). This implies that given the base year values of prices, A model-based analysis of land and water use reforms in Khorezm  59
input endowments and technology coefficients, the positive effects of abolishing 
the state procurement system will outweigh the negative impact of the removal 
of input subsidies. Furthermore, the simulation support another argument fre-
quently raised against agricultural policy schemes in favour of cash crops: The 
abolishment of the rigid state procurement system for cotton would increase prices  
and therefore relative profitability of food crops. In response, rational farmers  
which are free to decide what to crop would increase the production of food crops  
(Table 3-2). From a national point of view this would have the advantage to reduce 
import dependency ratios for food crops further. However, the impact on the  
production quantities of some traditional food commodities such as rice, vegetables  
and melons is rather insignificant. 
Policy simulation 3 looks into the effects of completing the fragmentation of 
shirkats into private farms. Against the prices, production technologies and input 
endowments used for the model's base year (2003) such a policy change would 
have positive effects on regional welfare and profits while at the same time less 
water and land would be utilized (Figure 3-3). A decomposition of regional welfare 
indicates that both regional consumer and producer surplus would increase in 
response to such a policy change. Consequently, the hypothesis is supported that 
one possibility to increase efficiency of land and water use is to enhance the 
flexibility with which the most important farm production factors, i.e. land and 
water, may be shifted between different farms.  
Table 3-2:  Deviation of regional parameters in scenarios compared to base 
run, % 








Regional welfare -4,7 3,1 0,4
Regional profit -9,1 0,5 6,6
Regional sown area -2,2 -0,7 -5,3
Regional Water used -6,2 -1,8 -3,5  
Source:  Simulation with KhoRASM model. 
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Water Use Land Use Welfare Profit  
Source:  Simulation with KhoRASM model. 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The paper aims at comparing the impact of a hypothetical set of agricultural policy 
reforms which are currently discussed and could be implemented in the future in 
the region of Khorezm. The analysis in the paper is based on a stylized model 
which represents "work in progress" but which is a first theoretically and statisti-
cally consistent representation of the agricultural sector if this region in such a 
model framework. Therefore, the results should be treated with caution. Neverthe-
less, it is believed that these results are solid enough to contribute to the discussion 
on how the selected policies may affect the regional agricultural production system.  
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the introduction of water 
charging as a single policy will decrease the regional welfare affecting the regional 
production levels simply because of contributing to higher production costs. 
However, it should be born in mind that the model is comparative static and the 
negative welfare effects may well turn positive if long-term effects would be taken 
into account. For instance, if the collected water charges would be invested into 
technological improvements of the regional irrigation and drainage system this 
would enhance regional water productivity. Furthermore, the reduction of exces-
sive water use is likely to yield positive effects on the environment which again 
would contribute to converting the long-term effects into positive ones.  A model-based analysis of land and water use reforms in Khorezm  61
Also the negative effects of introducing water pricing such as increase in produc-
tion costs and decline of production volumes can be reduced by opening domestic 
markets for imports.  
Furthermore, the simulation results suggest that the abolishment of the state pro-
curement system including input subsidies and the accomplishment of the farm 
restructuring process would increase the regional welfare and profits while at the 
same time using less water and land. This supports the hypothesis that liberaliza-
tion and privatization in the agricultural sector of the Khorezm region generally 
would make the agricultural economy of Khorezm more flexible and therefore 
more responsive to relative changes of economic variables. In fact both policy 
changes would induce higher welfare as if compared to the base year of 2003. 
Additionally, the model analysis suggests that further shifts of land and water 
resources to private farms will bring positive effects. Hence, inter-farm shifts of 
land, such as restructuring of shirkats into private farms, is one possibility to 
increase efficiency of land and water use.  
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CHAPTER 4 
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ABSTRACT 
After independence, Uzbekistan introduced far-reaching structural reforms including 
the transformation of the least profitable shirkats (cooperative farms based on the 
former kolkhoz
1 and sovkhoz
2) into private farms. Since this low profitability was 
caused by a combination factors, the following work investigates the influence of 
state policies on the profitability of shirkats using a static linear programming (LP) 
model developed for improved crop allocation in large scale shirkats. Several scena-
rios were analysed to understand producers’ choice under different policy options. 
The results showed that government interference in the form of state orders and fixed 
(low) procurement prices hindered a more profitable production, and obstructed 
proper decision-making and improved efficient resource use. The low gross margins 
of alternative crops combined with the dominance of the state crops cotton and wheat 
as chief pillars of the national agricultural production plans, explained the reluctance 
of producers to change presently cropping patterns. It is argued that there is potential 
for increased efficiency in resource use if reforms come as a full package and not in 
isolation. The developed LP model can serve as a template also for the new private 
farms since these differ only in size and ownership from the former shirkat structure, 
but still face an imposed state procurement for cotton and winter wheat. 
Keywords:  Uzbekistan, agriculture, linear programming, state order, cotton, 
market prices. 
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1  Kolkhoz, collective farm, the main agricultural producing unit during the Soviet Union era. 
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ОПТИМАЛЬНОЕ РАЗМЕЩЕНИЕ CЕЛЬСКОХОЗЯЙСТВЕННЫХ 
КУЛЬТУР И ПОСЛЕДУЮЩИЕ ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ВЫГОДЫ  
В (ШИРКАТНЫХ) ХОЗЯЙСТВАХ ПРИ ПЕРЕХОДЕ ОТ СИСТЕМЫ 
ГОСЗАКАЗА К СИСТЕМЕ РЫНОЧНЫХ РЕФОРМ В  
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АННОТАЦИЯ 
После приобретения независимости Узбекистан встал на путь широкомас-
штабных и далеко идущих структурных преобразований, включая транс-
формацию низкорентабельных ширкатных хозяйств (кооперативные хозяйст-
ва  напоминающие  бывшие  колхозы  и  совхозы)  в  частные  фермерские 
хозяйства. Поскольку низкая рентабельность ширкатных хозяйств была 
вызвана  многими  факторами,  включая  социально-экономические  и  при-
родные, влияние государственного регулирования на показатели деятель-
ности ширкатных хозяйств были проанализированы с помощью статической 
модели  линейного  программирования,  которая  была  разработана  для  
оптимального размещения сельскохозяйственных культур в ширкатных 
хозяйствах. Несколько сценариев были рассмотрены в рамках модели для  
более глубокого понимания поведения производителей в ответ на проводимые 
реформы. Результаты показали, что государственное вмешательство в форме 
гос заказа на хлопок и фиксированные (низкие) закупочные цены на продук-
цию препятствовали получению производителями более высоких доходов 
и не способствовали принятию ими оптимальных решений и поиску более 
эффективного  использования  имеющихся  ресурсов.  Предположенный  
моделью  низкий  маржинальный  доход  от  выращивания  альтернативных 
культур в совокупности с господством хлопка и пшеницы в нацинальном 
сельскохозяйственном производственном плане объяснили нежелание произ-
водителей изменить имеющуюся структуру культур. Аргументируется мнение 
о  том,  что  эффективное  использование  ресурсов  может  быть  достигнуто  
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только в проведении совокупности целенаправленных реформ. Разработан-
ная модель может служить в качестве образца для новых частных фермерских 
хозяйств, отличающихся от структуры бывших ширкатов размерами и типом 
собственности, однако все ёще осуществляющих обязательное снабжение 
государства хлопком и озимой пшеницой. 
Ключевые слова:  Сельское хозяйство, линейное программирование, гос 
заказ, хлопок, мировые цены. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (SU) in 1991, the Republic of Uzbekistan 
was cut off from the former SU support system, resulting in the collapse of various 
farming support services mandatory for farming such as laboratories, research 
stations, phyto-sanitary and food safety controls. At present, Uzbekistan, like 
other Central Asian Republics (CARs), is an agrarian country, with an economy 
heavily dependent on agricultural production using irrigated arable land 
(BUCKNALL, 2003; SAIFULIN, 1999). The agrarian sector makes up about one 
third of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ADB, 2003). More than 
30  percent of the able-bodied population (CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC 
POLICY, 2002) is engaged in the agrarian sector, while the rural population com-
prises 60 percent of the total 25 million inhabitants of the Republic (CENTRE FOR 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2004). Agricultural products are the main and largest 
source of the country’s exports and currency inflow. Exports of cotton fibre 
alone accounted in for about 18  percent of the GDP in 2004 (CENTER FOR 
EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 2004). The situation in the agrarian sector of the 
economy determines not only the standard of living of the largest share of the 
population, but the prosperity of the whole nation. 
Khorezm
1 is an administrative district located in the lower reaches of the Amu 
Darya River in North-west Uzbekistan, covering 680,000 ha of land, or roughly 
270,000 ha of which are used for irrigated agriculture. The region is located  
between 41°08′ till 41°59′ N latitude and 60°03′ till 61°24′ E longitude. The soils 
of the area originate from alluvial deposits, are heterogeneously stratified, and 
dominated by clayey, loamy and sandy-loamy textures. The region is surrounded 
by the Karakum and Kyzyl Kum deserts, which determine the extremely arid, 
and continental climate that is characterized by pronounced fluctuations in light 
intensity, day-length and temperature between seasons (GLAZARIN et al., 1999). 
The Khorezm region is home to 1.4 million people, 77.6 percent of which are 
rural (OBLSTAT
 2, 2005). From the total area of 680,000 ha, roughly 270,000 ha  
can be used for irrigated agriculture. The distance to the country's capital Tashkent 
is about 1200 km by road. The remote location of the Khorezm region from the 
country’s capital and most industrial centres implies an even higher importance 
of agriculture for the region's well-being. 
The long-term annual precipitation in the Khorezm region amounts to about 100 mm 
per year, which falls predominantly during the fall-winter period and thus outside 
                                           
1  This study is part of a research program conducted by the Center for Development Research 
(ZEF) at the University of Bonn (Germany) in the Khorezm region of Uzbekistan on 
"Economic and Ecological Restructuring of Land- and Water Use in the Region Khorezm  
(Uzbekistan). A Pilot Project in Development Research", <http://www.uni-bonn.de/khorezm>. 
2  OblStat is the local Branch of Uzbekistan’s Statistical Office in Khorezm region. Optimal crop allocation  67
the main vegetation period. This annual precipitation is by far exceeded by an 
evapo-transpiration of 1,400-1,600 mm/year (GLAZARIN et al., 1999), which 
renders cultivation feasible through irrigation only. Consequently, the Khorezm 
region is heavily dependent on irrigation water (extracted from the Amu Darya) 
and is in need of more effective water management than exists at present. 
The existing irrigation network in Khorezm suffers from critical problems owing 
to technical shortcomings and the planning and distribution of the water delivery 
(MARTIUS et al., 2004). The state of the infrastructure has reached such critical 
levels that Khorezmian farmers face insecure water supply in the quantities 
needed. Previous analyses showed that at present roughly four out of ten years 
farmers would face a water shortage, which is much more than in the rest of Uzbe-
kistan, and which has increased during the last decade (MÜLLER and WEHRHEIM, 
2006). This represents a high long-term risk to agricultural producers. 
The Khorezmian agricultural sector accounts for more than 40 percent of the 
regional GDP (OBLSTAT, 2005). However, in the years 2000 and 2001, this 
share was substantially lower owing to a severe drought and the resulting low 
agricultural output (Figure 4-1). Depending on the year, the share of employ-
ment in agriculture ranges between 35-45 percent (Figure 4-2). 























Source: OBLSTAT, 2005; own representation. 
The agricultural sector has undergone various changes since the dissolution of 
the FSU in 1991. Agricultural producers have had to cope in particular with  
structural transformations. In 1993, the former state and collective farms (sovkhoz 
and kolkhoz) were renamed into shirkats, which in fact is the Uzbek name for 
collective and joint-stock agricultural enterprises. In 1998 the law on agricultural Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  68
cooperatives (shirkat), on private and on dehqon
3 farms, was adopted, resulting 
in the emergence of three types of agricultural producers (RUZMETOV et al., 2003). 
Dehqon farms are small-scale producers, subsistent in nature thus mainly pro-
ducing for the rural household, whereas private farms (fermers) are medium-
scale producers with some market potential. Shirkats are large-scale producers, 
almost identical to the former collective and state farms. 
Figure 4-2:  Share of the agricultural sector in total labour employment in 




















Source: OBLSTAT, 2005; own representation. 
A shirkat is an independent enterprise with all rights of a legal entity, however, 
land still is owned by the state. The shirkat is basically a voluntary union of 
workers, producing agricultural products. All members participate in all activities 
of the union, whereas profits are distributed according to the property share each 
member holds. Each shirkat is subject to specific legal regulations and fully re-
sponsible for its banking accounts. However, due to the para-statal character of 
the shirkats, they benefited frequently from debt relief granted by government-
owned banks and/or suppliers.  
The regulations for shirkats set the economic and organizational framework in-
cluding rights and responsibilities of its members, land use and distribution, 
property rights, management, future reorganization and a possible liquidation. 
Shirkats need to be registered with the regional hokim
4.  
                                           
3  Dehqon farms are rural households in Uzbekistan, involved in small-scale agricultural pro-
duction, often dedicated exclusively to subsistence production.  
4  Hokim is the highest administrative body in the region or the district in Uzbekistan. Optimal crop allocation  69
Figure 4-3:  Shares of shirkats in total agricultural output of the Khorezm 
region 
 
Source: OBLSTAT, 2005. 
Until 2004, shirkats occupied the largest cropping areas and hence supplied the 
main share of the two state target crops: Cotton and winter wheat (Figure 4-3). 
The key role shirkats have played in agriculture is expected to change since the 
Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) has decided to dissolve all shirkats by the end 
of 2006.  
The newly established shirkats inherited all production factors and infrastructure 
from the collective farms. However, despite the seemingly favourable working 
environment, such as the availability of an agricultural machinery park, privileges 
in the acquisition of inputs, priority in water use, and governmental support, agri-
cultural production in shirkats did not become profitable (OBLVODKHOZ, 2003). 
The share of unprofitable shirkats in the Khorezm region was more than 90 percent 
in 2002 and 2003. Such a high percentage of loss-making shirkats may be  
explained by exogenous factors such as climate and land, as well as by endogenous  
factors, such as old machinery parks of poor quality with high maintenance and 
operation costs, an endemic shortage of spare parts, and inefficient organization  
and administration. As shown in Azerbaijan (LAMERS et al., 2000), an inefficient 
administration and organization are of high importance to farm entrepreneurship 
since in turn they lead to low performance levels. Likewise a problem with  
existing shirkats is a lack of flexibility in making managerial decisions, including  
an insufficient control by the shirkat management over internal agreements with 
contractors, the poor and undeveloped corporate management. Furthermore, the 
strong intervention of local governments into business operations of shirkats has 
led to significant losses in productivity (CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2004). Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  70 
Six years after their establishment, shirkats, as an agricultural production structure, 
have become obsolete. Shirkats with the highest losses were transformed into 
private farms on the basis of a Presidential Decree issued on March 3
rd, 2003. 
The decree provided the legal basis, transparency and momentum for land privati-
zation but land users did not gain the right to sell, exchange, and mortgage the 
land. Private applicants had to submit a request for each field to the committee 
mandated by the government to coordinate the restructuring process. In addition,  
auxiliary documents such as copies of passports, schooling and education diplomas, 
bank accounts, and evidence of ownership of agricultural equipment needed to 
be submitted together with the request. The applicants were indeed tested for 
their knowledge on agriculture before the committee approved or disapproved an 
application. A final decision on each application was than taken by the regional 
hokim. The transfer thus involved considerable effort, resources and time from 
both the state and the agricultural producers. The novelty of this procedure for 
administrators and applicants and the lack of transparency in decision-making 
caused many misunderstandings. Although the GoU envisaged a reform to meet 
free market principles, this process was delayed and it was hardly possible for 
shirkats to fulfill this expectation. Also, a profound lack of knowledge on agri-
cultural entrepreneurship prevailed among shirkat management.  
This section presents the results of a decision-making support tool developed for 
optimal resource allocation and higher income generation at the farm level. At 
the onset of the study mainly shirkat farms existed and, therefore, long-term data  
was available for these farm structures only. Consequently, the LP tool was  
elaborated for this farm type only. However, since the newly created private farms  
in Uzbekistan operate under similar conditions as the previous shirkat farms, the 
decision-support tool developed can be employed for the private farms and used  
for a more accurate interpretation once sufficient data are available. The following 
discussion also sheds light on why shirkats were considered unprofitable, thus 
allowing lessons to be learned for increasing the management of the newly created 
production units.  
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Economic production theory suggests that independent decision-making is a central 
factor for the economic success of an enterprise (COLMAN and YOUNG, 2002). 
Benefits from activities as indicated by gross margin and/or profits, and the 
availability of resources and technology, are key indicators for decision-making 
about the type and the extent of activities. Within irrigated agricultural, land, and 
in particular water, are the resources which recurrently are most limiting. Hence, 
allocating additional inputs to production activities depends on the expected  Optimal crop allocation  71
additional benefit (marginal revenue) from using additional units of an input 
(COLMAN and YOUNG, 1995). 
Crop and water allocation models (WANG and ZHOU, 2004; SONMEZ and ALTIN, 
2004; EVENS et al., 2003) have been widely used to identify the optimal resource 
allocation options resulting in optimal benefits subject to resource limitations at 
the farm and region level. These studies have used mathematical programming 
methods that allocate the constraining resources among competing activities in 
order to optimize profits or gross margins of agricultural production (HAZELL 
and NORTON, 1986). Such models have been successfully used under conditions 
of water allocation restrictions (EVANS et al., 2003).  
Numerous models have used the principle of linear programming (LP) for optimal 
resource allocation. The assumed linearity of the objective function is recurrently 
mentioned as a shortcoming of this method and substantial evidence has sup-
ported that LP approaches were useful tools when striving to improve the basis 
for agricultural production decisions and thereby increasing resource efficiency 
in Russia or Turkmenistan, countries with similar agro-ecological and political 
conditions as in Uzbekistan (SVETLOV, 1999; MARTIN, 2006). Despite various 
shortcomings, the arguments in favor of using LP models are its comparatively 
low data-demand and its flexibility in the elaboration of scenario building. 
This study follows the practice of water and land allocation models aimed at 
optimizing the gross margin of an average shirkat farm on the basis of the  
resources available to this shirkat, and subject to various current changes in the 
agricultural sector of Uzbekistan. Since the key production conditions for the 
new farms are similar to the recently established private farms, the LP model can be 
used for the private farms as soon as the relevant information becomes available.  
2.1  Optimization model and the objective function 
The objective function of the optimization model maximized the shirkat’s gross 
margin as the sum of all crop gross margins in one growing season. 




Z i i GM   A max  
where: 
Ai : optimum planting area of ith crop  
GMj : gross margin of ith crop, calculated as a difference between market turnover 
and variable costs: 
i i i i i IR   WP - VC - P  Y GM ⋅ ⋅ =  
where: 
Yi : the yield of crops in the model  Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  72
Pi  : product prices 
VCi : the variable costs like labour, machinery, fertilizer, seeds and others 
WP : The price of one cubic meter water, it was equal to zero in the first solution, 
but different price levels were tested in scenarios to see the impact of different 
price levels 
IRi: irrigation water requirement of ith crop, including leaching water demand. 
2.2  Activities: A decision variable 
All cropping activities such as soil preparation, leaching, levelling, seeding, culti-
vating, fertilizing, irrigating, weeding, harvesting and transporting were accounted 
for during gross margin (GM) estimations. The LP model optimized area alloca-
tion to each crop in the shirkat and the accumulated GM resulting from this op-
timal crop allocation. Crops included in the model were cotton, winter wheat, 
vegetables, sugar beet, melons and fruits which were produced by the former 
shirkat structures and presently also by the private farmers (BOBOJONOV and 
LAMERS, 2006). The state order regulations for cotton and wheat were taken into 
account, which allowed the marketing of wheat which is also similar to the pre-
sent private farms (RUDENKO and LAMERS, 2006). Therefore, the production of 
winter wheat was divided into two activities: Winter wheat production for the 
state order and winter wheat production for the market. 
2.3 Constraints 
Total available land and water, upper bound for fruit trees, minimum area for 
cotton and wheat to fulfil the state orders were constraints in the model. Diesel 
for agricultural equipment such as tractors, combiners and fertilizers were con-
sidered fixed resources, as the GoU provided these resources to fulfil the state 
orders to shirkats and will continue this practice for private farmers (RUDENKO 
and LAMERS, 2006). 
2.4  Data collection and technical coefficients in the models 
Data was collected step-wise (Table 4-1). During a survey conducted between 
2001 and 2003, input use and costs per ha of all crops was collected from four 
shirkats. Output prices were derived from the accounting files of the shirkat for  
2001, since the price data was available for that year only. Although the combi-
nation of data from different years is a "second best solution", given the situation in 
the Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector, no alternative dataset was available or could be 
obtained. Future datasets will by-pass this restriction. The amount of water applied 
per ha for each crop had not been recorded as default and hence the irrigation water Optimal crop allocation  73
norms, as stated by OblSelVodKhoz
5, were used as a proxy for water use per ha of 
each crop. This assumption is justified given that the irrigation water norms are 
still used for the planning of water supply in the Khorezm region as more precise 
measuring points are still absent. Crop yields were estimated as the average 
yield obtained in the shirkat over a six year period (1998-2003). 
For the strategic crops, including cotton and winter wheat as well as the contract 
crop sugar beet, state procurement prices were used during simulation runs. For 
all other crops, market prices were derived from various sources. Market prices 
for sunflower, melons and vegetables were provided by the OblStat market price 
database. In the absence of necessary details, fruit market prices were estimated 
as the average price for apples during the harvest period of 2001. This decision 
seemed justified since existing tree plantations in Khorezm are dominated by 
fruit trees, where apples take the lions’ share of 57 % compared to mulberry 
(15 %) and apricot (12 %) (TUPITSA, 2005).  
In contrast, the market price for vegetables detailed even individual varieties, thus 
allowing the estimation of an average market price for carrots, cabbage and toma-
toes in 2001. Prices for rice and winter wheat sold at the market were provided by the 
surveyed shirkat. A cross-check with market prices confirmed their reliability. All 
market prices were deducted with 20 percent to account for the transportation and 
other market access costs to obtain the farm gate prices. Other direct costs such as 
machinery and fertilizer costs were derived from statistical data sources. 
In 2001, the modelled shirkat spanned 602 ha of cropping area and used 7,186.8 
thousand m
3 of water, excluding conveyance losses. Other key data used in the 
model are shown in Table 4-1. 




























































Yield (t/ha)  2.4  4.9  4.9  3.0  15.5  22.4  1.0  11.4  3.3 
Actual prices  
(soum/kg) 79.1  41.8  120.8  169.2  12.00  11.61  255.86  23.83  35.40 
Market prices  
(soum/kg) –  –  –  –  44.8  –  348.8  42.4  131.2 
Seeds (t/ha)  56  500  500  130  4  4  24  4  0 
Fertilizer (t/ha)  0.31  0.61  0.61  0.02  0.29  0.29  0.25  0.29  0.00 
Fuel use (t/ha)  0.28  1.06  1.06  0.50  1.60  0.30  0.50  0.76  0.27 
Estimated water 
use (m
3/ha)   10166  8205  8205  30755  13128  10122  8055  8542  9743 
Note:  WWG – Winter wheat production for the state order, WWM – Winter wheat production 
for the market, SBTG– Sugar beet. 
                                           
5  OblSelVodKhoz is the Khorezm regional Agriculture and Water Resources Management Office. Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  74
2.5  Scenarios and assumptions 
Aside from the baseline scenario, nine different scenarios were simulated with the 
LP model, each aimed at different combinations of cropping patterns subject to 
various ecological and socio-economic changes (Table 4-2). In the base line sce-
nario, data for 2001 was used as a complete data set, including crop output, input 
prices and use were available for this particular year and from the surveyed shirkat. 
The minimum cropping area for cotton and wheat were bound in several scenarios 
to account for the state orders. An upper bound for fruit production was included 
due to the lack of information on initial investment costs for establishing orchards. 
According to the information provided by the shirkat management and statistical 
records, the total GM of the shirkat in 2001 was 38022.8 thousand soum. This  
information as well as the GM of individual crops, variable costs and data on state  
order plans, was included in the base line scenario. The difference between the 
"actual" situation and the base line scenario 1 is the decision-making principle:  
The LP model estimated the optimal crop allocation compared to the shirkat  
manager. The purpose of the second scenario was to test the hypothesis if increased  
output prices for vegetables, melons, sunflowers and fruits would provoke any  
change in crop allocation. Therefore, in the second scenario, market prices instead 
of the prices received by the shirkat in 2001 were used. All other parameters  
remained unchanged (Table 4-2).  
As in scenario 2, under scenario 3, the same quantity of production factors,  
including the water amount and access to the market prices for alternative crops 
were used. However, in this scenario, a reduced state order was introduced. Given 
that in various pilot regions throughout Uzbekistan a reduced state order by 75 percent 
was tested, only 75 hectares were kept for the state order allocation to cotton. 
Table 4-2:  Scenario description for the baseline and eight simulation runs 
Scenario  Detailed description  
1  Base scenario, with data of 2001 
2  Market prices for vegetables, sunflower, melons and fruits; state orders  
3  Market prices for vegetables, sunflower, melons and fruits, state order for cotton is 
decreased by 75 % 
4  Water price 10 soum6; state prices for all crops; state orders 
5  Water price 10 soum; market prices for vegetable, sunflower, melons and fruits; state orders 
6  Water price 10 soum; market prices for vegetables, sunflower, melons and fruits; state 
order for cotton is decreased by 75 % 
7  Decrease of water availability by 20 %; state prices; state orders 
8  Decrease of water availability by 20 %; market prices for vegetables, sunflower, melons 
and fruits; state orders 
9  Water price 10 soum; market prices for vegetables, sunflower, melons and fruits; state 
order for cotton is decreased by 75 %; no input (diesel, fertilizer) constraints 
                                           
6  Model results of the all simulated scenarios are summarized in Table 3. Optimal crop allocation  75
Scenario 4 examined changes in crop allocation when water would be priced, 
and while assuming that the state order and the system of state procurement 
prices remained unchanged. Ten soums/m
3 of water was introduced as a water 
pricing charge since previous studies suggested that such a price level is most 
realistic for cost recovery, and may offer the highest potential for a change in the 
cropping pattern (BOBOJONOV and LAMERS, 2006). 
Scenario 5 analysed the potential impact of introducing water pricing in case 
producers would receive the market price for alternative crops instead of the 
commodity prices the shirkat received in 2001. In scenario 6, market output 
prices and water charges remained unchanged, but the state order for cotton was 
decreased by 75 %, up to 75 hectares. In scenario 7 all conditions were like those 
in the base scenario except for total water availability, which was decreased by 
20 percent. Scenario 8 simulated the crop allocation under an assumed water limit 
of 20 percent of the actual amount used in 2001 and with market prices for the  
alternative crops. Scenario 9 tested for potential changes in crop allocation  
assuming that producers have access to inputs in unrestricted amounts (except 
water and land), can sell their products at the market, but pay for the water they 
use. 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
3.1  The baseline scenario: Model results vs. the reality of 2001 
The model computed 300 ha sown to cotton cultivation, which was the area the 
shirkat in 2001 had to allot to this crop and which was included as a constraint 
in the model.
7 The results of the area allocation of this scenario were very much 
in line with the reality of 2001, where approximately 70 percent of the regional 
cropping area was allocated to cotton, wheat and rice. Area allocation remained 
virtually unchanged, since most resources were spent on these crops and hence 
the area allocated to alternative crops was limited. 
When simulating a baseline scenario with the information provided by the 
shirkat for 2001, the GM increased to 64021.2 thousand soum. This is a strong 
indication of the low resource use efficiency by the shirkat management and 
confirmed the conclusions of low profitability of shirkats (OBLSELVODKHOZ, 
2003). The outcomes from the base scenario however allocated cotton, wheat 
and rice to 490 of the total 602 ha of land (Table 4-3). The remaining 122 ha 
dropped out of the production process because of the constraints in fuel and water. 
                                           
7  Model results of the all simulated scenarios are summarized in Table 3 including the area 
of fodder crops and sugar beet. Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  76 
Whereas in 2001, in reality 23 ha were allocated to rice, the model findings indi-
cated that with the resources available at that time, even 114.3 ha of rice could 
have been cultivated. This indicated that the relative profitability of wheat and 
rice was higher than for the other crops in the model. In contrast to the reality of 
2001, the model findings showed that a much higher GM could have been ob-
tained, with even less area cultivated, and thus keeping fields fallow. Yet, when  
simulating a baseline scenario with the information provided by the shirkat 
according to 2001, the GM increased to 64021.2 thousand soum. This is a strong 
indication of the low resource use efficiency by the shirkat management and  
confirmed the conclusions of low profitability of shirkats (OBLSELVODKHOZ, 
2003). The outcomes from the base scenario however allocated cotton, wheat  
and rice to 490 of the total 602 ha (Table 4-3). The remaining 122 ha dropped 
out of the production process because of the constraints in fuel and water.  
Surprisingly, the solution in this baseline scenario did not include an increase of 
the land area allotted to vegetables, melons or sunflower. At first, these results 
did not appear to match the expectations and even contradicted suggestions that 
crop diversification will automatically lead to improved land use and higher 
profits (PROHENS et al., 2003). However, the analysis showed that despite the 
high yields and comparatively low resource use, the GM from vegetables, sun-
flower and melons (as evidenced by the accounting documents) were very low. 
One reason for this low GM in the baseline scenario could have been the low 
wholesale prices received by the shirkat in 2001. On the other hand, prices  
received by shirkats were significantly lower than the market prices monitored 
by the central authority OblStat and another study in the region (BOBOJONOV, 2004). 
As long as state orders dictate farmers’ decision-making and price setting, it 
concurrently leads to forgone income of farmers under such production plans 
and market control. The model results of the base scenario along with results from 
other studies (e.g. BUCKNALL et al., 2003) indicate that the low GM of alternative 
crops as well as the dominance of state ordered cotton, wheat, and rice as the 
prime pillars of the national agricultural production plans, are key explanations 
for the presently encountered reluctance and resistance of agricultural producers 
to change their cropping pattern.  
 Optimal crop allocation  77
Table 4-3:  Crop and area (ha) allocation resulting from model simulations 
under the assumptions of the different scenarios: WWG = Winter 
wheat production for the state order, WWM = Winter wheat 





































































































































300 38  0  23  1  10.5  7.5  4  38
8 602
9 7187 
Base 300 38  37.9 114.3  0  0.0  0  0  64  490.1 7187 
2 300  38  0.0  98.2  0  95.1 0  4  71.5  535.3  7187 
3 75  38  0.0  154.6  0  163.9  0  4  112.7  435.4  7187 
4  300 38  53.2 81.4  0  0  0  0  -7.1  472.6 6303 
5 300  38  0.0  15.9  0  0.0  115.7 4  3.6  473.6  4877 
6 75  38  0.0  0.0 0  318.4  0  4  54.6  435.4  3678 
7  300 38  53.7 63.3  0  0.0  0  0  48.5  455.0 5749 
8 300  38  0.0  43.1  0  74.7  49.2  4  60.7  509.1  5749 
9  75  38  62.4  0.0 426.6  0  0 0 143.5  602 7187 
 
3.2  New prices but old constraints 
Scenario 2 tested if increased output prices for the alternative crops such as 
vegetables, melons, sunflower and fruits would change the accumulated shirkat 
GM and resource allocation. Although higher prices for these commodities indeed 
resulted in an increased GM due to an increased area alloted to these crops, 
changes were not substantial (Table 4-3, scenario 2 vs. scenario 1). As shown by 
the simulation results of scenario 1, the imposed share of the state target crop 
cotton in the cropping area obstructed alternative crops, thereby preventing a 
GM increase with the same amount of resources. 
                                           
8  Sugar beet and fodder crops are not shown in this table, as they did not appear in any scenario 
results because of low GM. 
9  Sugar beet and fodder crops are not shown in this table, as they did not appear in any scenario 
results because of low GM. Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  78 
3.3  New prices and new constraints 
How therefore would crops have been allocated if the state order for cotton was 
reduced? The outcome of scenario 3 indicated that under these assumptions a 
crop diversification would occur with a substantial increase of the total GM. Part 
of the land, which was released from cotton, was allotted to sunflower and rice 
production resulting in an increase of the total GM with 66 percent whilst con-
currently 27 percent less arable land was allocated. Hence this scenario would have  
allowed the shirkat not only to generate capital for investments in their enterprises,  
but it also offered a more sustainable basis for crop production in a region known  
for an advancing soil degradation (MARTIUS et al., 2004). 
Obviously one could argue that the increase in sunflower allotment seems in 
reality hardly feasible. Although the focus of this study was on the crop produc-
tion processes and excluded the processing and marketing aspects of crops, an 
increased production of sunflower seeds may indeed face obvious bottlenecks  
such as the availability of harvesters or sufficient storage and transportation facilities, 
which have been identified as chief bottlenecks for increased vegetable produc-
tion (BURIEV, 2005). Additional constraints, such as the marketing of these crops, 
may emerge since the local markets would be rapidly saturated as monitored un-
der similar conditions (HAU and VON OPPEN, 2002). Despite these reflections, 
the results underlined the existing potential of increasing income generation of 
farmers even under a controlled change of the state order since a reduced state 
order allowed for crop diversification and would render more land available for 
crop rotation. 
The increased area allocated to rice in scenario 3 is explained by the availability 
of sufficient water and while implying the absence of water charges. However, 
water charges are to be introduced soon in Uzbekistan (MAHMUDOV, 2004; 
SAIFULIN, 1999). Furthermore, rice is cropped mainly on very specific, clay-type 
soils that are not widespread among the soil types in the Khorezm region. This 
may restrict the predicted mushroom type of development in rice cultivation 
once the state order would be eased (VELDWISCH, 2007). 
3.4  Water pricing as a policy option for the future  
When analysing the potential changes in crop allocation with water pricing, the 
results of scenario 4 did meet only partially the hypotheses (Table 4-3: Scenario 4 
vs. scenario 1 or the actual situation and the results of the baseline scenario 1). 
An expected result was a significantly reduced GM owing to the remaining low 
revenues combined with the additional costs of water use. Previous research 
doubted whether water tariffs and pricing per se could be an effective managerial 
tool to bring about a change in water use as long as prices introduced were insuf-
ficient to recover maintenance and operational costs (BOSWORTH et al., 2002). Also 
SAIFULIN et al. (1999) argued that agricultural producers in Uzbekistan would Optimal crop allocation  79
not be able to pay for water charges in light of the low prices received for their 
products. Finally, RUDENKO and LAMERS (2006) showed that the introduction of 
an isolated measure such as the much discussed and advocated water pricing 
will not likely provide sufficient incentives to the farming population to grow 
less water-intensive crops, as alternatives to cotton and wheat, as long as the 
state orders and low output prices for these alternative crops prevail. 
3.5  More incentives when change is introduced as a package 
Would the crop allocation pattern change with the combined introduction of water 
pricing and free market prices? The outcomes (Table 4-3) showed indeed a clear 
change in the cropping pattern as evidenced by the landslide shift from the culti-
vated rice area in favour of melon. Furthermore, cultivating melons was not only 
more beneficial than rice cropping but it also required 32 percent less irrigation  
water compared to previous scenarios (Table 4-3: 4.9 million m
3 vs. 7.2 million m
3). 
Therefore, these findings support the hypothesis that if producers will be offered 
the higher market prices, the necessary incentive for water savings may occur 
even in combination with water charges. On the other hand, under the combined 
assumption of water charges and market prices, the overall GM turned out to be 
quite low, again due to the presence of the compulsory cotton state order in the  
cropping pattern. Also of interest is the negative GM for cotton when using a water  
price of 10 soums m
-3 under the assumption that producers will not alter their 
cropping practices. 
3.6  The burden of the state order for the production process 
Which crops are most attractive given free market conditions? The decreased 
state order did induce an increased allotment for the alternative crops, as well as 
a considerable increase in GM; there was also a decrease in the overall water use 
(Table 4-3). In scenario 6, all available resources and half of the cropping area 
were redirected from cotton to sunflower. Fruits continued to be an attractive 
alternative, as in most of the scenarios tested. These results underlined once 
more that an efficient water policy will yield effect in case producers, and gain 
concurrently the right to sell their products at market prices as was previously 
suggested (SAIFULIN, 1999).  
3.7  Less water but also less income  
Crop allocation also depended on water availability but what changes in crop 
allocation can be expected under water limitations? The resulting cropping pattern 
from scenario 7 resembled the model results in the base scenario 1. Obviously, 
much less rice was chosen under this scenario since rice is the most water-intensive  
crop. In addition to a reduction in rice cultivation, the total GM was reduced under  
this scenario. Under the current state price regulations, rice is still a highly  Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  80 
profitable crop in Khorezm and, therefore, even under the assumptions of water  
limitations, agricultural producers will not be inclined to cultivate alternative crops 
as long as alternative crops result in lower GM. 
3.8  A win-win situation under state order 
The relatively modest increase in output prices compared to the ones used in 
scenario 1 resulted in a drastic reallocation of the total cropping area to sunflower, 
melons and fruits (Table 4-3, scenario 1 vs scenario 8). Even when assuming water 
scarcity, the highest GM among all scenario simulations were obtained while 
concurrently less area needed to be cropped. This suggested, therefore, potential  
for a win-win situation for both farmer/producers and the deteriorated environment. 
However, the state order for cotton remained the prime obstacle for a further 
shift to alternative crops, thus under-exploiting options for reducing the adverse 
land degradation i.e., introducing crop diversification and rendering more land 
available for crop rotation (MARTIUS et al., 2004). 
The results of the various scenarios underline the potential of introducing crops 
other than the presently dominating cotton and winter wheat, but under two con-
ditions: First, producers should enjoy market prices and secondly the state order 
should be eased. Although the latter is a much advocated option (WORLD BANK, 
2003), in case of a decreased state order in cotton and wheat, the GoU may be 
deprived also of the opportunity to provide agricultural producers with inputs on 
preferential terms, including free irrigation water as previously cautioned (RUDENKO  
and LAMERS, 2006). Charging for irrigation water may be presently a widely  
debated remedy for Uzbekistan to initiate an increase in water use efficiency  
(MAHMUDOV, 2004), but without first a decrease in the state order, there is reduced 
incentive for farmers to move towards water saving crops and changing behaviour. 
3.9  Almost free market environment 
The results of this scenario 9, which tested how resource allocation would be 
altered if different measures were to be introduced in a mix, showed a sharp in-
crease in GM despite the additional water costs. The productivity of water use in 
this scenario turned out to be the highest of all scenarios tested, underlining that 
more income is generated for each cubic meter of withdrawn water. The outcomes 
indicated in addition an increas in land allocated to vegetables. Yet, as argued  
for scenarios 3 and 6, a large increase in sunflower production may not be realistic  
at present owing to the absence of adequate agricultural machinery, output markets  
and availability of seasonal labour (BURIEV, 2005). Furthermore, there may be 
structural constraints such as the deficiencies in processing facilities, or bottle-
necks in service providing institutions such as credit or extension, which showed 
to be of key importance in farm development in Azerbaijan (LAMERS et al., 2000).  Optimal crop allocation  81
One may underscore that the findings are valid for an abandoned farm type. 
However, even though shirkat farm types have been privatized since 2006 and 
instead private farms have been created, these new production units differ from 
the previously dominating shirkat production system mainly in size and owner-
ship of land and agricultural machinery. Yet, at present the newly created private 
farms in Uzbekistan operate based on input use norms which were developed in 
the FSU period, state orders and state procurement of strategic crops as was the 
case before the privatization, and fixed purchase prices determined by monopo-
listic state structures; and a centrally managed supply of agricultural inputs pro-
vided for use on the strategic cotton and wheat crops only (MÜLLER, 2006). 
Therefore, as long as the newly emerged private farms face similar production 
conditions as the former shirkats, the results obtained from this analysis are  
applicable to the private farm structures as well. However, in the absence of key 
empirical data, the use of the available information from shirkat farms justified 
the procedures applied for the analyses. Hence the same LP tool for optimal re-
source allocation and higher income generation can be used for these newly created 
agricultural units – farms or even rural households – with the same aim of opti-
mal resource allocation and profit maximisation. Irrespective of the present trend 
of agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan, the model results underscored the need for 
decisive agricultural reform in Uzbekistan, including decision making powers at 
the farm level in order to maximise profitability and sustainability of individual 
farms and hence the entire agricultural sector. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The model results revealed poor management, state procurement levels and low 
orders and low prices resulted in a less profitable production pattern in 2001 in 
the Khorezm region, with too little flexibility in the decision-making of shirkat 
managers. The results also provide evidence that similar limitations and restrictions 
will for the newly created farm types since they too will be bound by similar 
production conditions and restraints. There are several differences between shirkats 
and private farms, including ownership and size of the farm; private types of 
ownership may induce more incentives for better land management options and 
small scale fields will be easier to control and cultivate. However, the influence 
of the former and present state regulations and state production policies will  
impact on the private farms as they have on shirkat farms, ultimately resulting in  
little difference in the amount of income between farm types. 
Crop diversification in Uzbekistan is one option to prevent falling incomes, under 
scarce resources. However, such a generalization needs careful consideration. 
For example, many factors have to be considered, including cropping pattern 
under controlled state prices, and potentially low prices for alternative crops due Ihtiyor Bobojonov, Inna Rudenko, John P. A. Lamers  82 
to state-imposed prices. The findings showed that crop diversification indeed 
offers the scope for more efficient land and resource use, but prevents an income 
increase unless the output prices for these alternative crops increase and producers 
have an increased flexibility in the decision-making process. When introducing 
alternative crops into existing cropping patterns, environmental as well as economic 
factors need to be considered. High yields and relatively moderate resource require-
ments should be combined with greater liberalization of market conditions. 
The step-by-step introduction of a market economy in Uzbekistan over the past 
15 years has to a large extent prevented an abrupt and complete breakdown of 
the social security system as experienced in other FSU countries (SPOOR, 1999).  
However, the present pace of progress in farm and agricultural reforms is slowing 
down the economic restructuring and results in further degradation of the natural 
resources in general and of soil and water in particular. Khorezmian farmers are 
currently missing out on the benefits of reform because they fail to come to grips 
with the discrepancy between the aim of the state and exploring their own potential 
with the resources given to them by the same state. But, the present agricultural 
production facilities hardly allow more changes than exist at present. If agricul-
tural producers continue cultivating the strategic crop, namely cotton and rice, they 
risk further deteriorating the environment and natural resources. There is room  
for increasing the efficiency of resource use in the region, but only if socio-economic 
reforms come as a full package and not in isolation.  
A change particularly towards increased resource use efficiency is feasible when 
national standards could be redefined further. Initial steps have been taken, but there 
still is a long road ahead. Improving cultivation conditions for the farming popula-
tion, including less state order influence in cropping decisions and price regulations, 
would represent an unprecedented upheaval of the deteriorating environment in the 
Khorezm region, where food, environment and demographics are at stake. 
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CHAPTER 5 





This paper addresses a problem widely known in agricultural economics; especially 
in the case of developing countries: Input-output relationships are often poorly 
recorded despite the importance of agriculture for many regional and national 
economies and the related ecological systems. With the exception of allocated 
area, it is hardly possible to acquire information on inputs used for the different 
crops in an agricultural production system; this limitation is especially grave in 
terms of disaggregated production data. This paper highlights a method of dealing 
with limited data supply in an efficient manner, by employing a mixed estimation 
approach. This allows us to estimate crop-specific water input based on aggregate 
data via the inclusion of an informative prior for water demand at the field level.  
Besides introducing this methodological approach, a second objective of this 
paper is to quantify quantify the allocation of water to different crops in this region, 
and to gain information about possibilities of reducing water demand. Khorezm is a 
region of interest because of the reliance of the regional economy on agriculture 
and the supply of irrigation water from the river Amu Darya.  
Keywords:  Uzbekistan, water allocation, Mixed Estimation Method, data 
recovery. 
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Данная работа преследует, главным образом, две цели. Первая – изучение 
широко известной проблемы в сельскохозяйственной экономике, в особен-
ности, в развивающихся странах – взаимосвязь между ресурсами и произ-
водством остается без должного учета, несмотря на значимость сельского 
хозяйства для региональной и национальной экономики и соответствующих 
экологических систем. За исключением отдельных районов, здесь очень 
трудно приобрести информацию о затратах (например, орошения) на раз-
личные виды культур в сельскохозяйственной производственной системе, в 
то время как информация об общем количестве более доступна. Для того, 
чтобы максимально использовать ограниченные данные, применяется метод 
комбинированной оценки. Этот метод позволяет оценить расходы воды для 
культуры, основываясь на совокупных показателях, путем изучения водопо-
требления на уровне поля. Второй целью данной работы является определение 
количества распределяемой воды для различных культур в регионе и сбор 
информации  о  возможностях  сокращения  водопотребления.  Хорезмская 
область представляет большой интерес в силу зависимости уровня эко- 
номического  развития  в  регионе  от  сельского  хозяйства  и  обеспечения 
оросительных систем водой из реки Амударья. 
Ключевые слова:  Узбекистан, водораспределение, метод комбинирован-
ной оценки. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
The years 2000 and 2001 marked the most severe water-shortage in Uzbekistan 
recorded over the last two decades. While the entire country felt the impact of 
this drought, the downstream regions Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, located in 
north-west of Uzbekistan, south of the Aral Sea, were affected most heavily. The 
annual flow of the main provider of irrigation water for this part of the country –  
the Amu Darya River – amounted to only 40 % and 34 % of the long-term average  
in 2000 and in 2001, respectively. For the first time since the early eighties, the  
total harvested area in Uzbekistan declined in response to a lack of irrigation water.  
In the most harshly affected regions, like Khorezm, the total real output value of  
the plant-producing sector dropped by 33 % in 2001, compared to recorded output  
for 1998. Given the fact that the regional incomes depend mainly – be it directly or  
indirectly – on irrigated agriculture, the drought in 2000/2001 caused serious harm  
to the economic welfare of the population in the Khorezm region, and Uzbekistan  
as a whole.  
Farmers in Uzbekistan have been using the water flows from Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya to irrigate their fields since ancient times. The provision of water in 
sufficient quantities has never been a certain event in the past nor will it be in 
the future. But due to population growth and the extension of the irrigated area 
the probability to receive adequate amounts of water has decreased to a level 
that raises concern about the sustainability of the current agricultural production 
system. (e.g. MÜLLER, 2006). 
A major obstacle for analysts attempting to develop strategies to decrease the 
regional agricultural production systems' reliance on irrigation water is the lack 
of available data on water allocation across different crops and on the losses of 
irrigation water during the conveyance from the source to the fields. Farmers are  
usually not in a position to provide the required information due to a lack of water 
measurements at the field level, and official statistical departments often make 
aggregate data on irrigation water and allocated areas available, but crop-specific 
water inputs are difficult to obtain. As this issue occurs frequently in applied 
studies, it has been addressed by several scholars in the past and a variety of 
methods to recover the missing data from available sets of information has been 
suggested; ranging from approaches based on sample information only (e.g. 
JUST et al., 1990) to approaches which allow for the includsion of additional in-
formation within a generalized maximum entropy framework (GME, see e.g. 
LENCE and MILLER, 1998; GOLAN et al., 1996). The study presented here aims at 
the recovery of information about crop-specific irrigation water on the basis of 
aggregate water usage and average per-hectare requirements of main crops in the 
region Khorezm by employing a "mixed estimation method" (MEM) that allows 
the usage of prior information about the parameters to be estimated but does not 
rely on the formulation of support points like GME. The main objective is to gain Marc Müller  92 
insights into the actual water demands of the main crops and crop-aggregates, as 
well as into the patterns of water usage in different districts, as they differ in 
their proximity to the source of irrigation water, the Amu Darya River.  
The following section 2 will outline the general characteristics of irrigation and  
crop production in the region of Khorezm and its sub-regional districts. In section 3, 
a mixed estimation approach following JUST et al. (1990) is applied in order to estimate 
the missing crop-specific water inputs; the results are discussed in section 4. 
Section 5 summarizes the main findings and states some cautious implications for 
mandatory policy change as well as suggestions for further research on the topic.  
2 AGRICULTURE AND IRRIGATION IN THE KHOREZM REGION 
Plant production in the Khorezm region is characterized by the high share of cotton 
(Figure 5-1), mainly because of the fact that cotton is a strategic crop in Uzbekistan 
and its production is largely determined by governmental interventions. These 
interventions range from the administration of production targets to the subsidiza-
tion of core inputs (e.g. fertilizers) to cotton growers. The same applies to a lesser 
extent to wheat (largest component within the category "grains" in Figure 5-1).  
The Uzbek government has fostered the domestic production of wheat since 
1994 as a strategy to substitute wheat imports with domestic produce (IMF, 2000), 
and the area allocated to wheat has increased in the Khorezm region, although  
its share in the total area cropped is still comparatively low. Rice is the third  
major single crop in Khorezm and the regional output contributed in 1999 was  
around 30 % of the national supply (OBLSTAT, 2002b and FAOSTAT, 2007).  
Figure 5-1:  Harvested crop area in the Khorezm region, 1990 to 2001,  
















Cotton Grains Rice Fruit and vegetables Fodder crops Other  
Sources:   OBLSTAT, 2002a; OBLSTAT, 2002b. Where has all the water gone?  93
The commodity group "fruit and vegetables" comprises melons, orchards, grape 
plantations, and vegetables like onions and carrots. The production takes place 
mainly on household plots.  
The water supply for the six crops and crop-aggregates described above depends 
mainly on the flow of the lower Amu Darya, which is collected in the Tuyamuyun 
reservoir south-east of the Khorezm region and released during the irrigation  
period. As illustrated in Figure 5-2, the water intake of the Khorezm region during  
the irrigation period of approximately 4.5 km
3 is in most years below the discharges  
from Tuyamuyun, except in the drought years 2000 and 2001, during which  
Khorezm received apparently all of the water available. The decline of harvested  
area (Figure 5-1) in those years indicates that the supply of water was well below 
the actual demand and underlines the dependence of Khorezm’s agriculture on  
irrigation water. However, Figure 5-2 also illustrates that drought years are a 
rather exceptional event; occuring twice since 1990. 
When comparing the feedback between available irrigation water and harvested 
area (Figure 5-1 and 5-2), it appears that water scarcity has the largest impact 
on the harvested rice area while the other five crop categories are affected to a 
much lesser extent. This is not only because of the high water demand of rice, 
but also because the level of rice production was restricted during the drought 
years by governmental regulations in order to ensure the availability of water 
for cotton and wheat. Cotton and wheat production are mostly determined by 
state orders (OBLSTAT, 2002b, household plot are an exception from the state 
order); fruit and vegetables have to satisfy subsistence demand and fodder is 
required by the animal stock whose annual output value is approximately as 
high as the total plant output value (OBLSTAT, 2002a). Other crops like pota-
toes and sugar beet represent only a small segment of the production system. 
The details of agricultural producers’ behavior in the Khorezm region are, 
however, beyond the scope of this study and are addressed in current works by 
DJANIBEKOV (2007, Chapter 3 in this volume) and BOBOJONOV, RUDENKO and 
LAMERS (2007, Chapter 4 in this volume). The main objective here is to iden-
tify the actual distribution of irrigation water across districts and crops. Marc Müller  94 































































Discharge at Tuyamuyun Reservoir Irrigation water usage in Khorezm Khorezm intake  
Source:  HYDROMET, 2002; OBLSELVODKHOZ, 2002a; OBLSELVODKHOZ, 2002b; real. 
Data available for the Khorezm region is divided between 10 or 11 districts,  
depending on the year for which data is recorded: The district Pitnyak (no. 11 in 
Figure 5-3) is in some years merged with Khazarasp (no. 5 in Figure 5-3), probably 
because its larger part (the area east of the Tuyamuyun) consists only of unirrigated  
desert land. Four districts do not border the Amu Darya directly (Kushkupir,  
Shavat, Khiva, and Yangiarik), of which Shavat has the comparative advantage  
that a major irrigation channel provides water to the district’s farmers. 
Figure 5-3:  Irrigation network and districts (rayons) in the Khorezm region 
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For these districts, the following sets of information are available: First, the annual 
total usage of water during the irrigation period (April to September) from 1998 
to 2001 (OBLSELVODKHOS, 2002, depicted in Figure 5-2 on Khorezm level) and 
the areas allocated for the different crops in the same period (OBLSTAT, 2002b). 
When comparing average gross water consumption among districts (Figure 5-4), 
it appears that the values for the remote districts are considerably higher than the 
values in the districts closer to the Amu Darya. This may demonstrate higher 
conveyance losses, but could also be explained by a higher share of water intensive 
crops in those districts. In addition, the decline of gross water usage per hectare 
from 1999 to 2001 in the remote districts ranges between 57 % and 65 % and is 
remarkably higher than in the other districts (Figure 5-4).  
In order to identify crop-specific water demand in the absence of actual data it is 
necessary to have an informed guess or applicable expert knowledge. Such infor-
mation is available in the context of the following scenario:  
Figure 5-4:  Average gross irrigation water per hectare in 1999 and relative 










Source: OBLSTAT, 2002b; author’s presentation. 
The regional department of the Ministry for Agriculture and Water Resources 
calculates the expected requirement for irrigation water in a future period based 
on assumed (formerly "planned") areas and "norm" values for the water-demand 
of different crops. These "norm" values are calculated according to a hydrological 
model (HYDROMODRAY, 2002) which was developed during Soviet times. This 
model provides estimates for the on-field demand of irrigation water for several 
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irrigated land, so that the calculated "norm" values for each crop differ depending 
on the model’s land classification. Table 5-1 shows the weighted average norm 
values for the regarded crops and crop-aggregates in the Khorezm region.  
Table 5-1:  Average norm water requirements in the Khorezm region 
 
Water requirement during the irrigation period 
[1000 m
3/ha] 
Grains  4.5 
Rice  26.2 
Fruit and vegetables  6.3 
Other market crops  8.4 
Fodder crops  6.7 
Source: HYDROMODRAY, 2002. 
3 ESTIMATION OF CROP-SPECIFIC WATER ALLOCATION  
Statistical sources for agricultural production systems often provide data about 
produced quantities and harvested areas, but data about inputs are usually only 
available at an aggregate level. The recovery of missing information on inputs 
allocated to different crops is a crucial step for the quantitative assessment of the 
agricultural production system’s efficiency, as a first step towards deriving policies 
promoting possible omprovements. The best source for crop-specific information 
on applied irrigation water would be detailed measurements, but those are of 
limited availability in developing countries and conducting one’s own measurements 
requires time and monetary resources that are not readily available. The second-
best option is, therefore, to take advantage of any source of readily available 
information and systematically combine all available data during the estimation 
process. 
The approach followed here is based on JUST ET AL. (1990), who suggest splitting 
the water allocation per unit of area in a crop effect, a regional effect, and an annual 
effect. Here, the water usage per hectare can consequently be expressed as in 
Equation (1): 
         =+ +
est
c,r,t c r t CSW ccrop cray cyear    (1) 
with:  
 CSW
est:  Estimated crop-specific water     [1000 m
3/ha] 
  ccrop:    Parameter covering the crop effects    [1000 m
3/ha] 
  cray:    Parameter covering the regional effects  [1000 m
3/ha] 
  cyear:    Parameter covering the annual effects  [1000 m
3/ha] Where has all the water gone?  97
  r:  Index for Rayons (districts)    {Gurlen, …, Pitnyak} 
  t:  Index for time        {1998, 1999, 2001} 
  c:  Index for crops        {Cotton, …, Other} 
Following JUST et al. (1990), the total water usage in each region equals the per-
hectare values multiplied by allocated areas. The estimation model is as seen in 
Equation (2): 
  () =+ + ⋅ + ε ∑
ray year
r,t c r r t t c,r,t r,t
c
TAW ccrop cray D cyearD AREA          (2) 
with:  
  TAW:    Total available water [1000 m
3] 
  AREA:    Allocated area [ha] 
  D:    Binary (Dummy) variables covering regional and annual effects 
  ε:    Error term 
  ray:    Index for Rayon Dummies 
  year:    Index for year Dummies 
The needed data for TAW and AREA are available for the 11 Rayons in Khorezm: 
For the years1998 to 2001, 12 crops and crop-aggregates are included and are 
summarized here in six categories. In total, there are 44 observations for TAW, 
and as many for the areas of the different crops. The model was normalized for 
the year 1998 and the Rayon Bagat in order to avoid singularity of the matrix of 
explaining variables (X). The number of parameters to be estimated is consequently: 
  ccrop:      6 
 cray:    10 
  cyear:      3 
 Total:    19 
Thus, Equation (2) can be estimated with 25 degrees of freedom only; therefore, 
the different effects for crops, district, and years cannot be isolated at a satisfying  
level of statistical significance and the validity of the results are questionable. Indeed,  
it turned out that the results for the crop-effects by estimating (2) with ordinary 
least squares (OLS) were unreliable: They did not agree with the available "norm" 
values for each input and became negative in some cases, which is unrealistic  
since physical input quantities cannot have values below zero. The source of this 
problem is most likely the comparatively limited number of available observations. 
In order to address the aforementioned problem, an alternative estimation method was 
used, the "mixed estimation method" proposed by THEIL and GOLDBERGER (1961). 
This approach allows for the inclusion of additional information on the parameters Marc Müller  98 
to be estimated. The general idea of this approach is to combine the sample-
distribution of a parameter-vector b with prior information about the mean and 
variance of the respective parameter. The model was formulated according to 
GREENE (2003): 
  () () () ()
− −− −− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ σ = +σ +σ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
1 11 11 22 2
MEM E[ | , , ]
-1 -1
00 0 β TAW X Σ X'X Σβ X'X b       (3) 
  () =
-1 bX ' X X ' T A W                 ( 4 )  
  = e TA W-X b                 ( 5 )  




e'e                 ( 6 )  
with:  E[ ]  Expected value 
  βMEM:  Vector of parameters to be estimated (ccrop, cray, cyear) 
  σ
2: Variance  of  β (obtained from OLS regression, s
2) 
  X:  Matrix of area and dummy variables 
  Σ0:  Prior information about variances of β 
  β0:  Prior information about expected values of β 
  b:  Parameter vector obtained from OLS regression 
  e:  Error term of OLS regression 
  k:  Number of parameters to be estimated (19) 
  n:  Number of observation (44) 
The crucial point of this method is to determine the prior information about  
expected values of the parameters (β0) and their variances (Σ0) accurately. Especially 
when the sample is comparatively small, the weight of the prior information in 
the estimation process will be very high. Consequently, β0 was constructed by using 
the "norm" values for the inputs in the case of the parameter group covering the 
crop-effects (ccrop). Prior information for regional effects (cray) was not available 
and was therefore set to the average difference between net and gross water usage 
based on the sample and recommended data. The annual effects (cyear) were set 
to equal the average decreases of water availability throughout the Khorezm region. 
In the case of crop effects, the variances Σ0 were assumed to be at a level to make 
negative values very unlikely. This was achieved by setting the standard errors 
to one-third of the norm values. Variances of the regional and annual effects 
were taken from the OLS regression. Where has all the water gone?  99
4 RESULTS 
The results from the estimation are shown in Table 5-2. It turns out that the crop 
effects deviate substantially from the prior information, indicating that the recom-
mendations from HYDROMODRAY (2002) do not match the actual irrigation 
practice on the fields. The annual effects on the other hand do not deviate signify-
cantly and show plausible results with negative values for 2000 and 2001, which 
were the drought years. The regional effects from the MEM estimation convey 
in principle the same message as the prior information, including that the water 
usage per hectare in the regions not bordering the Amu Darya is higher than in 
the regions along the river. As would be expected, in the off-stream regions, 
more water is needed per hectare in order to compensate for the losses associated 
with transporting water from the river to the respective regions. 
The MEM estimation for total water consumption across the districts of Khorezm 
replicates the sample information with an R
2 of 0.96; the fit of estimated and ob-
served values is displayed in Figure 5-5. It appears that the estimates for 2000 
and 2001 show slightly higher deviations from the observations than in the other 
years. The reason is the rigid formulation of the estimated model that does not 
include dynamic adjustments of the crop-effects on total consumption (ccrop). 
Annual patterns are covered by a different parameter (cyear), which measures  
the absolute average deviation from the irrigation water usage per hectare in 1998. 
Although the actual adjustment of on-field application of irrigation water is done 
in a more complex manner than expressed in the estimated model, the results are 
surprisingly accurate even for 2001. 
The estimated average water application levels for the included crops and crop-
aggregates are, in all cases, higher than those recommended by HYDROMODRAY 
2002 (Figure 5-6). Cotton showed the largest relative deviation of 86 %. This 
result has to be interpreted cautiously in the context of the estimation model,  
because the high area-share of cotton increases the explanatory power of the asso-
ciated parameter, but it nevertheless indicates that the on-field losses are com-
paratively high. The second highest deviations can be observed in the case of 
fodder crops (72 %). This finding is due most likely to the fact that the officially 
recorded levels of fodder production are below the actual acreage, as fodder is 
also produced in small household plots which are not monitored in the same way  
as former state farms and newly established private farms. Rice production is  
estimated at 35000 m
3 per hectare and is the most water demanding crop. Despite  
the comparatively low area-share, rice is the largest water consumer in the Khorezm  
region (31 % of total water usage in 1999, Figure 5-7).  Marc Müller  100
Table 5-2:  Estimation results and prior information 
   OLS Prior  MEM 
 [1000  m
3/ha]  b  σ  β0  0 Σ   βBAY  σBAY  tBAY
Cotton  41.61  13.71 5.62  1.87  10.47  1.56  6.72 
Grains  -5.55  19.08 4.49  1.50  6.10  1.46  4.17 
Rice  4.44  12.26 26.20 8.73  36.71  4.47  8.22 
Fruit and vegetable  -4.11  20.60 6.29  2.10  7.78  2.06  3.77 














Other crops  -19.52  35.30 6.72  2.24  7.72  2.22  3.47 
Gurlen  -0.26  3.05  3.77  3.05  1.61  0.84  1.91 
Kushkupir  0.52  1.37  7.84  1.37  6.79  0.55  12.41 
Urgench  -0.35  1.85  4.39  1.85  2.89  0.56  5.20 
Khazarasp  -1.11  1.33  5.84  1.33  4.80  0.67  7.20 
Khanka  -2.82  1.39  2.40  1.39  0.90  0.55  1.64 
Khiva  1.32  1.52  6.66  1.52  5.64  0.65  8.66 
Shavat  -0.10  1.04  5.82  1.04  4.92  0.52  9.50 
Yangiarik  3.63  1.40  7.97  1.40  6.90  0.69  9.94 















Pitnyak  4.89  3.59  1.60  3.59  -0.47  1.71  -0.27 
1999  0.03  0.95  -0.54 0.95  -0.18  0.39  -0.46 
















2001  -12.58  1.76  -10.68 1.76  -7.45  0.66  -11.29 
Source: OBLSELVODKHOZ, 2002; author’s results. 
 
Net conveyance losses amounted to 20  % of total water consumption in the 
Khorezm region (Figure 5-7) during the years with sufficient water supply. 
When interpreting the deviations between recommended and estimated on-field 
usage of irrigation water as losses due to sub-optimal irrigation practice, the 
losses on field amounted to 29 % in 1998 and 1999.  Where has all the water gone?  101
Figure 5-5:  Observed and estimated water usage in the Khorezm region,  












































































































































































































































































































































Source: OBLSTAT, 2002b; author’s results. 
Figure 5-6:  Recommended and estimated application of irrigation water 
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Source: HYDROMODRAY, 2002; author’s results. Marc Müller  102 
Figure 5-7:  Distribution of irrigation water in the Khorezm region during 
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Source: Author’s  results. 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
The aim of this study was to derive crop-specific application rates of irrigation 
water based on information about aggregated water supply, harvested areas, and 
recommended values for on-field demand of the various crops grown. (The 
crops are grouped into six crops and crop aggregates for this study). In order to 
combine all types of information, a Mixed Estimation Method based on THEIL  
and GOLDBERGER (1961) was employed. It was shown that the estimated actual 
water application on the fields is systematically higher than recommended by a 
regional hydrological model. The highest deviation was calculated for the domi-
nant crop, cotton, while the largest consumer of irrigation water in the Khorezm  
region during the observed period was rice. When interpreting the estimated 
rayon-effects as conveyance losses and the deviations between recommended 
and estimated on-field applications as results of a sub-optimal management of the 
irrigation system, it appears that conveyance losses amount to 20 % of the total 
water supply in the region, with on-field losses as high as 29 %. 
These results are of relevance when developing strategies to decrease the total 
demand for irrigation water in the Khorezm region in order to mitigate the region's 
dependency on the naturally given water supply from the Amu Darya river. The Where has all the water gone?  103
results demonstrate that reduction of conveyance losses by appropriate mainte-
nance of the regional channels, as well as investment in infrastructure, would have 
a potentially lower impact than improvement of the irrigation system on the fields. 
In particular, a higher irrigation efficiency of cotton production through appropriate 
preparation of the fields and adequate timing of the irrigation events throughout 
the irrigation period could be a less costly and feasible measure. The same applies 
basically for all crops included in this study, but cotton production appears to 
have the highest potential for efficiency gains.  
The fact that rice production has the highest share in regional water consumption 
suggests that the administrative restriction of rice areas is a cheap and effective 
way of reducing total water demand – this policy was employed during the drought 
years 2000 and 2001. The permanent application of such a policy, however, would 
further decrease the farmers’ already limited entrepreneurial freedom and cause 
significant welfare losses within the agricultural sector of the Khorezm region. 
An alternative for farmers to save water would be the introduction of irrigation 
fees, which would directly affect the profitability of rice production, but such a 
political measure has also to consider the ability of farmers to pay such fees. 
The formulation of feasible strategies to improve the efficiency of the irrigation 
system in Khorezm requires a better understanding of the hydrological, agro-
nomical, and institutional dimensions. The main objective of this study was to 
shed light on the actual water usage patterns in the Khorezm region based on 
available data, and the results indicate improvement of on-field irrigation effi-
ciency (especially for cotton) as a reasonable starting point for further studies in 
this domain. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF WATER USE AND ALLOCATION FOR THE  
KHOREZM REGION IN UZBEKISTAN USING AN  
INTEGRATED ECONOMIC-HYDROLOGIC MODEL 
 
TINA SCHIEDER
∗ AND XIMING CAI
∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Sustainable management of water resources is important for social and economic 
development in Khorezm, a region in the Amu Darya region (Aral Sea Basin), 
Central Asia; Republic of Uzbekistan. Due to historical and recent expansion of 
irrigation projects, the region highly depends on water for irrigation. However, 
inefficient water management results in severe ecological, social, and economical 
problems such as rising soil and water salinity, waterlogging (high groundwater 
levels), declining crop yields and health problems. The increasing competition  
among water users within the region and between up- and downstream areas along 
the river calls for a more efficient water allocation and management approach. In 
this paper an integrated economic-hydrologic model is developed for water allo-
cation analysis in the Khorezm region, which is used to 1) determine water use 
patterns according to physical and agronomical basics; and 2) explore strategies 
for more efficient allocation and management of water resources through the 
analysis of alternative water policy scenarios. The model consists of a system of  
non-linear equations programmed in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System).  
The model integrates various disciplines (natural sciences, economics, and social  
sciences) to search for efficient, equitable, and environmentally sustainable water 
allocation mechanisms for the study area. This modeling study can serve as an  
example for Uzbek river basins and irrigation areas as a whole. 
Keywords:  Irrigation, Uzbekistan, optimization model. 
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АНАЛИЗ ПОТРЕБЛЕНИЯ И РАСПРЕДЕЛЕНИЯ ВОДЫ В ХОРЕЗМСКОЙ 
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∗∗ 
АННОТАЦИЯ 
Устойчивое  управление  водными  ресурсами  является  весьма  важным 
фактором социального и экономического развития в Хорезмской области, 
которая  расположена  в  дельте  реки  Амударьи  в  Приаралье ( Республика  
Узбекистан, Центральная Азия). Вследствие развития ирригационных работ 
в прошлом и на современном этапе, регион сильно зависит от водных 
ресурсов для оросительных целей. Однако нерациональное использование 
водных ресурсов приводит к таким экологическим, социальным и эконо-
мическим проблемам, как повышение степени засоленности почвы и воды, 
заболачивание (высокий уровень грунтовых вод), понижение урожайности 
культур и возрастающие проблемы со здоровьем. Усиливающаяся конку-
ренция среди водопользователей в пределах самого региона а также районов, 
расположенных выше и ниже по течению реки в этой области, требует более 
эффективного подхода к распределению и управлению водными ресурсами. 
Авторами разрабатывается интегрированная экономичко-гидрологическая 
модель для анализа водораспределения в Хорезмской области, которая будет 
использоваться, во-первых, для установления схем водопользования согласно 
физическим  и  агрономическим  показателям  и,  во  вторых,  для  изучения 
стратегий более эффективного распределения водных ресурсов и их управ-
ления путем анализа сценариев альтернативной водохозяйственной политики. 
Модель, состоящая из системы нелинейных уравнений, запрограммирована 
по Системе общего алгебраического моделирования (СОАМ). Разработка 
такой модели – это шаг к интегрированию различных дисциплин таких, 
как естествознание, экономика и социология, для улучшенного управления 
водными ресурсами, включая эффективные, справедливые и экологически 
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устойчивые механизмы водораспределения в изучаемом регионе. Данное 
исследование может послужить примером для регионов речных бассейнов 
и орошаемых земель по всему Узбекистану.  
Ключевые слова:  Интегрированная  гидрологическо-экономическая  
модель, орошение, модель оптимизации, распределение 
воды. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Khorezm region of Uzbekistan, water consumption and management for 
irrigated agriculture is inefficient and unsustainable. Like in much of Uzbekistan, 
irrigated agriculture is a primary source of income and has resulted in drastic 
ecological, social, and economical problems, which continue to worsen. To improve 
water management and minimise the negative effects of existing practices on the 
local and national ecosystem and livelihoods, a more efficient water allocation 
and water use management strategy is needed.  
In the following study, a regional analysis was carried out for the Khorezm  
region to analyze water allocation and use at various spatial scales and the impacts 
of alternative water management strategies and policies on hydrologic cycles, 
plant growth, yields and areas. The main objective of this study was to detect 
water supply and demand balance as a consequence of the water availability and 
water use patterns in the study region. The method could be applicable to all irriga-
ted areas in Uzbekistan. Based on agronomic, hydrologic and climatologic data 
and calculations, economic consequences of optional, more effective water use, 
management and allocations were estimated. The results could be used to inform 
policy makers of more efficient water use strategies in the region.  
Hypotheses for the research that arise from the given situation include:  
•  The complex interdisciplinary relationships between hydrology, agronomy,  
and socio-economy can only be effectively acquired and manifested within  
an integrated modeling tool. 
•  With modified cropping patterns, reduced cropping areas, improved water 
management and increased water use efficiency, it should be possible to 
reduce environmental damage while enhancing agricultural production levels. 
•  Measures like taxes, subsidies, permits and rights have a positive impact 
on more effective water use and allocation, which will be beneficial to 
both local ecosystems as well as the economy. 
2 REGIONAL CONDITIONS AND CASE STUDY AREA  
2.1 Uzbekistan 
The case study area is situated within the Republic of Uzbekistan. During the 
Soviet time, Uzbekistan became the largest cotton producer in the U.S.S.R. and  
ultimately a key supplier for the rest of the Soviet Union. Poor water management 
during that period brought decades of water stress, lack of drinking water and 
sewage treatment facilities, heavy use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers in Analysis of water use and allocation  109
the fields; the construction of industrial enterprises has resulted in significant 
impacts on human society and the environment. Cotton production throughout 
Uzbekistan is characterized by large-scale use of chemicals, inefficient irrigation 
systems, low water use efficiency, and poor drainage systems that have resulted 
in a high filtration of salinized and contaminated water back into the soil 
(CURTIS, 2004). Combined, these processes have threatened the water quality for 
drinking water supply and irrigation. The Khorezm region illustrates the notorious 
"Aral Sea Crisis" in Central Asia associated with the excessive expansion of the 
irrigated cotton agriculture in Central Asian republics (GIESE, 1998; CAI et al., 
2003a). 
After its independence in 1991 Uzbekistan’s government started to alter the Soviet-
style command economy of central planning, a system characterized by large 
subsidies and control over production and prices. During this period of transition, 
Uzbekistan has nonetheless retained many elements of Soviet economic planning.  
Economic policies remain under state control; the government has limited foreign  
direct investment and little privatization has occurred aside from small enterprises  
(CURTIS, 2004). Intended structural changes and imperative measures to protect 
the environment have been slow or absent due in large part to ongoing state  
controle over the economy and thus on the environment. Additionally, high popu-
lation growth rate have led to increasing pressure on the environment and natural  
resources such as the Amu Darya River and the Aral Sea (UNITED NATIONS, 2001). 
2.2  Amu Darya River and the Khorezm Region 
During the past 30 years, the Amu-Darya River, the largest river in Central Asia, 
has been used for large-scale irrigation projects.
1 There exist hundreds of canals 
and lift stations to supply and distribute water from the Amu Darya for irrigation. 
In this process, a number of water storage reservoirs were generated and have 
resulted in a nearly 100 % rate of consumption of the water from the Amu Darya. 
At present, less than 10 % of pre-1960 levels of water is arriving at the Aral Sea 
(2-5 km
3 per year). In some years, no water arrives at all.  
The Khorezm region is dominated by large-scale irrigation (Figure 6-1). The 
Province is situated in the north-western part of Uzbekistan at the lower reaches 
of the Amu Darya. Its total area is around 6300 square kilometers. The climate is 
continental, with moderately cold winters and dry hot summers. The Aral Sea 
basin experiences less than 150-200 mm of annual precipitation,
2 but potential 
evapotranspiration is as high as 1700 mm/year.  
                                           
1  There are more than two million hectares of irrigated land in the Amu Darya basin, approxi-
mately one half of the total irrigated area in Uzbekistan. 
2  Khorezm denotes an average annual precipitation below 100 mm. Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  110 
Figure 6-1:  Irrigation system in the Khorezm region 
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Current figures estimate the population in the Khorezm region exceeds 1.2 million, 
with about 80 % living in the rural areas. The province is divided into 10 administra-
tive districts with Urgench as the administrative center. The Amu Darya provides 
irrigation water to some 270 thousand hectares of land in the Khorezm region 
(of which >12 % is highly salinized). The region accounts for 15 % of all water 
withdrawls in Uzbkistan and water consumption for agriculture is estimated at 
94 % of the total regional water budget. 
The main strategic crop in the Khorezm region is cotton, occupying more than 
45 % of all sown area in the period 1998-2001. Other basic crops in the Khorezm  
region include wheat, rice, potato, vegetables, melons, fruits and grapes. After 
1993 the government started a new policy aimed at independence in grain supply 
and, more specifically, self-sufficiency in wheat. During the same period, cereal 
production has increased mainly through state orders, subsidies and direct credits. 
These policies have led to a decline in vegetable and fodder crops, which in turn  
has negatively affected livestock breeding and productivity, as well as the quality  
and productivity of agricultural lands due to the elimination of crop rotation. 
Costs of cotton and wheat production in the Khorezm region and Uzbekistan 
were still higher than at the international level; yields did not increase and new, 
more effective technologies were not introduced (UNITED NATIONS, 2001). The 
average water use per hectare is up to 12000 m
3; for wheat, rice and cotton it is 
around 5000, 30000, 12000 m
3, respectively (UNESCO, 2000; FAO, 1997). Analysis of water use and allocation  111
One of the central problems of the irrigation system seems to be its poor effi-
ciency and maintenance. Water application efficiency in the field averages just 
40 %, while water distribution efficiency to the fields is approximately 50 % 
(UNESCO, 2000; FAO 1997). The annual discharge of collector and drainage 
water in the Khorezm region goes directly to evaporation ponds, natural salt lakes, 
or is re-used for irrigation. High water consumption and high loss rates require 
better management and restructuring of the farming system; but one has to bear 
in mind that due to the transition to a market economy there is a lack of economic 
incentives and financial resources to improve the irrigation system, and neither 
land-use nor water-use practices at the moment encourage improved efficiency 
in water use. For these aforementioned reasons, models can serve as an instru-
ment to assess alternatives for future strategies.  
3 METHODOLOGY 
Economic-hydrologic models 
Sustainable and efficient management of water resources requires an interdisci-
plinary approach. To analyze the management policies, natural, economic and 
social aspects have to be integrated into a consistent model. The economic com-
ponents are driven by the hydrologic and agronomic system that is based on 
physical parameters and principles while the hydrologic components and their 
operation is driven by socio-economic (and environmental) objectives.
3 
Khorezm Water Management Model 
The aims of the modeling analysis include: 
•  The detection of water supply and demand balance resulting from water 
availability and water use patterns in the region of Khorezm; 
•  The evaluation of economic and environmental consequences (costs, 
benefits, tradeoffs and complementarities) of water use in the region and the 
detection of water based or related constraints to agricultural and economic 
development; 
•  The exploration of the impacts of economic incentives such as water prices, 
irrigation investment; salinity control measures on crop pattern change, 
water use and hydrology; 
•  The identification of strategies and policies for more efficient water allocation 
among users, agricultural development and water resource demand manage-
ment in the Khorezm region. 
                                           
3  For further details see MCKINNEY et al., 1999; CAI et al., 2003b. Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  112 
The regional water management model is built up as a system of nonlinear equa-
tions. The model components and the interactions among them are based on  
hydrologic, agronomic, economic and institutional relationships. The model is 
developed in the context of the Khorezm region, where the agricultural demand 
for irrigation purposes plays the most important role (other sectors are marginal). 
The allocation of water via irrigation canals of different orders to the field level 
will be of special consideration, including water distribution and conveyance 
and field application efficiencies, irrigation network and canal lining.  
The model is comprised of: 
•  Hydrologic components (water flow and salinity transport and balances, 
groundwater balances, crop field water and salinity balances); 
•  Economic relationships and incentives (production and profit functions for 
different crops and water uses, costs, welfare, water prices and taxes); 
•  Agronomic components (crop parameters, yields, soil characteristics); 
•  Irrigation management (efficiency) and environmental conditions (salinity 
control); 
•  Institutional rules and policies (water and salinity regulations). 
Structure, components and modules of the model 
The Amu Darya river water is distributed to the main irrigation canals in the 
Khorezm region. As the model is static, the water is exogenously given to the  
region and then distributed to the districts. Within the districts the water is distri-
buted for industrial/municipal consumption and to the different agricultural  
demand sites. Here the water is allocated to a number of crop fields according to 
their water requirements and profitability and according to different soil types. 
The water from the river, local water from precipitation, drainage re-use and 
groundwater are all considered as sources for irrigation. The major fraction of 
irrigation water is consumed by crops via evapotranspiration; the rest is perco-
lated to the downward layer and to groundwater; part of the percolation is 
drained and delivered to evaporation ponds or is re-used for irrigation. Due to 
increasing groundwater levels and the deliberate afflux of irrigation and drainage 
water within the canals, the influence of groundwater pumping, as well as leaching, 
and groundwater exchange with the crop root zone (via seepage losses and capil-
lary rise) is simulated in the modeling framework. 
The cropping areas and yields are determined within the optimization model 
within a given set of boundaries that represent historical cropping patterns and 
yields. At the regional scale, the general hydrologic operation and water allocation 
to districts is determined for the purpose of maximizing agricultural gross margins 
for the single districts and for the whole region. For water allocation at the  Analysis of water use and allocation  113
sub-regional and district level, efficiency of the water distribution system and the 
groundwater and drainage system are taken into consideration. The allocation 
among crops and among different soil types is determined with consideration of 
soil parameters, cropping pattern and crop characteristics.  
The demand of water is determined endogenously within the model by using 
empirical agronomic production functions. Water supply is determined through 
hydrologic water balances (surface water, groundwater balance, drainage water, 
soil water) in the region with extension to the irrigated crop fields at each of the 
irrigation demand sites.  
Water demand and water supply are then integrated into an endogenous system; 
the valuation of revenues, crop market prices, and gross margins is implemented  
in an economic objective function, which is constrained by hydrologic, agronomic, 
and institutional relations. In particular, crop yield that relates water demand and 
supply is determined by the requirement of evapotranspiration and water allocated 
to particular crops.  
One of the important purposes in this study is to apply economic incentives (like 
subsidies taxes, water prices and water rights) to obtain alternatives for efficient 
water allocation and pollution control. To perceive whether those alternatives 
have an effect on the current system, the analysis of those economic incentives 
and their influences on profits and costs, the hydrologic system operations and 
the water use will be undertaken using a scenario analysis.  
The model consists of 10 districts, 8 different crops (cotton, wheat, rice, other 
grain, alfalfa, vegetables, fruits, potatoes) in each of the districts, and 3 main soil 
types. 
Salt concentrations for surface and subsurface water, groundwater and crop fields,  
drainage and return flow are calculated within the model and shall provide a 
basis for environmental analysis, i.e. the future development of the irrigation  
system under increasing levels of salinity in the irrigation water and subsequent 
salinity accumulation in the soil.  
The model is coded in a modeling language provided by General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) (BROOKE et al., 1988), a package for mathematical 
programming problems. The modeling horizon covers a hydrologic year with 12 
one-month intervals. 
Data, data interpretation and model parameters 
The modeling framework requires multidisciplinary data sets and programs covering 
hydrology, climatology, agronomy, economy, social aspects; crop, soil, and ground-
water-related parameters are also involved. In this section a short description of 
hydrologic, economic and agronomic conditions within the area will be given, 
which serves as the basis for the modeling work and finally for policy analyses. Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  114












Source: OBLVODKHOZ (2004), UPRADIK 2001/2004, OBLSELVODKHOS 2002, SIC ICWC 2005. 
Notes:   Encircled are drought years. The arrow indicates the 2003 data which were used in this 
study. 
The annual water availability (Figure 6-2) during 1989-2005 shows that 2000-2001 
was a period of particular water scarcity, especially so within the vegetation period. 
This affected crop yield, acreage and profits (MÜLLER, 2006). The following years 
showed an upward trend but water supply did not come back to the level of the 
1990s. The model presented here is validated based on data for year 2003 (arrow) 
as this year seems to be a year "typical" for the medium water availability after 1999. 
Figure 6-3:  Water allocation to districts in the Khorezm region 
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Water proportioning by district in 2003 (Figure 6-3) shows that districts located 
downstream of the river received less water than those upstream. The exception 
is Kushkupir, here the high amount of leaching water in February to April con-
tributes to a very high cumulative water supply (see also Figure 6-4). 








































Monthly water supply by district (Figure 6-4) is characterized by high water inputs 
in the main crop growth periods (June to September) with peaks in July and August. 
A relatively high amount of water flowing into the system in non-vegetation periods 
(Oct-March) is used mainly for filling up the channel system (Jan-Feb) and leaching 
of salts out of the soil (Feb-March). For this reason, leaching is also considered in the 
model.
4  
























Water Use per Hectare in Khorezm in 2003





                                           
4  Up to 25% of total water supply is used for leaching in 2003. Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  116 
Water use per hectare in among individual districts shows a relatively uniform 
distribution, with an average water consumption range (Figure 6-5) between 
15.200 and 18.700 m
3 per hectare. In Gurlan, a district dominated by cotton and 
rice cultivation, higher levels of water were consumed. The other districts of 
greater distance from the river (Khiva, Yangiarik) show higher water consumption 
per hectare, which may be due to high water losses within the irrigation canal 
system. In contrast, the canal network for Urgench, Khanka and Yangibazar is well 
extended and close to the Amu Darya River whereby lower water use per hectare 
could be explained due to higher distribution efficiencies and better utilization 
of water supply. 





































































































Source: SOYUZNIHI UZASHI, 1992. 
To account for the different soil types in the dataset, the model differentiates 
so-called hydro-module zones, a differentiation of soils based on soil texture and 
groundwater table levels. Light soils comprise sandy and sandy-loamy soils (clay 
fraction under 35 %), medium soils are defined by light and moderately textured 
loamy soils, and heavy soils comprise the heavy loamy and loamy soils, with 
homogeneous and heterogeneous texture and a clay fraction of minimum 45 % 
(SOYUZNIHI, 1992). Soil texture classes determine important parameters such as 
soil moisture, hydraulic conductivity, and storage capacity, parameters which 
have a strong influce on soil water balance and crop yields. 
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4 ANALYSIS, VALIDATION, SENSITIVITY 
Positive, descriptive model 
For the purpose of model validation, first a so called "Positive Model" was estab-
lished to assess the model consistency with the reality. A positive model analyzes 
"what is", unlike a normative model that analyzes "what should be". For the 
positive model, all relevant input parameters of water supply, cropping areas and 
yields were taken from actual data obtained in 2003 and fixed in the model. This 
allows a "base-line" scenario to be established and thus illustrates if the outcomes 
underlying the model formulation and data for water balances and crop production 
processes stand in a realistic range. Subsequently, the fixation will be released to 
crosscheck the impact of some relevant parameters and to obtain a validated 
optimization model with appropriate constraints. 
With fixed water supply, cropping areas and yields, it is possible to calculate 
de-facto economic values like gross margins of agricultural crops based on under-
lying hydrologic and agronomic model fundamentals. This is a way to evaluate 
model structure, equations and data by outcome, like crop production and profit, 
that are based on evapotranspiration and (ground, drainage and surface) water 
balances. 
The determination of actual evapotranspiration (ETa) is one of the most important 
procedures as crop growth, soil moisture and soil water balance, yields and corre-
sponding agricultural profit and benefits form a chain of causation. Monthly ETa 
is determined for all 10 districts, 8 crops, and 3 soil types. ETa ranges between 
340 (wheat) to 1055 (rice) mm, with an annual average of 680 mm in 2003 (see 
Figure 6-7). Due to the high water consumption requirement and the type of irri-
gation in use, rice has an exceptionally high ETa rate. Winter wheat, as it grows in 
winter and spring, has the slightest evapotranspiration (Figures 6-6 and 6-7). 
Differences between crops are relatively high due to crop specific properties like 
crop development stages, plant height, leaf area, ground coverage and water 
management (ALLEN et al., 1998). Also differences of ETa between soil types 
are not negligible (see Figure 6-8), which depend on soil characteristics like  
humidity, storage capacity, porosity and matrix potential.  
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Figure 6-7:  Calculated ETa for the district Gurlan (by crop type) 
Actual Evapotranspiration in Khorezm, District Gurlan, medium soils 




























Figure 6-8:  Calculated ETa for the district Gurlan (by soil type) 
Actual Evapotranspiration in Khorezm, District Gurlan, 





























The range of ETa in 2003 in the Khorezm region matches very well those of 
other studies. CONRAD et al. (2004, 2006) calculated an evapotranspiration for 
the summer season of 530 to more than 1000 mm, with an average of approx. 
600-900 mm. FORKUTSA (2005, 2006) calculated ETa values based on some field 
observation in Khiva in the range of 160-640 mm (average of 450) within the 
vegetation period 2003.  
For a first plausibility-based groundwater validation, simulated groundwater values 
for all districts in the Khorezm region were compared with extrapolated and  
averaged groundwater data that are available for around 1000 groundwater obser-
vation wells distributed over the Khorezm region (IBRAKHIMOV, 2005). Those  Analysis of water use and allocation  119
groundwater measurements were conducted three times per year in April, July, 
and October and the values in the remaining months were interpolated. With only 
three specifications per year it is difficult to adjust groundwater curves, but a 
simple interpolation method was chosen as the most appropriate approach here.  
Real data were also crosschecked with monthly groundwater measurements on an 
experimental farm in the Khorezm region (TISCHBEIN, 2006). The characteristics of 
the groundwater curves are comparable. As can be seen in Figure 6-9, simulated 
groundwater levels over months match well with the quasi real groundwater values.  
Here the use of a simple groundwater tank model provided by BEAR (1977) and 
implemented by CAI (1999) seems to be an effective instrument to emulate ground-
water balances involving pumping and extraction, percolation and discharge processes.  
Groundwater in the Khorezm region is in general relatively shallow (Figure 6-9). 
Due to leaching in February to April and intensive irrigation during the summer 
months, the groundwater table can rise towards the ground surface. Such a shallow 
groundwater status is desired by farmers and to some extent is consciously mani-
pulated (water afflux in canals, blockage of drainage) since subsurface water can 
be used by the crops, and functions as a "storage" mechanism during periods of 
water shortages. 





























Urgench real Yangibazar real Bagat real
Urgench sim. Yangibazar sim. Bagat sim.
 
Source:  "Real groundwater data": MAWR (2003/2005). 
After the calculation and validation of hydrologic and agronomic parameters and 
relative crop yields (based on actual evapotranspiration)
5, it is now possible to 
determine economic parameters such as gross margins for main agricultural 
crops per district, value of water, marginal value, gross revenue and costs of crop 
production (Table 6-1).  
                                           
5  For additional validation of parameters like deep percolation, soil moisture, drainage, crop 
water consumption see SCHIEDER (2008, forthcoming). Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  120 
Table 6-1:  Some economic indicators for the Khorezm region in 2003  
resulting from the model 
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Determination of Gross Margins (GM), Water Costs (WC) and Water Application 
(WA) for single crops/crop field level and for all districts is calculated by:  
c dt
s
c s dt c dt c dt c dt Otc Area c WC c v c GM , , , , , , * _ _ Re _ ∑ − − =           (1) 
∑ =
c
c dt dt c GM all GM , _ _               (2) 
dt c dt dt c dt c dt Gct c PW Sct c SW c WC * _ * _ _ , , , + =            (3) 
dt dt dt dt dt Gct all PW Sct all SW all WC * _ * _ _ + =            (4) 
∑∑ + =
ms
m c s dt c dt leach dstr eff WCP c SW ) 1 ( * _ / _ , , , ,          (5) 
∑ =
m
m dt dt dt WS all SW , _ _               (6) 
The items involved in these equations are defined in the following: 
GM_c, 
GM_all 








Revenue for crops and districts  PW_c, 
PW_all 




Water costs for crops and dis-
tricts 
dt,c,s  District, crop, soil 
WV_c, 
WV_all 
Value of water for crops and 
districts 
Area  Cropped area  
Otc  Other variable planting costs  Sct  Surface water price (Costs) 
Gct  Groundwater pumping costs  WCP  Surface water applied to fields 
Eff_dstr  Distribution efficiency  Leach  Leaching fraction of water appli-
cation 
WS_dt  Gross water supply to districts     
 
Gross Margins act as an indicator of profitability of crops as well as of districts 
(Equation 1-6), the proportion of leaching is included, as leaching is one important 
factor in crop growing processes and soil preparation and must be reflected within 
economical analyses. In 2003, the reference year of the calculations, the leaching 
fraction was relatively high, due in large part to favorable climatic conditions, and 
leaching – which normally begins in March – was initiated in January and February. 
Around 20 % of the total water supply was leached within the first months of the 
year.
6  
In Table 6-2, a differentiation between gross margins with and without a water 
price is demonstrated. For the calculation of water costs for districts and for single 
crops, total gross surface water and pumped water applied to fields and their 
costs are included. An overall surface water cost of 0.003 US$ per cubic meter 
                                           
6  In this preliminary assessment, salinity was not included. Irrigation and groundwater salinity 
is likely to reduce gross margins as it affects crop growth. Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  122 
and pumping cost of 0.005 US$ per cubic meter are assumed. As can be seen, those 
water pricing items have a relatively large influence of approximately 23 %, 
compared to the situation without water costs on gross margins.  
Another interesting point is the distribution of gross margins over single crops. 
As shown in Table 6-2, mainly cotton and alfalfa have a negative value. This 
means that even without introduction of water pricing, the costs for those crops 
exceed revenues. For alfalfa, this can be explained by the fact that alfalfa is mainly 
used within the farms and not for selling. For cotton, the state order in cotton 
production and the controlled lower selling prices resulted in relatively low gross 
margins. It must be noted that depending on the farmer’s cotton growing orders, 
pesticides, machinery and seed will be provided and do not reflect real marked 
prices. Despite significant favorable crop growing prices in 2003 it would in 
general not have been worthwhile for farmers to grow cotton mainly because of 
lower selling prices (when compared with world market prices). But the fact that 
the government commands and buys a certain quantity of cotton at guaranteed  
prices while at the same time providing subsidized inputs (MÜLLER, 2007, chapter 10 
in this volume; RUDENKO and LAMERS, 2007) represents an enormous incentive 
for farmers to consider cotton production as a "safe" option that somehow – not 
necessarily in monetary terms – compensates for the lower prices.  
In contrast, high prices are being paid for rice and vegetables, but they also con-
sume much more irrigation water. The share of these two crops in terms of total 
area seems to be controlled mostly by administrative orders. It remains to be 
studied how the present cropping pattern would be affected by water prices? 
Water values per crop will be discussed below and can be useful in decision-
making. 































































Khasarasp  -0.222  0.571 6.651 0.018 -0.166  1.119 0.028 0.008 
Khanka  0.004 0.59  4.929 0.025 -0.186  1.959 0.068 0.237 
Urgench  -0.538  0.755 5.061 0.059 -0.149  1.044 0.214 0.032 
Yangibazar  -0.638  0.434 3.07  0.011 -0.152  0.455 -0.108 0.096 
Gurlan  -1.344  0.375 8.54  0.072 -0.265  1.122 0.184 0.163 
Bagat  -0.321  0.605 3.087 0.022 -0.234  0.796 0.042 0.094 
Yangiarik  -0.204  0.356 3.748 0.035 -0.116  1.248 0.076 0.145 
Khiva  0.053 0.27  1.065 0.012 -0.091  2.517 0.075 0.278 
Kushkupir  -1.06 0.623 1.765 0.041 -0.386  0.553 0.011 0.087 
Shavat  -0.433  0.541 2.202 0.027 -0.193  1.23  0.321 0.486 
Khorezm 
total  -4.703 5.12  40.118 0.322  -1.938 12.043 0.911  1.626 Analysis of water use and allocation  123
Revenues are determined by produced yields and obtained market prices:  
c dt c s dt
soil
c dt c dt Cpp Area yld c v , , , , , * * _ Re ∑ =
            
∑ =
c
c dt dt c v all v , _ Re _ Re
               (7) 
with: 
yld  Yields 
Cpp  Crop selling prices 































































Khasarasp  3.84 1.63 8.93 0.04 0.09 1.45 0.30 0.05 
Khanka  4.05 1.90 6.44 0.06 0.10 2.40 0.27 0.44 
Urgench  3.05 2.02 6.71 0.13 0.06 1.54 0.56 0.24 
Yangibazar  3.32 1.41 3.97 0.03 0.16 0.64 0.20 0.21 
Gurlan  3.30 1.17  11.06 0.15 0.13 1.53 0.55 0.38 
Bagat  3.10 1.76 3.99 0.04 0.07 1.02 0.26 0.17 
Yangiarik  2.27 1.10 4.90 0.08 0.14 1.52 0.26 0.32 
Khiva  3.02 1.25 1.42 0.04 0.09 3.26 0.27 0.52 
Kushkupir  3.37 1.92 2.38 0.11 0.14 0.95 0.30 0.30 
Shavat  3.91 2.00 2.97 0.08 0.20 1.57 0.65 0.70 
Khorezm total  3.32 1.61 5.28 0.07 0.12 1.59 0.36 0.33 
 
As can be seen in Table 6-3, the highest revenues can be obtained for rice and 
cotton, this is mainly because of the large cropped areas for cotton (>45 %), and 
due to the high selling prices of around 450 US$/ton for rice. With respect to gross 
margins, alfalfa and maize, sorghum, barley, and beet have relatively small revenues 
and total production of these crops is used internally.  
Finally, the economic value of water is calculated with respect to water application 
to crop fields and water withdrawals to districts (Table 6-1, Table 6-4). Depending 
on this water value, decisions on cropping patterns and areas, water allocation 
and applications to crops can be implemented. The economic value of water is 
established as the relationship between gross margins to total water costs with 
respect to single crops and to districts.  
c dt c dt c dt c TW c GM c WV , , , _ / _ _ =                (8) 




Total Water applied to Crops 
and Districts Tina Schieder, Ximing Cai  124 
Table 6-4:  Water value per crop and district, in M US$ m

































































Khasarasp  -0.001  0.011  0.079  0.008 -0.004 0.075 0.002 0.006 
Khanka  0.00002 0.007  0.090  0.011 -0.003 0.095 0.007 0.032 
Urgench  -0.003  0.009  0.054  0.007 -0.003 0.035 0.009 0.003 
Yangibazar  -0.003 0.008  0.084  0.012  -0.003 0.031  -0.004 0.018 
Gurlan  -0.006  0.009  0.058  0.011 -0.004 0.038 0.007 0.012 
Bagat  -0.001  0.017  0.114  0.010 -0.006 0.053 0.003 0.020 
Yangiarik  -0.001  0.015  0.078  0.008 -0.004 0.088 0.006 0.020 
Khiva  0.0004  0.005  0.050  0.004 -0.002 0.042 0.005 0.020 
Kushkupir  -0.005  0.008  0.051  0.013 -0.004 0.023 0.001 0.011 
Shavat  -0.003  0.008  0.045  0.006 -0.003 0.050 0.012 0.046 
Khorezm total, 
avg  -0.002  0.010  0.070  0.009 -0.004 0.053 0.005 0.019 
 
As shown in Table 6-4, the economic value of water for rice and for vegetables 
is relatively high compared to that of other crops. Particularly for rice, this result is 
surprising as one would expect a lower value mainly due to the higher water utili-
zation rate for rice. Revenues for rice are much higher than for other crops, so it 
is worthwhile for farmers to grow rice.  
5 OPTIMIZATION 
After introducing this "positive model" – the validation of main parameters and 
of economic and hydrologic de-facto analyses – the normative optimization model 
can be executed, which is presently under way (SCHIEDER, 2008 forthcoming). The 
economic analyses that are or will be conducted address the following questions: 
•  What is the economic value of water for different crops and demand sites 
and how does it change over time under different water supply situations? 
•  What influences will infrastructural investment have on profits and costs, 
as well as on water use efficiency? 
•  How will the irrigated area change under various hydrological conditions 
and how does it affect gross margins? 
•  How will the change of output prices influence cultivation, cropping area 
or crop type, and how sensitive will the cropping area and crop prices react 
to the modification of cotton or wheat prices? Analysis of water use and allocation  125
•  What will happen to water users, profit, demand, area and value of water if 
water prices are introduced?  
•  Is it possible to raise a tax on excessive salt discharge and what are the 
consequences on profits and incomes, as well as salt quantity?  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a system modeling approach to analyze efficient water allo-
cation and sustainable water resource management at a regional scale for the the 
Khorezm region in Uzbekistan. The main advantage of the model is its capability 
to integrate several aspects of the regional agricultural water use system, including 
socio-economic, hydrologic, and ecological aspects in a consistent system, and 
to account for the interdisciplinary nature of water resource problems within the 
context of an irrigation-dominated agricultural region. With this model it will be 
possible to analyze, for example, the effects of institutional directives and eco-
nomical incentives on ecology and hydrology, and, vice versa, the impacts of 
hydrological situations on the economy. 
Preliminary results and tests from the "positive model" outlined above demonstrate 
a running, robust model that provides plausible results. The model will be expanded 
to include salinity simulation and leaching mechanisms, sensitivity analyses of 
model parameters, and more extensive economic and hydrologic analyses. The 
model has been constructed in a way to allow further extension from a regional 
scale to a river basin scale or further focusing on a local scale such as farms for more 
detailed analysis. The model also can serve as one part of a decision support system 
to be developed for agriculture and water management in Uzbekistan. 
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CHAPTER 7 






From the first days of their independence in 1990, the countries of Central Asia 
began to reform land use and agriculture. In the Republic of Uzbekistan, as a 
result of establishment of relatively small farms (from 1 to 100 ha) replacing the 
former shirkats (who were the original follow-up structures to the kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes), thousands of individual water users appeared. However, this was not 
adequately accounted for in the reform processes e.g.: The responsibility for the 
technical maintenance of on-farm irrigation and drainage systems was not allo-
cated. To provide for this, the first water user associations (WUAs) were estab-
lished in 2000, and since 2003, a new wave of reforms since 2003 resulted in the 
complete coverage of the country with WUAs in 2006. This study looks at the 
functioning of WUAs, their mechanisms of management and conflict resolution. 
It concludes that WUAs have an important role to fulfill in water distribution in 
Uzbekistan, but that their functioning is hampered by lack of payments, unclear 
mandates, and lack of training. Donor-assisted implementation of pilot WUAs, 
in contrast, showed a better performance and acceptance rate, possibly due to a 
better emphasis on capacity building. 
Keywords:  Land reform, water reform, agricultural policies. 
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АССОЦИАЦИЙ ВОДОПОЛЬЗОВАТЕЛЕЙ В УЗБЕКИСТАНЕ: 





С первых дней обретения независимости (1991), страны Центральной Азии 
начали  реформирование  использования  земельных  ресурсов  в  сельском 
хозяйстве. В результате создания относительно небольших по площади 
(1 до 100 га) фермерских хозяйств (взамен бывших колхозов и совхозов), в 
регионе появились тысячи водопользователей. Но подотчетность не была 
адекватно организованна для процессов реформ, например, не была распре-
делена  ответственность  за  поддержание  технического  состояния  межфер-
мерских ирригационных и дренажных каналов. Для решения этой проблемы, 
в Узбекистане, в 2000 году, возникли первые ассоциации водопользователей 
(АВП), а с 2003 года в республике была начата реформа в водном (ирригац-
ионном) секторе и результатом ее явилось полное внедрение АВП по всей 
республике  в 2006 году. Данное  исследование  изучает  работу  АВП, ее  
механизм управления и решения конфликтов. Заключение показывает,что 
АВП имеют важную роль в выполнении распределении водных ресурсов в 
Узбекистане, но работа АВП затруднена невыплатой взносов со стороны 
членов  АВП,  неясного  мандата  управления ( распределение  власти),  и  
нехваткой тренингов. Внедрение пилотных АВП, поддержанных иностран-
ными донорами, показало лучшую работу и более высокий уровень принятия 
АВП членами, что возможно связано с более тщательным упором на усиление 
мощностей посредством тренингов и интенсивной работой с персоналом и 
участниками АВП. 
Ключевые слова:  Земельная реформа, водная реформа, аграрная поли-
тика.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The economic reforms of the agricultural sector in the Republic of Uzbekistan 
started in 1992 and continue still today. These reforms are carried out in an "evolu-
tionary" way: Whereas most countries of Central Asia plunged head-on into some 
form of market economy, the government of Uzbekistan pursued an "Uzbek way" 
with strong government control of agricultural production (POMFRET and ANDERSON, 
2002). Reforms mainly address the organizational aspects of the agricultural enter-
prises’ activities and less the economic aspects such as liberalization of agricultural 
production, and establishment of markets for agricultural inputs and products. 
Today, there are different types of agricultural enterprises, in particular collective 
farms (shirkats, now formally extinct), family farms and dehqons. 
The water sector was not taken into account in the so-called first stage of reforms. 
This was corrected in the second stage of the reforms that started in 2003. In 
March of this year, the decisive decree of the President of Uzbekistan was passed 
"On the most important extension directions of reforms in agriculture" (24 March, 
2003) was passed (UZBEKISTAN, 2003a). As a result, an essential resolution of 
the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (N 320) dated 21 July, 2003, 
was issued: "The improvement of water management organization" (UZBEKISTAN, 
2003b). These decrees also solicited the establishment of WUAs in the Republic.  
The first WUAs in Uzbekistan were established in 2000 in the form of pilot projects, 
with support from international donor organizations. The government supported 
the establishment of WUAs in some of the unprofitable collective farms. The first 
WUAs did not have a secure legal basis and their establishment was legitimated by 
Cabinet decrees and regulations. The legitimacy of this process was often disputed. 
Standardized by-laws and other necessary documents such as contracts of water 
supply were provided by the government. The leaders of WUAs and their technical 
staff were elected under the supervision of the governmental water management 
organizations (OblSelVodKhoz and RaySelVodKhoz). 
Whereas the first of these WUAs were established based on the hydrographical 
principle, i.e. new boundaries were cut to provide for water allocation according 
to hydrographic micro-basins, later the process was sped up by establishing 
WUAs that corresponded to the former territories of the shirkats.  
At the time of this study (2004), there were three WUAs with two or three years 
experience in Khorezm. All others had been founded only in 2003. Limited eco-
nomic data such as business plans and reports do not yet allow for a profound 
investigation of the performance of WUAs. Therefore this study focused on the 
perception of water users, officials and international donors as a way of assessing 
the WUA’s performance. The study analyzes how WUAs – as a now central element 
of the reform package in Uzbekistan – are designed and implemented; how do Darya Hirsch  132
they function; and how are they perceived by farmers, the government and inter-
national donors.  
Specific research questions were: 
1. How do water users perceive the WUAs? How do users perceive them-
selves as members of WUAs? What does the membership consist of? 
2. What are the characteristics of presently (in 2005) functioning WUAs? 
What is the importance of leadership and hierarchy? What is important for 
water users in WUAs in terms of equality
1 and stability? What is unique 
in the behavioural pattern of Uzbek water users in relation to functions of 
WUA (e.g. conflict resolution mechanisms etc.)? 
The following section of this paper describes the methodology used within this 
study. Section 3 gives an overview of the results and discussion, and sections 4 
and 5 summarize the perspectives of WUAs in the Republic of Uzbekistan. This 
paper focuses specifically on Khorezm, a region in Northwestern Uzbekistan. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
Khorezm is a region of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and is located in the irrigated 
lowlands of the Amu Darya River, which is the major tributary to the Aral Sea. 
It covers 680,000 ha, of which 270,000 ha are irrigated, and has a population of 
1.3 million people of which roughly 70 % are rural. The Khorezm region serves 
as a model region in which many of the more general problems regarding the 
establishment of WUAs in Uzbekistan are exemplified, where available, country-
wide data were additionally used. 
This study is based on qualitative methods; semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in the Khorezm region with officials and users of WUAs and stake-
holders of irrigation management. Triangulation supported the findings where 
possible. Preliminary results from a standardized questionnaire indicated a need to 
focus the analysis on the WUA’s chairman’s role, the importance of user fees, and 
"indigenous" conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Four established WUAs in the Khorezm (See Table 7-1) and four pilot projects 
supported by international donors in Syr Darya district and Fergana Valley (see 
Table 7-2) were selected for the research. The water users in the WUAs have a 
wide variety of primary agricultural training. Their professions range from teachers 
and medical doctors to agricultural specialists.  
                                           
1  In Uzbek usage, equity means water distribution based on the irrigation rate of each crop, 
whereas stability denotes reliable irrigation water supply (from interview with V. Sokolov). Problems and perspectives of water user associations in Uzbekistan  133
A standardized questionnaire proved to be an appropriate instrument to record 
the fermers’ unbiased opinions about WUAs. The questionnaire takes into account 
factors important for the functioning of WUAs as mentioned by AGRAWAL (2001), 
OSTROM (1990), MEINZEN-DICK (1999), and BRUNS (1999). 
The questionnaire was created and based on so-called attitude questions which 
address how water users perceive their WUA. The questionnaire was organized 
in groups of thematically linked questions. So, for instance, if the main question 
was "Why do you pay user fees?", additional aspects were covered in order to 
gain complex information about the actors’ perceptions, such as their opinion on 
statements like "The WUA is our main organization. It is necessary to maintain 
it with our own means and my user fee is an opportunity to contribute to the 
common business!"; "I can take water from the canal and do the cleaning of the 
canal independently"; "I would like to pay the WUA fee, but I don’t have the 
money" (Figure 7-1). Concerning the role of the WUA chairman for water users, 
questions revolved around water rotation, conflict mediators and conflict resolution. 
Table 7-1:  Characteristics of the WUAs investigated in the Khorezm region 
No.  Rayon  Names of WUAs Members  Served area, ha  Number of 
respondents 
1 Khiva  "Mirob"  90  1426  20 
2 Yangibazar "Buston"  239  5043  25 
3 Yangibazar "Eski  Daryalik"  93  2822  21 
4 Kushkupir  "Shikhyab"  148  1841  23 
 
The theoretical basis for the questions was partially built on WUA design principles 
developed by OSTROM (1990). Besides Ostrom’s design principles, factors such 
as adaptation of a WUA to local conditions and evolution over time (BRUNS and 
MEINZEN-DICK, 1998; BRUNS, 1999; HUPPERT and WALKER, 1989, OSTROM, 1990; 
AGRAWAL, 2001), the degree of the WUA’s autonomy, rights, and governance 
authority to manage irrigation (BRUNS, 1999; MEINZEN-DICK, 1999; OSTROM, 1990), 
specification of roles and accountability of leaders and employees (MEINZEN-DICK, 
1999), financing from irrigation fees and mobilization of money, reliable water 
delivery and transfer services (BRUNS, 1999), transfer of responsibility to the farmers 
(BRUNS, 1999; MEINZEN-DICK, 1999), recognition from government and external 
legitimacy for farmers’ activities (MEINZEN-DICK, 1999;  OSTROM, 1990, 
OSTROM, 1992), were identified in the literature as essential for irrigation manage-
ment. 
Answers to the questionnaire were coded; summarized in spreadsheets and analysed 
with the statistics software package SPSS. In addition the answers were train-
gularized (cross-checked) with the help of other techniques of qualitative research 
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resources were used, e.g., answers to questions concerning the water user meetings, 
supporting information would include the minutes of the meetings. Data at the 
national level were obtained from the four different pilot WUAs organized by 
the three international donors IWMI, ADB and USAid (see Table 7-2).  
The present paper is based on a first assessment of the data collected in 2003 and 
2004. Readers interested in the full analysis set are referred to ZAVGORODNYAYA 
(2006). 
Table 7-2:  Characteristics of the WUA pilot projects investigated in other 
districts 
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3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Irrigation water is distributed in a rotational fashion among the farmers depending 
on the same channel. How this water is allocated throws light on the handling of 
water distribution and potential for conflict in the region. A top-down approach 
is predominant but, depending on the region, autonomous problem resolution is 
as likely: The water users were most often informed by the WUA chairman 
about their turn to take water for irrigation (this was answered by over 80 % of 
the respondents in three investigated regions of Uzbekistan); however, in Khorezm 
and Syrdarya farmers often seem to come to an agreement directly with other 
farmers (Table 7-3).
2 
                                           
2  The question in the questionnaire was as follows: How do you know that it is your turn to 
receive water from the canal? with the following possible answers: (a) The sequence is dis-
cussed at the general meetings; (b) The WUA chairman informs me; (c) The farmer who  
receives water before me informs me; (d) At random; (e) I come to an agreement with other 
farmers. For the answers, degrees from ’fully agreed’ to ‘disagreed’ were given (five-step scale). 
Table 1-3 lists only answers, which were ranked as most important. The percentages added up 
according to the scale. The table shows only percentages to "fully agreed" degree. 
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Table 7-3:  Water allocation mechanisms (%) 
Regions 
"WUA chairman 
informs me about 
water rotation" 
"I come to an 
agreement with 
other farmers"
"The farmer who 
receives water before 





2003 (N=89)  79 75  51  29 
Khorezm 
2004 (N=40)  33 0  18  0 
Ferghana 
2004 (N=21)  100 5  0  0 
Syrdarya 
2004 (N=20)  80 85  35  25 
 
There was a strong difference in responses in the Khorezm region between the 
years 2003 and 2004, principally regarding the answers on "agreement" and 
"random distribution", but the reasons are unclear. 
Table 7-4:  Conflict mediators in a WUA (%) 
Regions  WUA 
Chairman  Mirobs  WUA 
Council 
WUA General  
Assembly 
Khorezm 2003 (N=89)  77  60  21  55 
Khorezm 2004 (N=40)  85  45  18  5 
Fergana 2004 (N=21)  67  52  64  39 
Syrdarya 2004 (N=20)  65  40  40  50 
 
The WUA often acts as a conflict mediator in the three investigated regions 
(more than 60 % of respondents) (Table 7-4)
 3. Hydrotechnical personnel (Mirobs) 
and the WUA General Assembly can also act as conflict mediators. WUA councils 
have lower importance in conflict resolution. These answers did not change over 
time (Khorezm 2003 and 2004).  
Regarding conflict resolution mechanisms of the more specific – and possibly 
more problematic – situation of untimely or unauthorized water withdrawal by a 
competing water user, the role of a WUA chairman (Table 7-5)
4 was less important 
                                           
3  The question in the questionnaire was: Who resolves the conflicts and disputes in your 
association: (a) Commission for the resolution of disputes; (b) WUA Council; (c) WUA 
chairman; (d) WUA General Meeting; (e) Other respected WUA members; (f) Mirabs  
(Hydrotechnical personnel). For the answers, degrees from "fully corresponds to reality" 
to "does not correspond to reality" were given (five-step scale). 
4  The possible statements in the questionnaire were: If anyone takes water without permis-
sion and out of turn… - (a) …it happens, I’ll forgive the first time; (b) …it happens, I’ll 
talk to that man; (c) …I’ll start a conflict; (d) …I’ll also take water out of turn; (e) …I’ll Darya Hirsch  136
(on average over 40 % of respondents in all three investigated regions). Again, 
either an autonomous conflict resolution approach was sought by directly contacting 
the infringer (over 69 % in Khorezm and Fergana, and 55 % in Syr Darya), or a 
relative indifference was shown either through "forgiveness" (51 to 80 %) or 
"waiting for their own turn" (more than 60 % in Khorezm and Fergana, 38 % in 
Syr Darya). 
Table 7-5:  Conflict resolution mechanisms (%) 
  I will talk to 
that man 
I will "forgive" 
for the first time
I will talk to 
chairman 
I will wait for 
my own turn 
Khorezm 2003 (N=89)  66  51  44  72 
Khorezm 2004 (N=40)  88  73  63  73 
Fergana 2004 (N=21)  67  72  67  38 
Syr Darya 2004 
(N=20)  55 80  55  65 
 
To introduce the topic of user fees for WUA members, it was mentioned by the 
interviewer that user fees are a mechanism for equality and fairness of irrigation 
water distribution (see Figure 7-1).
5 Farmers from all three regions agreed with 
that statement. However, about one third of the water users both in the Khorezm 
region (in 2003: 38 %) and in the Syr Darya region (35 %) believed that water is 
God’s gift and nobody has a right to demand user fees. In contrast, only 15 % of 
the Fergana farmers, and – in 2004 – 10 % of the Khorezmian farmers agreed 
with this statement. The change of the opinion of Khorezmian farmers from 2003 
to 2004 is explained by the fact that awareness rising was carried out among 
WUA members.  
                                                                                                                                    
ignore that man; (f) …I’ll talk to the chairman; (g) …I’ll appeal to the community committee 
(mahallya); (h) … I’ll wait for my own turn. For the answers, degrees from "absolutely ap-
proved" to "disapproved" were given (five-step scale).  
5  The question was: Are you willing to pay user fees to the WUA? Possible answers:  
(a) User fees guarantee the fair water use as the one who takes a lot of water pays accordingly 
more; (b) Water is God’s gift. Nobody has the right to demand water fees; (c) Introduction 
of user fees is useless. At first water will be received only by those who are situated upstream 
or who have a lot of money. For the answers, degrees from "absolutely sure of it" to "unsure" 
were given (five-step scale).
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Another question regarded the user fees for WUA members. The respondents 
from all three regions of Uzbekistan exhibited a strong ownership feeling towards 
the WUAs they belonged to (Figure 7-2)
6. At the same time, over 50 % of  
respondents in the Khorezm region (consistently over the two years) and Syr Darya 
pointed out that they understand the importance of the payments to a WUA, but 
they are not in command of their own money (this refers to a specificity of the 
Uzbek banking system in which government bodies exert strong control on bank 
withdrawals). Nevertheless, 48 per cent of the farmers in Syr Darya stated that 
they can take water from the irrigation canal and clean the canal independently, 
without a WUA, but less than 22 % of the respondents in Khorezm and Fergana 
agreed with this statement. 
Non-payments or untimely payments of water users to WUAs remain one of the 
largest obstacles for the functioning of WUAs. WUA administration personnel 
in several occasions complained not to have received their salary for several 
months in a row. Farmers which own more than than 10 ha of land have to grow 
strategically important crops such as cotton and wheat, the yields of which are 
delivered to state-owned ginneries. The farmers in all areas suffer from untimely 
                                           
6  The question and answers in the questionnaire were: Do you feel the necessity for paying user 
fees? – (a) The WUA is our farmer-run organization. It is necessary to maintain it within our 
own means. And my user fee is an opportunity to contribute to common business! (b) I can 
take water from the canal and do the cleaning of the canal independently; (c) I would like to, 
but I don’t have money. For the answers, degrees from "fully agreed" to "disagreed" were 
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payments for the delivered cotton. If payments do arrive, however, they are made 
directly to the bank accounts and withdrawals from these accounts are under strict 
control. 
In addition, the absence of funds in WUAs constrains their opportunity to buy 
new machinery or repair exisiting omes; this in turn reduces their ability to provide 
services to their members. The generally low level of equipment availability may 
be seen from the following figures: On average, a WUA has 0.29 excavators, 
0.28 bulldozers, 0.1 tractors and 0.25 car transport (BOCHARIN, 2004: 31). A 
WUA on average has about 100 members.  
Most WUAs in Uzbekistan
7 rely on pump irrigation (instead of gravimetric water 
flow). On average, each WUA has 3 pumping facilities, every one of which serves 
approximately 7740 ha of irrigated land (BOCHARIN, 2004: 31). Where pump 
irrigation prevails, as in the Khorezm region, the payments for fuel or electricity 
are considered a priority, and the payments are transferred from the farmers’ bank 
accounts without the farmers’ previous knowledge. 
BOCHARIN (2004) stresses: "The lowest payment for WUA service was observed 
in Kashkadarya (15 % of actual expenses), Syrdarya (10 % of actual expenses) 
and Tashkent (7 % of actual expenses) Regions. In Andijan, Bukhara and Navoy 
the payments for WUA services and works have been increased. In 2003 in 
Andijan it was increased by 61 %, in Bukhara 41 % and in Navoy – 40 % of actual 
expenses of the WUA" (BOCHARIN, 2004: 31). On average, in 2003, 22 % of the 
actual expenses were paid. 
According to BOCHARIN (2004) "on average the actual cost per unit of WUA 
amounted to 1000 soums/ha
8 (prices for 2003), but costs differ widely between 
regions. For example, in the Samarkand and Khorezm regions the average actual 
cost per unit were, respectively, 3570 and 3910 soums/ha, whereas in Syrdarya 
and Navoy, these costs were 256 and 454 soums/ha, respectively". 
                                           
7  The total number of WUAs in the Republic of Uzbekistan amounts to 894 (December, 
2005). 
8  In 2003, 975 Uzbek soums corresponded to 1 US Dollars. Problems and perspectives of water user associations in Uzbekistan  139
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4 CONCLUSIONS  
The WUAs in the Khorezm region provide services such as water allocation, 
including the cleaning of canals or maintenance of pumps and other equipment. 
Respondents in all three Uzbek regions perceived the WUA Chairman as an im-
portant actor for the overall execution of tasks. Likewise, Water Masters are equally 
involved in conflict mediation and/or resolution. Less important for conflict  
mediation in the respondents’ opinion were the WUA Councils and general  
assemblies. Also, autonomous approaches to problem resolution are as likely as 
mediated conflict resolution, e.g. farmers just "forgive" or patiently "wait for 
their turn." In gravity-irrigated regions the importance of a WUA increases, as 
seen in Fergana and Syr Darya. In areas with pump irrigation, the temptation to 
use the water without considering other water users is higher. 
The water users in Fergana and Syrdarya seemed to be more convinced than 
those in the Khorezm region that paying user fees is beneficial. This is consistent 
with the higher level of capacity building work that was provided by the inter-
nationally supported pilot projects in Fergana and Syrdarya. Nevertheless, it 
seems difficult to overcome the legacy of the Soviet system and the expectations 
that inputs for agricultural production will be given free of charge, or the more 
Islamic notion that water is a public good.  Darya Hirsch  140
This points to the need to increase capacity building among farmers, a process in 
which international donors could play an important role via training, awareness 
raising and by setting up infrastructure such as rural business advisory centers. 
The members of pilot WUAs are more conscious of agro-technical activities 
than farmers in the Khorezm region. The training should aim, for example, at basic 
hydrometric, economic and legal knowledge, and should become permanent: For 
example, farmers’ schools could be established. 
5 PERSPECTIVES FOR WUAS IN THE UZBEK CONTEXT 
The following recommendations may help increasing the effectiveness of the 
operation and management of WUAs in Uzbekistan: 
•  Further careful liberalization of production and sale markets of agricultural 
products in order to stabilize the financial situation of water users; 
•  Full implementation of the law the Republic of Uzbekistan "On integration of 
land users into water user associations" in order to give real powers to WUAs; 
•  Capacity building regarding goals and objectives of integrated water resource 
management among farmers;  




This study was funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research 
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 Continuity and change: Land and water use reforms in rural Uzbekistan 
PETER WEHRHEIM, ANJA SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER, and CHRISTOPHER MARTIUS (editors 2008), Chapter 8, pp. 145-164. 
CHAPTER 8 
BARRIERS TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 





There are a number of serious challenges to technology adoption and agrarian 
reform in rural Uzbekistan. These must be acknowledged, and mitigation strategies 
devised, for sustainable development strategies to be implemented. Some of the 
barriers result from government policies that stifle innovation and risk taking, 
whereas the preconceptions of farmers and decision-makers require working 
with leading farmers. The constraints on farm decision-making autonomy present 
a number of barriers to technology change and large scale adoption of new 
technologies and agrarian reform will be premised on continuing reforms in land  
tenure, cropping decisions and farm management. Whilst the current political 
climate does not allow for effective changes to remove these barriers, the gradual  
reform process and the reform of state farms into leasehold units hold real  
potential. However, without the reform of the existing barriers to technology 
change, current reforms will achieve very little. 
Keywords:  Technology adoption, good governance, rural reform. 
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ПРЕПЯТСТВИЯ К ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКИМ ИЗМЕНИЯМ И АГРАНЫМ 





Существует ряд серьезных проблем на пути к применению новых технологий 
и осуществлению аграрных реформ в Узбекистане. Для того, чтобы внедрить 
стратегии устойчивого развития, необходимо признать этот факт и разработать 
меры по уменьшению таких проблем. Некоторые препятствия возникают 
вследствие политических решений, которые сдерживают принятие инноваций 
и рисков. Принимая во внимание предубеждения фермеров и лиц, принимаю-
щих решения, появляется необходимость работать непоередственно с пере- 
довыми фермерами. Препятствия к независимому принятию решений на 
уровне отдельного хозяйства представляют в свою очередь ряд барьеров к  
технологическим  изменениям  и  широкомасштабному  внедрению  новых 
технологий, а реформы в сельском хозяйстве будут основываться на про-
должающемся реформировании землевладения, схем посева и управления 
фермерским хозяйством. Постепенный процесс реформирования и преоб-
разования государственных хозяйств в арендуемые единицы представляет 
несомненный  потенциал,  даже  если  в  данной  обстановке  не  произойдут 
серьезные  изменения  для  преодоления  существующих  преград.  Таким 
образом, без преодоления существующих барьеров на пути к технологи-
ческим изменениям текущими преобразованиями можно достигнуть очень 
малого.  
Ключевые слова:  Усвоение технологий, Разумное Управление, сельско-
хозяйственная реформа. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports on action research
1 conducted during the two main harvest 
periods in the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan in 2003. The main aim of this research 
was to assess the barriers to technological change and agrarian reform in rural 
Khorezm, Uzbekistan; more specifically, the economic and social challenges 
that militate against rural development. These were hypothesised to consist of both 
a legal and an economic system that conspires against progressive agricultural   
policies such as the introduction of multiple cropping. It was further hypothesised 
that the challenges could be partially explained as a defence by certain elites, 
seeking to maintain certain practices, which supported their own interests. As the 
environmental and economic situation in Uzbekistan continues to decline there 
is a growing need for rural reform
2. It is vital that any international development 
interventions that are taken are cognisant of the unique challenges and legal 
framework of rural Uzbekistan. Likewise, the opinion of farmers towards these 
barriers is of similar importance, as agrarian reform can only be effective when 
implemented in concert with the rural population. Reforms to date have generally 
been imposed without considering the perceptions of farmers, and whilst rural 
reform has been prominent on the government’s agenda, this has often been at the 
expense of rural livelihoods. This research aimed to adopt an ethnographic  
approach, viewing the challenges to agrarian change from the perspective of the 
rural farmers, as well as from an international development perspective. 
A total of 207 farmers were interviewed across the period, many more than once. 
Selection was primarily through snowball sampling – utilising existing project 
contacts in regions and then progressing to further interviews through introduc-
tions. Interviews were primarily conducted within four regions of Khorezm chosen 
for their sociological representativeness, including access to water as a key factor. 
Most interviews were semi-structured interviews and adopted a broadly   
                                           
1  That is research that is focused on what is actually occurring in a given setting, using ob-
servational and interview tools to attempt a better understanding of real events as they occur. 
2  That the ecological situation in Uzbekistan is in decline is undisputed (POMFRET and ANDERSON, 
2002, p. 190), however official statistics suggest that Uzbekistan’s economy is growing. 
This premise is problematic, given the unreliability of official figures on which economic 
growth is based (an unpublished US State Department report states that "The <Uzbek> 
government claims that GDP rose 4.1% in 2003; however the US Government does not think 
it was greater than 0.3%", cited in MURRAY, 2004: 2-3).  
  Equally problematic for the assembly of reliable data is the dominance of the Black/unofficial 
market in Uzbekistan and lack of effort to document this (BARTLETT, 2000). However, 
even if we accept the official figures of economic growth, this does not account for the 
massive population growth (2.3% p.a.) and low average age (23.9 years) which could see 
Uzbekistan’s population double in the next 30 years (UNDP, 2001), suggesting that GDP 
per capita is set to fall drastically. So whilst the official picture is of economic growth in 
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ethnographic approach (c.f. REINHARZ, 1992: 18). This included extensive use of 
focus groups and whole household meetings. Group based research was also con-
ducted, especially in the use of H-Forms, Decision trees and priority ladders (for 
a discussion of these methods, see WALL and LAMERS, 2004). The gender represen-
tation was much better in the group based work, achieving 39 % female participation 
(ibid). However the challenges of working in the Khorezm region restricted female 
participation to 21 % for one-on-one interviews. 
By focusing on the perceptions of farmers towards technology change, a range 
of opinions were elicited in an attempt to understand the barriers that exist to 
technological adoption. Primary amongst these problems is a lack of farm decision 
making autonomy; which incorporates real limitations on the security of land 
tenure, politicised cropping decision making and centralised farm management. 
It is argued in this paper that because cropping decisions are centralised and po-
litical, rather than devolved and practical, that farm management and cropping 
decisions are distinct areas for analysis. This paper argues furthermore for the 
need for reform of the cropping decision system, this refers to the process through 
which cropping decisions are made, rather than the actual cropping decisions 
made. 
Secondly the tendency for incentives to favour negative or flawed decision making 
is a key constraint. This is especially the case in terms of establishing efficient 
water management that accounts for the entire economic benefit of different 
crops, not just the formulaic attainment of state goals in an unquestioning and 
uncritical manner
3 (WEGERICH, 2002: 9-11). There are also disincentives for 
innovation at the farm and bureaucratic levels and these pose constraints to 
technology change and agrarian reform. These disincentives include a punitive 
system for non-fulfilment of the state plan coupled with few sources of profit for 
excessive performance. This research also exposed a high degree of preconceptions 
held by farmers and decision makers, many of which are contrary to established 
scientific best practice. These preconceptions are exacerbated by an economic 
system that restricts farmer options – placing more decision making authority 
with centralised bureaucracy, which also suffers from uninformed opinions.  
Finally, the potential for change within the political and economic system is dis-
cussed in light of the numerous barriers to technology change and agrarian reform. 
                                           
3 M ÜLLER (Chapter 10 in this volume) makes an interesting case that, contrary to many other 
papers (SPOOR, WORLD BANK etc.) that the Uzbek state does not profit economically from 
cotton production. At a macro level this may be correct, there are differing views and I do 
not wish to claim competence in deciding this. Yet one must acknowledge that at a meso 
and micro-economic level, state actors (if not the state) profit from cotton through corruption 
and other informal practices. Given that this compensation is seen as part of the ‘payment’ that 
state actors (eg hokims) receive, it would be naïve to claim that the state is a disinterested 
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2 FARM DECISION MAKING AUTONOMY 
I will demonstrate below that farm decision making autonomy is severely restricted 
in Uzbekistan. This lack of autonomy poses a real constraint to the transfer of new 
agricultural technologies. Farmers are unable, for a variety of reasons, to make 
informed (and un-feted) decisions about technology use and farming methods. 
This is especially pertinent in terms of; secure land tenure, cropping decisions, 
and farm management. 
2.1  Secure land tenure 
Post-Independence, Uzbekistan has made halting moves away from Soviet style 
kolkhoz (collective) farms, shifting most farms into shirkats, a form of "joint 
stock company" whereby former collective farm employees (kolkhozniks) became 
share-holders in a new farm. However, the real impact of these reforms has been 
slight, with few management changes and where "most shirkats are the same 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes (state farms) in smaller scale (ILKHAMOV, 1998: 545).  
However, these shirkats were always seen as "a temporary step between the ‘stage 
of the kolkhoz’ and the final ‘stage of the Private Farms’" (TREVISANI, 2006).  
This stage of private farming was first introduced in 1998 in the "Farm Law" for 
Uzbekistan, which was updated in 2004. This law allows for the creation of  
"leasehold" farms, which are nominally "private" farms of 10 ha. or more, which 
enjoy a fifty year lease. Within the Khorezm region the pilot region of Yangibazar 
was first "privatised" (i.e. converted into leasehold farms) in 2003, however lease-
hold farms first appeared in Uzbekistan in 1992 (POMFRET, 2000: 271), since 
then this policy has subsequently been introduced across almost all of Khorezm 
in February 2005. 
Under the system of leasehold farms all land is officially owned by the state, but 
it can be leased for negotiable periods by farmers for a set fee or land tax. The 
actual official rent is relatively low; however the imposition of a state order for 
cotton and wheat provides much of the state income from this land. The relatively 
low land tax is also inflated by an array of unofficial "taxes" or bribes necessary 
to access and maintain control of the leasehold land. State officials need to be 
bribed to ensure that the land which is privatised is high quality, and it is then 
necessary to "negotiate" the state plan each year – this also comes at a financial 
cost in the form of bribery, favours and corruption. From this expenditure the 
farmers gain the right to their land, as specified under the legislation: 
"Farms specialising in plant cultivation products shall be allowed areas with minimal 
size of at least 10 hectares for the purpose of grain and cotton growing, and of at 
least 1 hectare for the purpose of gardening, wine and vegetable growing, as well 
as cultivation of other specimens. On provision of land areas, farms take on the ob-
ligation to provide the yield of agricultural crops (three-years average) in the 
amount of no less than the cadastre assessment of the land. Given obligation is 
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We see here that the legislation is clearly aimed at establishing "private" farms  
as sources of cotton and wheat (KARIMOV, 2003). Under the typical arrangement 
given in the legislation, and more or less followed in practice, only 10 % of farm 
land is available for cultures other than cotton and wheat. There is every indication 
in existing legislation (KARIMOV, 2003; GoU, Law on Farm, 2004) that the state 
plan system will continue and that the expansion of land tenure is more that of 
usufruct right, subject to a state order specifying "proper use". So, whilst the lease 
period can be as long as fifty years, after three years the farmer’s performance is 
reviewed by the hokim’s (regional governor’s) office. Follow-up research in 
2005 identified that land tenure issues certainly exist, with some farmers having 
their land taken away from them under the pretext of improper use – in some 
cases this re-nationalisation of land was found in my research to be, at least in  
part, politically motivated. Indeed, the legislation does allow for immediate disen- 
franchisement of land for improper use or for the failure to fulfil the state plan.  
The new land law of Uzbekistan (2002) specifies that farms must "provide for 
supply of agricultural production on government requests in compliance with  
signed agreements of contracting within limits of envisaged volumes" (article 17) 
and that "violation of land legislation, including cases of utilisation of land area 
for the purposes other than farming, including sowing agricultural crops, not 
specified in the contracting agreement" (article 32) will lead to the liquidation, 
without mention of compensation, of the farm. Thus whilst there is legal land 
tenure, this must be read with the caveat that land can be taken away from the 
farmer at any time, through the decision of a hokim (local mayor) or other senior 
official. In Yangiarik in 2004 there were apparently twenty one cases of farm 
liquidation from approximately 1000 leasehold farms, accounting for approxi-
mately 2 % of all leasehold farms. So whilst the formal legal institutions provide 
clear rules and standards, the informal institutions – or "the rules of the game" – 
determine a great deal of what actually occurs in rural Khorezm. Thus the net 
impact of these reforms has been slight, with land tenure rights remaining inse-
cure. So, whilst the move towards so called "privatisation" is occurring, and has  
been rapidly expanding in 2005 – after this research was conducted, there is reason 
to suspect that the broadening of land tenure is too limited in scope or security to  
be realistically labelled as "private" land. Whilst the discourse used by the govern- 
ment, and adopted by farmers, is one of "privatisation" – it is wrong to assume 
that this carries with it western legal notions of usufruct rights with title enshrined  
in legislation and protected by the courts. In Uzbekistan, "private" land is neither 
secure nor land on which the owner can decide what to plant. Farmers still retain 
a limited degree of security in their right to land and a high degree of uncertainty 
that their leases will not be cancelled. Aside from the issue that usufruct rights in 
Uzbekistan are severely limited, to perhaps 10-20 % of actual land holdings,  
an issue discussed below. A closer analysis of the land law (de jure) as well as 
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hold a legal right to land – this right is insecure and very conditional. Most  
recently (2005) almost all of the Khorezm region has been "privatised" yet the 
cotton growing season has not been freed at all from the state plan. Similarly, in  
Yangibazar (where privatisation begins in the Khorezm region) there are increasing  
accounts of land seizure – with unconfirmed interviews suggesting that approxi-
mately 2 % of land was de-privatised in 2004. True or not, these reports further  
undermine the security of land tenure, at least in the minds of farmers, who are 
forced to rely upon rumour rather than reported fact, in their determination on 
their own security of land tenure. 
In view of this limited security of land tenure, it is worthwhile to analyse the likely 
impact that these new reforms will have on the barriers to technology change in 
Uzbekistan. Evidence for this comes from 2003 in the form of H-Form analysis
4, 
comparing leasehold farmers in Yanghibazar with shirkat (joint-stock shareholding 
companies) farmers in other regions. This research identified that those farmers 
who enjoy no land tenure have little incentive to invest in their land, especially 
to implement sustainable land use practices. This is because they do not have a 
security of "ownership" of the land, and an "ownership" of the environmental 
problems faced. With short-term or insecure land tenure the rational decision for 
farmers is to conduct extractive farm practices that emphasise short-term profit 
gains over long-term ecological sustainability. 
This theoretical view is reinforced by differences in opinions between farmers 
interviewed at Yanghibazar and Khonka hokimyats. Yanghibazar was imposed 
within a national pilot program to lead the way in the Khorezm region by "priva-
tising" all shirkat farms, whereas Khonka was not selected and was slow to libera-
lise. In each instance (across a total of 58 direct interviews and 5 focus groups) 
farmers from Yanghibazar indicated greater concern than their colleagues from 
Khonka about soil degradation, salinisation and organic matter loss. This is 
surprising given that the devolution from shirkats to private farms is not yet finished. 
It is possible that this concern is due to privatisation, or that the salinisation and 
hence, the decline in profitability of shirkats was the reason for the privatisation. 
Similar differences of opinion were evidenced within the Yangiarik hokimyat,  
where some farms have been privatised whilst others remain shirkats or kolkhozes.  
We see in the below Table 8-1, showing results from the priority ladder method 
that soil quality, water quality and financial resources are all more important for 
those farmers on privatised land (for further discussion see WALL and LAMERS, 
2004). 
                                           
4  For a detailed discussion of the methods used in this research, refer to WALL, C. and 
LAMERS, J. P. A. (2004).  Caleb Wall  152
























































































































Fertiliser availability  7 9 9 9 2 9 
Price of vegetables at bazaar  11 13 14 14  9  14 
Quality of wheat produced  10 12 12 11 12 11 
Quality of cotton produced  9  11 11 12 13 13 
Availability of herbicides/pesticides   10  10  10  6  10 
Agricultural engineering  6 8 7 5 5 8 
Seed quality   7  1  3  11  7 
Supply of machinery and technology  4 6 5 2 7 2 
Availability of diesel for tractors  8 5 6 7  10  3 
Financial resources  1 4 4 6 8 1 
Soil quality  2 1 3 1 1 6 
Water quality  3 3 2 8 4 5 
Water/irrigation timing  5 2 8 4 3 4 
 
It was interesting to note that within the Yangiarik rayon there was a marked 
difference of views on sustainability and investment between private farmers and 
shirkat workers. In most instances those farmers who had a degree of land tenure 
indicated an increased willingness to implement sustainable land use practices, and 
many were making greater use of natural fertilisers such as cow manure. However, 
as the land rights of farmers remain restricted, the incentive to invest in the land 
through sustainable land use may remain low. So, whilst leasehold farmers may 
have a greater interest in ecological sustainability than shirkat employees, this 
will be limited by the degree of security they have over their land tenure. This 
phenomenon is closely linked with the low degree of autonomy that leasehold 
farmers have over cropping decisions, an issue discussed below. 
2.2 Cropping  decisions 
Cropping decisions in the Khorezm region remain heavily centralised. Farmers 
are given very little decision power over crop choices in a system of State Plans 
for the production of mandated quantities of cotton and wheat, which are classified 
as "strategic crops". The ecological and environmental impacts of this monoculture 
and the accompanying excessive irrigation are severe, including declining living 
standards, high morbidity rates and severe gynaecological ailments in the   
Karakalpak and Khorezm regions, which are nearest to the Aral Sea (POMFRET and Barriers to technological change and agrarian reform  153
ANDERSON, 2002: 90). The Government of Uzbekistan retains an official policy 
of encouraging cotton and wheat production on a large scale, which in turn are 
compulsorily acquired at sub-market rates (WORLD BANK, 1999; SPOOR, 1999). 
In practice every Rayon, and in turn every shirkat and now every leasehold must 
produce certain quantities of cotton and wheat, according to a plan for both 
quantity of produce as well as amount of land under cultivation of each crop. 
One hundred percent of the cotton crop is purchased at 60-65 % of world market 
value and then sold abroad by the central government for foreign exchange 
revenue (WORLD BANK, 1999)
5. However this figure varies greatly, depending 
on how you measure world market price (farmers are paid for un-ginned cotton, 
for which there is no market
6). Approximately fifty percent of the wheat crop is 
also purchased below market rates, ostensibly to ensure domestic food security.  
In approximately 80 % of respondent’s farms, cotton and wheat rotations continue 
without any fallow or alternate crops being utilised, with vegetables being cropped 
on separate land or as a third crop in between the harvest of winter wheat and the 
planting of winter-wheat. Or, inter-row cropped (illegally) between the cotton. In 
some regions of Uzbekistan, especially in the Khorezm region, local varieties of 
rice are favoured by farmers both for their usefulness in the staple food plov as 
well as because of historically high market prices. The production costs are however 
somewhat distorted as water (essential for paddy rice cultivation) is essentially 
free in Uzbekistan, thus subsidising rice production. Whilst four participants noted 
that the 2003-2004 drop in market price of rice was possibly due to market over-
supply of rice, over fifty other respondents did not mention the issue of over 
production. In any case, in 2004 rice production was officially banned in the 
Khorezm region, however it continued to a large extent. In some farms, such as 
in Yangiarik – there has been a marked increase in the production of rice. This is 
concomitant with raised ground water levels, a factor that farmers interviewed 
were aware – yet unconcerned – about. Despite the attempts at land reform, the 
national economy and especially the state budget both continue to rely heavily 
upon agriculture and, in particular, cotton production. "Agriculture accounts for 
30 per cent of GDP, 60 per cent of foreign exchange receipts and about 40 per cent 
of employment" (KANDIYOTI, 2002: 8). Cotton continues to constitute a large 
proportion of government revenue through the compulsory acquisition of the 
"strategic crop" from farms at sub-market rates. There is little evidence to date 
of any interest by the state in a reform of the state plan system. Rather, there is 
significant evidence to suggest that land reform is more a means of improving 
                                           
5  Some observers note that officially only 30% of cotton is part of the state plan. What this 
ignores is the factual monopoly by which in practice all cotton is sold to the state. Thus it is 
accurate to talk about 100% of the cotton going to the state, as this is what occurs in practice.  
6  However this argument misses the point that farmers only sell un-ginned cotton precisely 
because the government is a monopoly purchaser of cotton – thus preventing the development 
of competitive cotton ginning industry.  Caleb Wall  154 
the efficiency of the existing state plan system, rather than as an entrée to greater 
systemic reform of agriculture in Uzbekistan. Of course we are at the very be-
ginning of the privatisation regime and it may well be that further liberalisation 
occurs. If so, this will mark a move away from the central command economy – 
however if all the other structures of central planning and control remain in place, it 
is difficult to classify the land reforms as anything other than a re-organisation. 
To balance this negative view, leasehold farmers have a greater degree of autonomy 
in terms of planting outside of the state plan system. Once a farmer has planting 
their state quota (by land area), they are able to exercise a high degree of autonomy 
over their remaining land. This may range from as little as 10 % discretionary lands 
for most farmers who are involved in the rice & wheat complex. Some farms, 
especially those with established fruit groves or land only suitable for rice produc-
tion, may have a much higher percentage of discretional land. This discretion is 
somewhat illusory, as it is often the case that no other crop can be grown on the 
land. The discretionary land is used firstly for producing domestic consumption 
needs, followed by market influenced cropping decisions. At Yanghibazar, which 
has fully devolved all shirkat farms to leasehold farms, there is a high level of 
farmer initiative. This includes growing grapes, tomatoes, and evidence of small 
investment in post-harvest processing facilities by a growing number of individuals. 
The most common form of post-harvest processing is small scale wheat and rice 
milling – suggesting that for aspects of the economy outside of the state plan, 
there is a potential for private industry to manage processing. The optimistic view 
of land tenure is supported by World Bank survey data cited by VAN DUSEN et al. 
(2003) which measured the average number of crops across different farm types. 
Here it was shown that shirkats had an average of 1.24 crops, compared to 3.28 
for shirkat household plots and an impressive 3.62 for leasehold farms. Thus it 
is vital to acknowledge that the case for optimism is nuanced. We would be 
wrong to disregard the significant achievements of the state centred command 
economy since 1992 (or equally of the Soviet experiment). For instance KOTZ 
(2002) argues that the shirkat system was very effective in achieving wheat self-
sufficiency in the post-1991 period: 
"Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector had been operating under central planning since the 
1930s, and it did not have a significant sector of independent farmers who knew how 
to grow a variety of crops. The government used its control over the large collective 
farms to issue directives to shift a part of production from cotton and other crops to 
grain. Agricultural experts were deployed to provide the know-how required to make 
this crop shift. This succeeded in rapidly increasing grain production. Given the insti-
tutional reality of agriculture in Uzbekistan, it seems unlikely that such a rapid shift 
could have been undertaken through market methods. (KOTZ, 2002)" 
Whilst we may question the economic wisdom of aiming for wheat self-suffi-
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lower economic and financial costs, we must acknowledge that the policy was 
very successful. 
More negatively, POMFRET (2000) credits this lack of attempt at systemic reform of 
the state order system with the gradual economic decline of agriculture in Uzbe-
kistan. In a compelling comparison between China’s very successful land reform 
project and Uzbekistan’s continuing collapse, POMFRET (2000) points out that 
the key difference is the maintenance of state plans for output, which were 
abandoned in China but which have, if anything, been strengthened in Uzbekistan. 
So whilst the introduction of leasehold property in China is broadly hailed as a 
successful move towards market based production in the rural economy (whilst 
remaining within the "Communist" ideology of no private property) this has not 
been the case in Uzbekistan. TREVISANI (2006) makes a similar judgement in the 
specific case of the Khorezm region where "agriculture is going, more than through 
a veritable liberalization, through a process of reorganisation". In the absence of 
reform of the state plan system that land reform becomes a somewhat vacuous 
concept. Farmers retain only an insecure tenure over their land, which can be 
removed for a failure to fulfil the state plan. Likewise, it is illusory to discuss 
usufruct rights when at least eighty percent of use is externally mandated, both 
in terms of crop as well as methods, a third issue discussed below. 
2.3  Farm management  
In terms of farm management it is clear both from literature sources 
(KANDIYTOTI, 2002; ILKHAMOV, 2002) and my research (WALL and LAMERS, 
2004; WALL, 2004), that shirkat managers and leasehold farmers do not have 
autonomy over cropping and machinery use decisions in the Khorezm region. 
Rather a complex set of socio-political networks and rules exist, influencing farm 
management decisions. Primary amongst these is the State Plan system of strategic 
crops. This issue is discussed at length above. This reinforces the lack of autonomous 
farm management in the Khorezm region. State strategic crops dominate the 
agricultural system, accounting for over 60-80 % of typical farm land use. Farmers 
have little ability to adopt fallow strategies or to opt for more sustainable systems 
of crop rotation. This is partly because the state plan system also legislates exact 
farming methods. Land levelling, the depth of ploughing, regimes of fertiliser 
application and harvesting times of cotton and wheat are all part of the state plan. 
This occurs through the state agronomists and hokimyat (Mayor’s office) officials 
who still – even in Yanghibazar, after privatisation – travel around their regions 
ensuring that land is being "planted" properly, ostensibly to ensure fulfilment of 
the plan. Some activities, such as inter-row planting of wheat or melons in the 
cotton, are officially banned (yet occur none the less).  
Partly government control is also regulated through control of agricultural inputs, 
especially; fertiliser, seeds, water and mechanical traction. Concomitant with this is Caleb Wall  156 
the veritable shortage of agricultural inputs, especially mechanical traction and 
consumables. Farmers rely on the state monopolies for fertilisers and seeds and  
have only a limited selection of private machinery providers. Farmers must apply  
agricultural inputs as and when they are available, for the fear that they may not 
be available at another time. Whilst officially farmers may request inputs at any 
time (within the centrally established system of norms), in reality monopoly  
suppliers deliver fertiliser and other inputs at times convenient to the supplier,  
with little regard for demand. Forty three participants commented that they apply  
their inputs and use machinery at a time that is largely outside of their direct 
control. So, whilst a degree of autonomy may exist in theory and legislation, this 
is curtailed by practical constraints. Fertilisers can only be applied when they have  
arrived, leaving tacit decision making authority in the hands of the agro-industrial 
complex. This takes the form of a cohesive state and para-statal system which  
controls almost all legal agricultural inputs. This same apparatus also exercises  
considerable coercive power over farmers. Given that this complex remains heavily 
monopolistic, there is no mechanism through which farmers can choose better  
quality or service in their input providers. 
Important farming decisions, such as when to plant wheat and when to begin 
harvesting cotton, remain centralised decisions. There is an official period during 
which strategic crops must be planted and subsequently harvested. It is difficult 
to ascertain the legal implications of not following such rules; however they are  
almost universally obeyed. There appears to be a significant amount of legislation 
in this regard, but it is impossible to find a definitive guide to such regulations. 
What appears to happen is that directives are issued in the form of decrees by the 
hokim for Khorezm, which are then promulgated on a regional basis and imple-
mented, by Regional hokims and state farm managers. The execution of decrees 
is open to interpretations, and various hokims appear to implement these decrees 
in varying manners. Both shirkats and leasehold farmers appear to be equally 
subject to the imposed regulations from the central political infrastructure. As the 
privatisation project advances it will be worthwhile reviewing the extent to which 
leasehold farms gain greater or lesser freedom from the state plan. Experience to 
date suggests that no greater freedom from the state plan will be gained. 
There is of course the argument that the state plan system and the associated 
monopolies on all inputs, produces strong results. This is of course true. Cotton 
production remains high and funds a large proportion of the state budget. Like-
wise the case of national self-sufficiency in wheat is a good example of how the 
state plan achieves its aims. The problem is what these aims are. Clearly the state 
plan is aimed at gaining the greatest possible profit (for the state) from agriculture –  
with little regard for rural livelihoods or the development of the rural economy. 
If we take these (as well as ecological sustainability) as our aims then we see 
that the state plan continues to fail. However, in terms of producing an extractable 
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3 NEGATIVE INCENTIVES 
There are a range of negative incentives for efficient land and water use, as well 
as for innovation, at work in the rural economy of the Khorezm region. That is 
to say that farmers are rewarded for actions that are disadvantageous to either their 
own interests, or to larger environmental and economic considerations. There 
are disincentives for innovation, which poses a serious constraint to technology 
change. 
Innovation at the local level is a necessary part of effective technology transfer 
and agrarian change (RICHARDS, 1985). Instead in Uzbekistan there are a range 
of disincentives, especially for shirkat managers and leasehold farmers, for the 
innovation of agricultural methods. For example, seeds for strategic crops are 
provided cheaply or free of charge by the Government, even though they have a 
high fungible value (wheat for flour, cotton for edible oil). Improved sowing  
methods and the use of better quality seed could reduce seed inputs significantly, 
but there is no real incentive to do so. Conversely adopting a farming method 
not promulgated by higher authorities invites rebuke and punishment for shirkat 
and kolkhoz managers, as well as endangering the land tenure of new leasehold 
farmers – who can have their land seized if they "mismanage" it. This risk is not  
balanced by the possibly of reward if the innovation is successful. So whilst failing 
to meet the cotton plan would mean a leasehold farmer losing their land, the profit 
from exceeding the state plan is quite low (POMFRET, 2000). Such a situation 
favours risk aversion and provides a disincentive to innovation and a real barrier 
to technology transfer. This has created the mentality within shirkat and kolkhoz 
management whereby officials would have to take significant risks were they to 
adopt new technologies, without any hope of tangible gain if the innovation works. 
Likewise, whilst leasehold farmers may be interested in new technologies – if 
they take a risk in trying a new technology and this fails, they may lose their land. 
Thus, they have no incentive to deviate from accepted central wisdom, and face 
punishment ranging from dismissal for failing to meet central plans.  
A limited margin for experimentation exists for poor farmers in the Khorezm 
region. This is to say that most farmers are relatively poor, and cannot risk a 
poor crop in the pursuit of higher yields – this is because of both a credit constraint 
and due to the risk of falling below the income threshold required to continue 
farming. Likewise, many farmers are so close to the poverty level that they cannot 
afford to undergo short-term reductions in profitability in order to achieve long-
term economic benefits and sustainability. This is made worse by a regulatory 
regime that provides negative incentives for risk-taking, and positive incentives 
for the formulaic fulfilment of centrally devised plans. In such a situation it is 
difficult to access and target leading farmers to act as agents of technological 
trials and extension. This will pose a real barrier to the downstream implementa-
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At the larger scale, research institutes are excessively specialised and face con-
siderable political interference. Cotton and wheat research institutes focus on their 
narrow production area, with no research on alternative crops or on researching the 
ecological cost of these dominant cultures. Promotion within these institutes 
does not come to those who question cotton and wheat growing, or who propose 
paradigm shifts in agriculture. These same negative incentives exist for those 
working within governmental research institutes in Tashkent and at Universities 
in the provinces. There is no central research funding for independent research 
that might question the wisdom of the state plan, thus preventing innovation. 
Given the legal and administrative constraints that exist – it is difficult to imple-
ment agrarian reform and technology change. Because cotton and wheat production 
is so important to the government, any research or activity that could potentially 
threaten these crops is restricted. For example, an international project promoting 
potato growing in the Khorezm region has come under a range of sanctions de-
signed to make their extension services ineffective. Whilst international projects 
face a range of bureaucratic and administrative constraints, even on their research 
plots, local universities have almost no ability to conduct independent research. 
Central funding and career advancement relies more on producing legitimating 
myths than hard scientific evidence for those academics and researchers. There exists  
at all levels and in all disciplines a lack of academic freedom within Uzbekistan. 
This poses a real constraint to research and technology change in Uzbekistan, a 
factor often over-looked in international development projects. 
So to at the farm level, innovative methods by farmers carry high risks with little 
prospect of reward combined with the fact that the majority of farmers lack the  
capital (fiscal or political) to conduct trials of new methods or technologies.  
Together, these issues militate against the indigenous development of new farming 
systems. Increasingly, the uptake of new technologies in Uzbekistan will be 
premised on the creation of effective incentive systems. Further privatisation of 
land tenure and reforms in cropping decisions will allow greater incentives for 
leasehold farmers, who exhibit higher levels of commitment to innovation. This  
devolution must occur along with the liberalisation of fertiliser and tractor supplies, 
a reduction in the state order, as well as a move away from centrally promulgated 
farming methods. Also, there needs to be a strengthening of the protection of land 
tenure for leasehold farmers in order to establish the right mix of positive in-
centives for experimentation.  
4 FARMER AND DECISION MAKER PRECONCEPTIONS 
Farmer and decision maker preconceptions about "correct" agricultural practices 
are very strong in Khorezm. A poor quality of agricultural education for decision 
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of collective ownership, have come together to form strong preconceptions. This is 
especially the case in terms of tillage practices and water use management.  
It was evident from a range of discussions with hokims, university staff, shirkat 
managers and farm workers, that there is a strong belief in periodic tillage of the 
soil. This was confirmed in 2005 with a review of Soviet era archives, where 
mechanisation and extensive ploughing were presented as "victories" of Soviet 
agriculture. Over twenty farm managers and agronomists were interviewed, and 
every one of them expressed a belief in tillage practices, as well as being some-
what scornful of no-tillage. Whenever it was suggested that ploughing could be 
replaced with permanent or semi-permanent bed planting, almost all of the forty 
five farmers interviewed dismissed this idea as ridiculous. Similarly, suggestions 
that water could be conserved through the use of alternative irrigation methods, 
was met by strong opposition "You cannot use less water and get the same  
yield…it is impossible". These preconceptions are only two of many traditionally 
held opinions about farming best practice. Many would appear to be contrary to 
significant scientific enquiry and published literature. This is typical of "poor 
economic, social and environmental performance" of agriculture in the economy,  
as a result of the bureaucratised structure (ADAMS et. al., 1997: 707). Thus, farmer 
education must precede any attempts at technology transfer and extension. This 
will be made more difficult given the legacy of formulaic and centralised educa 
tional methods introduced in Soviet times and continued to the present. The Soviet 
method of research and technology transfer was always closely imbricated with 
ideology and politics and attempted to eliminate traditional forms of expertise 
and knowledge through "modernisation" campaigns (KREMENTSOV, 1997: 24). 
The Soviet system of reform, both within and outside of agriculture, was charac-
terised by secrecy and "political correctness" (JORAVSKY, 1970: 8-10). There is 
little evidence of a development from "top-down" technology transfer towards 
more participatory methods. There is a real need for the government and official 
donors to move away from this technology transfer paradigm towards a more 
farmer focused participatory approach. 
5 SETTLEMENT ACCOUNTING 
The system of banking and national accounts is based on "settlement accounting". 
This system uses government owned banks as middle-men or intermediaries for 
almost all (legal) financial transactions between farmers and inputs suppliers, as 
well as regulating taxation on profit and assets. All official transactions must be 
actioned through one of several government banks, with the individual seldom 
seeing their physical money. Nor is there any evidence of competition between 
these banks. In the case of cotton, farmers are paid for their cotton harvest direct  
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suppliers, they can also borrow from this account to pay for inputs against their 
future cotton harvest. The balance remaining in their settlement account at the end 
of the year is then deemed to be their profit for the year, which is taxed accor-
dingly. It is almost impossible for individuals to access their cash deposits with 
bank managers refusing to (or simply being unable to) provide cash payments 
(POMFRET, 2000). This has created a substantial black market for both goods and 
financial services. Likewise, non-state providers of machinery or other inputs cannot 
receive payments through the settlement account system, making the private access 
of machinery and inputs outside of the economic ability of most farmers who rely 
upon credit to buy their inputs. The settlement accounting system has an impact on 
private technology providers, fertiliser supplies and on cropping decisions.  
"The state-controlled banking system often acts as a monitor. By law purchases of 
seeds, fertilizer, machinery, fuel, and other inputs must be through bank transfer, 
and revenue from agricultural sales must be deposited in a bank and can only be 
used for approved purposes. Depositors' right of withdrawal in cash is circum-
scribed by centrally determined limits and local practice. The banks do not serve 
their depositors, but serve the state in checking that funds are used appropriately.  
There is no confidentiality or security. Indeed, bank account information is routinely 
supplied to local officials seeking information about a farmer's activities, and taxes 
may be deducted directly from bank accounts." (POMFRET, 2000: 273). 
Private contractors of tractors and other mechanical technologies must be paid in 
cash, as they are not eligible to receive deposits to their settlement account. Only 
Machine Tractor Parks (state run) and kolkhozes can rent out equipment and  
receive a settlement account transfer. This stifles private enterprise, and creates  
periodic shortages of technology for leasehold farmers, who in many cases do 
not have the cash required to hire a private contractor. Kolkhozes and Machine  
Tractor Parks were found in my research sample to be inefficient and tended to 
favour shirkat farms over leasehold farmers. Interviews with various leaseholders 
identified that the settlement account system is a much greater hindrance to poor 
farmers. Only seven of the thirty poor leasehold farmers interviewed were able  
to afford private machinery rental. In contrast none of the twelve richer leasehold 
farmers noted any problems with technology access, thus suggesting that settle- 
ment accounting is a greater burden on those without access to liquid capital 
(usually US Dollars). From my research it is the majority of farmers who lack 
this capital and access to machinery. 
Fertiliser and seed supplies remain a state monopoly and there has been no real move 
towards introducing effective competition. Even if it did occur, any privatisation 
would be ineffectual without a prior reform of the settlement account system. It 
is difficult to envisage private investment in the agricultural input industry, 
without any real possibility to a contestable market. This is because those areas 
that have been privatised in the past (such as cotton gins in the early-mid 1990s) 
faced a range of punitive state policies designed to stifle rather than encourage 
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sector and one cannot imagine this preferential system ending simply. The lack 
of access to technology despite privatisation suggests that the settlement account 
system will pose a real constraint to technology transfer. Even the recent "priva-
tisation" of land is unlikely to change this situation, as most inputs supplies still 
flow through the same shirkat structures as before, especially in the case of  
machinery and seed supplies (TREVISANI, 2006). 
"In fact, not only do leaseholders receive negligible in-kind payments, but they 
also claim that the shirkat provides them with inadequate inputs and services and 
then penalizes them for not meeting their production targets. This is a cause for 
great bitterness, aggravated by a context of growing polarization in access to land" 
(KANDIYOTI, 2002: 29). 
Cropping decisions are also influenced by the settlement account system. Farmers 
voice a preference for growing rice, as the surplus can be sold for cash at the 
market. As mentioned earlier, rice production is somewhat distorted as, unlike 
cotton and wheat, it is outside of the state plan and thus not subject to compulsory 
acquisition. This is why it is more profitable than, potentially higher earning 
strategic crops, as access to cash is guaranteed whereas bank deposits are not. This 
system of settlement accounting thus creates a distortion of cropping decisions, 
which poses a barrier to rural reform. 
6 POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE 
The political structure of the Khorezm region and Uzbekistan has yet to demon-
strate that there is a potential for positive change in the rural political economy. 
The changes to date, most notably land "privatisation" have been on the scale of 
re-organisation rather than reform (TREVISANI, 2006). The privatisation of 
Yanghibazar and the recent expansion of this programme for the rest of the 
Khorezm region can be seen as encouraging signs. However, this "privatisation" 
policy needs to be balanced against the evidence to date of the impact of these 
reforms. This evidence suggests that whilst land tenure may have changed to some 
extent, the usufruct rights normally associated with land tenure have not altered 
from the Soviet period of collective farming and the state plan. We also need to 
remember that there has been a high incidence of corruption that has characterised 
land reform thus far (KANDIYOTI, 2002). Privileged elites have capitalised on the 
privatisation scheme, amassing significant land holdings (TREVISANI, 2006). 
These large land holdings do little to encourage the transition to positive incentive 
systems for farmers and certainly marginalise many farmers.  
The political and economic elites of Khorezm, and indeed the Government of 
Uzbekistan, continue to rely on the rural economy as a source of funds and 
power. At a micro level state actors do profit from cotton, at a macro level state 
power is enforced through the cotton system – regardless of whether the state Caleb Wall  162 
profits economically or not – it is not a disinterested power. The vested interest 
of many high placed political officials in the agro-industrial complex suggests 
that any reforms may not deliver real benefits (WALL, 2006). For example the  
privatisation of the fertiliser industry may leave factories in the control of political 
and economic elites. This makes a move away from monopoly supply unlikely, 
as existing elites will maintain their monopolies either in a de facto or de jure 
manner. Likewise the central government has strongly resisted any reform of the 
financial sector, if anything strengthening the rural banks and the settlement 
accounting system. So long as the key aspects of the farming system do not reform, 
the changes from shirkats to leaseholds will have little impact on the rural lands-
cape and economy of Uzbekistan. 
If the manifold challenges of: Farm decision making autonomy, negative incen-
tives, preconceptions and a perverse settlement accounting system are to be 
addressed the systemic issue of corruption must also be addressed. It is less clear 
if there is the political will, or flexibility within the system, to allow these changes 
to occur. Without the reform of the political system it is possible that changes in  
the rural economy will run contrary to their aims. As argued throughout this paper, 
there are multiple barriers to technology change and agrarian reform. These barriers 
must be removed in a holistic manner in order to affect substantive rural reform. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Peter Mollinga, John Lamers, 
Christopher Martius and the staff of the ZEF/UNESCO project in the Khorezm 
region. Equally valuable was the contribution of various farmers and decision 
makers within the Khorezm region, who provided their time and hospitality, in 
aid of this research. The German Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF; 
project number 0339970A) and the Ministry for Schools, Science and Research 
of the State of Northrhine-Westfalia funded this study. 
REFERENCES 
ADAMS, W. M., WATSON, E. E., MUTISO, S. K. (1997): Water, rules and gender: Water rights 
in an indigenous irrigation system, Marakwet, Kenya, Development and Change, 28 (4), 
pp. 707-730.  
BARTLETT, D. A. (2000): Economic recentralization in Uzbekistan, Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics, 42 (2), pp. 105-121. 
ILKHAMOV, A. (1998): Shirkats, dehqon farmers and others: Farm restructuring in Uzbekistan, 
Central Asian Survey, 17 (4), pp. 539-560.  
JORAVSKY, D. (1970): The Lysenko Affair, Boston. Barriers to technological change and agrarian reform  163
KANDIYOTI, D. (2002): Agrarian reform, gender and land rights in Uzbekistan, Social Policy 
and Development Programme Paper 11, Geneva, <http://www.unrisd.org/UNRISD/website/ 
document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/c2919ac1cd7b5379c1256cca00369d07/ 
$FILE/kandiyot.pdf>. 
KOTZ, D. (2002): Sources and features of the "Uzbek growth puzzle" UNDP Uzbekistan Poverty 
Report, <www.undp.org/poverty/docs-propoor/uzbekistan-report/>. 
KREMENTSOV, N. (1997): Stalinist science, Princeton. 
MURRAY, C. (2004): Public lecture "The trouble with Uzbekistan" – By Craig Murray, British 
Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2002-04, Chatham House, Monday 8 November 
2004. 
POMFRET, R. (2000): Agrarian reform in Uzbekistan: Why has the Chinese model failed to 
deliver?, Economic Development & Cultural Change, Vol. 48, Issue 2, pp. 269-282. 
POMFRET, R., ANDERSON, K. (2002): Gradual economic reform and well-being in Uzbekistan, 
in: LU, A., MONTES, M. F. (eds.): Poverty, income and distribution and well-being in Asia 
during the transition, Hampshire/New York. 
RICHARDS, P. (1985): Indigenous agricultural revolution: Ecology and food production in West 
Africa, London. 
SPECHLER, M. C. (2000): Uzbekistan: The silk road to nowhere?, Contemporary Economic 
Policy, 18 (3), pp. 295-303. 
SPOOR, M. (1999): Agrarian transition in former Soviet Central Asia: A comparative study of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Institute of Social Studies Working Paper 298, 
The Hague, <http://adlib.iss.nl/adlib/uploads/wp/wp298.pdf>. 
TREVISANI, T. (2008 – forthcoming). Changing patterns of land control in Uzbekistan: Agricul-
tural policies, dynamics of power and social conflict in and after the kolkhozes of Khorezm, 
FU Berlin [Dissertation].  
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM [UNDP] (2001): United Nations Human Develop-
ment Report, Uzbekistan.  
VAN DUSEN, E., LEE, M., DENNIS, E., ILYASOV, J., TRESHKIN, S. (2003): The conservation of 
agricultural bio-diversity in Uzbekistan: The impacts of the land reform process, Paper 
Presented to the CAPRI workshop, September 29, 2003, Rome. 
WALL, C. (2006): Knowledge management in rural Uzbekistan: Peasant, project and post-
socialist perspectives in Khorezm, University of Bonn [Dissertation]. 
WALL, C., LAMERS, J. P. A. (2004): Farmer priority setting: Issues and research needs for 
Khorezm, Uzbekistan, ZEF Working Papers for Sustainable Development in Central Asia 
No. 3, <http://www.khorezm.uni-bonn.de/downloads/WPs/ZEF-UZ-WP03-Wall.pdf>.  
WEGERICH, K. (2002): Natural drought or human made water scarcity in Uzbekistan? Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, 2 (14), pp. 154-162.  
WORLD BANK (1999): Uzbekistan: Social and structural policy review, Report 19626, Washington, 
D. C. Caleb Wall  164 
LAWS AND DECREES 
LAND LAW OF UZBEKISTAN (2004): Law on agriculture in the Republic of Uzbekistan (English 
translation), Law passed by the Parliament of Uzbekistan  
Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Farmer Enterprises, No 602-I, 30 April 1998, last 
amended 2004. 
Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Plan for Development of Farmer 
Enterprises in the years of 2004-2006, 27 October 2003. 
 
 Continuity and change: Land and water use reforms in rural Uzbekistan 
PETER WEHRHEIM, ANJA SCHOELLER-SCHLETTER, and CHRISTOPHER MARTIUS (editors 2008), Chapter 9, pp. 165-182. 
CHAPTER 9 




∗ AND JOHN P. A. LAMERS
∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This study addresses the three primary types of commodities produced and traded 
in the Khorezm region of Uzbekistan. The data used in the following analysis was 
collected over a 23 month period, between 2003 and 2004 on the Urgench and 
Khiva markets for ten commodities. This report aims to shed light on the role of 
agricultural markets during the transition period from a command to a market eco-
nomy. The season and harvest period had a very strong influence on the established 
price of vegetables and fruits both in the different market types and locations.  
Except for rice and meat, prices of the other agricultural products depended strongly 
on their import from administrative regions inside Uzbekistan. Price differences of 
all commodities between markets were caused in the first place by transport costs. 
Due to the relatively low transport costs between regions, the price margins and 
hence the profit margins for traders were low. The analysis of the commodity flow 
chains revealed that aside from cotton, all other commodities were produced prima-
rily for domestic consumption. Only rice and meat were exported to other regions 
of Uzbekistan. It is argued that the Khorezm region has presently a comparative ad-
vantage to other regions in Uzbekistan for rice production and animal husbandry. 
Keywords:  Market economy, agricultural markets, transition period, marketing 
channels, prices. 
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АНАЛИЗ СЕЛЬСКОХОЗЯЙСТВЕННЫХ РЫНКОВ В ХОРЕЗМСКОЙ 
ОБЛАСТИ, В СЕВЕРО-ЗАПАДНОЙ ЧАСТИ УЗБЕКИСТАНА 
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∗∗ 
АННОТАЦИЯ 
В статье рассматриваются три разных рынка сельскохозяйственных культур 
в Хорезмской области, на северо-западе Средней Азии. Основные данные,  
собранные в течение 23 месяцев на рынках городов Ургенча и Хивы по  
десяти различным продуктам, показывают роль рынков сельскохозяйствен- 
ных культур в переходный период. Сезонный и урожайный периоды оказали  
сильное влияние на установление цен на фрукты и овощи как на рынках 
различных типов, так и в зависимости от месторасположения. Кроме риса, 
цены на сельскохозяйственные продукты зависят от количества произведен-
ной сельхозпродукции в других областях. Различия цен между рынками 
можно объяснить, во первых, стоимостью транспортировки, а низкие цены 
транспортировки между областями влияют на снижение разницы между 
ценами и прыбили. Анализ цепи потока продуктов показал, что все про-
дукты, кроме хлопка, были произведены, в первую очередь, для внутрен- 
него потребления. А в другие области Узбекистана экспортировались только 
рис и мясо. Предполагается, что в настоящее время Хорезмская область в 
сравнении с другими областями Узбекистана обладает преимуществом в 
производстве риса и животноводстве. 
Ключевые слова:  Рыночная  экономика,  Сельскохозяйственные  рынки, 
Переходный период, цепь потока продуктов, цены. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
When Uzbekistan became a sovereign country in 1991, it possessed a specialized  
agrarian sector. The arid continental climate favors open-field production of annual,  
warm-season crops such as cotton. Before independence in 1991, Uzbekistan  
supplied raw cotton, cotton fiber and early harvested vegetables to other Soviet 
republics (OLIMJANOV and MAMARASULOV, 2006). Imports from other Soviet 
republics covered Uzbekistan’s demand for cereals (particular wheat), potatoes 
and sugar. Crop cultivation in Uzbekistan occurred on large, specialized state and 
collective farms, heavily mechanized and with subsidized fertilizers, seeds and 
pesticides. Marketing activities and the supply of agricultural input were centrally  
organized outside the farm during the FSU
1 period (ALI et al., 2003). After inde-
pendence, the vegetable and fruit production sector collapsed (OLIMJANOV and 
MAMARASULOV, 2006) and the imports of sugar and potatoes decreased sig-
nificantly (MURADOV, 2002). 
Following independence, the government of Uzbekistan (GoU) opted for a gradual 
transition from the command-state to the envisaged market economy, intending 
thus to cushion the severe impacts of the collapse of the FSU as experienced in 
neighboring countries (SPOOR, 2003). This was substantiated in maintaining, for 
example, the governmental targets for cotton and wheat and a strong control of 
major marketing activities of these strategic crops (MURADOV, 2002). Although  
the strategic crops cotton and winter wheat covered on average 61 % of the arable 
land during the last 14 years (OBSTAT, 2005), farmers are free to cultivate other 
products on the remaining land and to sell these commodities. 
During the FSU epoch, agricultural commodity prices were centrally fixed and 
producers did not depend on a market demand, which does not mean that during 
the SU-era marketing and trade did not occur. The so-called "state-shops" sold  
commodities produced by the country or region itself, whereas consumer co-ope-
ratives sold commodities coming from abroad. At markets (bazars), people   
could sell commodities from their own (kitchen) gardens or obtained from their 
share of state farms. 
Although the introduction of economic reforms by Gorbachev in 1985 sparked 
entrepreneurship and the development of private enterprise in the FSU, until 
1991 these activities were still restricted in Uzbekistan. After independence,   
several reforms were introduced but the abolishment of the system of fixed prices 
and the adoption of a free market environment where commodity prices are to be 
established turned out to be a severe obstacle for producers due to their lack of 
knowledge and experience in a market-oriented production set-up (MATYAQUBOV, 
2004). The marketing experience gained during the FSU period was insufficient 
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to cope with the disruption of trade, shortages of all agricultural inputs, the limited 
opportunities for marketing agricultural commodities, and the limited opportunities 
to earn foreign exchange via agricultural activities, which was engraved by the  
absence of farmer advisory services to support farmer decision-making (ALI et al., 
2003). Currently, many "state shops" still exist, but their functioning is reduced. 
In contrast, the bazars are flourishing and both the type of products and amount 
of commodities sold has sharply increased since 1991. In the study region Khorezm, 
the number of markets has increased and the administration of these markets has  
changed. KhorazmBazarSavdo
2, the umbrella organization of all markets, collected 
fees from sellers and controlled the sale of restricted and prohibited products such 
as alcohol, cotton oil, guns, and drugs. 
Little market research has been conducted in the FSU countries. In a study in 
neighboring Tajikistan, it was found "… an increased market orientation improves  
farmers’ efficiency in the use and allocation of agricultural resources…" (LAMERS  
and VON OPPEN, 1998). Despite the absence of information on prices for producers 
and consumers or on supply and demand in Uzbekistan (YUSUPOV, unknown),  
recent findings showed that farmers obtained higher profits when selling their  
products directly to consumers (MURADOV, 2002). Farmers are thus in need for  
market information also as a guide for their decision-making. This study analyzed 
therefore the various types of markets in the Khorezm region, located at the 
southern part of the Aral Sea Basin in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya (see 
chapter 8 for details of the study region), and evaluated the situation and role of 
the three dominating agricultural markets: Dehqon markets, private as well as 
government trade purchase organizations and processing plants. Finally, the study 
intended to identify for what commodities the Khorezm region has a comparative  
advantage. 
2 DATA COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND ASSESSING 
A combination of methods was needed to collect the necessary information 
about the different markets and institutions involved in the marketing and to 
monitor the price dynamics of ten agricultural products in the Khorezm region. 
Weekly prices of meat, egg, rice, wheat, onion, potato, apple, carrot, tomato and 
the processed sour cream were collected in Urgench, the capital of Khorezm,  
and Khiva city markets over a 23 month period between 2003 and 2004. Stratified 
random sampling was used for the selection of the markets surveyed. Seasonal 
trends and price variations were analyzed using regression and correlation analyses 
and t-tests, all performed with Excel software. Transaction costs of market access 
and transport costs were gathered during the same study period. 
                                           
2  Khorezm Market Trade Association. Analysis of agricultural markets  169
Product flow chains of the ten agricultural products were elaborated and analysed 
to identify the importance and share of key market agents (governmental and private) 
involved in the marketing of agricultural products. Qualitative and quantitative 
data were obtained from interviews conducted with sellers and key resource 
experts such as directors of processing plants and storage facilities involved in 
agricultural marketing in the Khorezm region. Secondary data on the planted area, 
yields and farm gate prices of the monitored market commodities were provided 
by OblStat
3, OblSelVodKhoz
4, and the regional statistic departments which allowed 
cross-checking and completing the data sets. 
Parameters for market differentiation included the location, products marketed, 
prices, product origin, duration and opening time, service provision, number of 
sellers as well as the type of market agents. 
3 RESULTS  
3.1  Type of agricultural markets 
Three types of markets were identified where agricultural products were marketed: 
Dehqon markets, Universal markets, and Mini markets. The Khorezm region had 
seven main dehqon markets. They usually were located one or two kilometers out-
side the center of the capital city of each of the eleven administrative districts. All 
locally produced agricultural products, except cotton, were sold at these markets 
mostly by producers selling their own produce. Clothing and other non-agricultural  
products were also sold, albeit in much smaller quantities. A livestock section 
existed as part of the dehqon market in most of the seven markets. Households 
were the main suppliers of animals whereas butchers, farmers as well as traders 
were the primary consumers of animal goods. Products such as oil cake, husks, 
and other non-agricultural products were traded by resellers. Prices in general 
could be bargained. Dehqon markets were open one or two days a week. 
Eleven Universal markets existed in the Khorezm region, all of them situated in 
the center of the capital of the administrative district. A wide variety of products 
were traded at these markets, which enjoyed a relatively developed "service" 
sector. The section with agricultural products occupied the largest part of the market. 
Next to farmers, resellers intervened actively at Universal markets, which were 
open most days of the week. In case Universal and dehqon markets were located 
in close proximity, Universal markets were not operational during periods when 
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dehqon markets were open, due primarily to buyers demonstrating a preference 
for dehqon markets. 
Numerous Mini-markets, chiefly trading agricultural products, existed in the 
Khorezm region and were frequented by 15-20 sellers. In particular, resellers ope-
rated on these mini-markets, which explains why prices in these markets were in 
general 10-15 % higher than in Universal markets. Mini-markets were open every 
day of the week. 
Market transactions also occurred also outside the controlled markets since 
farmers and dehqons sold their products directly from their homesteads to fellow 
villagers. This home marketing reduced transport expenses for sellers as well as 
customers. 
3.2  Market segmentation by type of sellers in Urgench market 
Three types of sellers were identified at the different market types (Table 9-1): 
(i) Sellers, who sold their own products thus referring to farmers, household and 
shirkat members; (ii) resellers or retailers, who bought products from farmers or 
wholesalers and traded these; (iii) intermediates and wholesalers. Depending on 
the commodity and trading place, resellers sold on average 100-200 kilograms of  
product per day. Butchers were classified as resellers, since they bought animals 
from special livestock markets, slaughtered them and sold meat in pieces at the 
market. Special wholesalers traded mostly rice and eggs whilst others traders  
imported apples from Iran, potatoes from Surkhandarya, onions from Kashkadarya, 
and tomatoes from Samarkand during both the winter and spring. 
Carrot, wheat, rice, egg, sour cream and meat were locally produced only (Table 9-1). 
Rice and animal husbandry products were never imported into the region, but 
rather, exported out of the region to other administrative regions in Uzbekistan, 
which is discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
3.3  Commodity flow chains 
The following three commodity flow chains demonstrate a contrasting picture  
(Figures 9-1, 9-3 and 9-5). The commodity flow chain of winter wheat is depicted 
in Figure 9-1. KhorazmDonMahsulot
5 is the association that transported wheat 
directly from the field of the farmers to the state mills. In case farmers organized 
their own transport, KhorazmDonMahsulot reimbursed the transportation costs. 
About 70 % of the harvested wheat by private farmers and cooperative farms 
(shirkats) reached consumers via the intervention of government structures. The 
remaining 30 % was delivered to markets by the producers, mainly wholesalers, 
or consumed. There where no import and export activities involved in the wheat 
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flow chain except that wheat flour was imported from Kazakhstan, since it has a 
higher baking quality than the wheat produced in the Khorezm region. 
After 1991, meat production sharply increased in the Khorezm region (Figure 9-2) 
also driven by a gradually increased share of exported meat, in particular to 
other regions of Uzbekistan (Figure 9-3). This was caused by constant lower meat 
prices in the Khorezm region. For example, in 2004 the meat price at Urgench and 
Khiva markets in Khorezm averaged 1800 soum/kg compared to 2000 soum/kg in 
Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan which is located roughly 1000 km from 
Urgench; or in Navoi, a region located at about 600 km from Urgench. The quanti-
fication of export quantities was not possible. 
Table 9-1:  Number of sellers, type of sellers and product origin in Urgench 
market, 24.04.04 




























































































Egg 30  7  57.1  42.9  0  100 
Apple 89  12  33.3  66.7 62.5  37.5 
Meat 53  6 0  100  0  100 
Rice 64  7  57.1  42.9  0  100 
Wheat 13  4  50.0  50.0 0  100 
Onion 147  16  37.5  62.5  60  40 
Potato 169  20 30.0  70.0  71.4  28.6 
Tomato 75 7 28.6  71.4  40  60 
Carrot 109 9 42.9  57.1  0  100 
Sour cream  11  4  25.0  75.0  0  100 Ihtiyor Bobojonov, John P. A. Lamers  172
Figure 9-1:  Simplified commodity flow chain of winter wheat in the 
Khorezm region in 2004 
 
Figure 9-2:  Dynamics of meat production (in tons) in the Khorezm region 
between 1991 and 2004 
 
Source: OBLSTAT, 2005. 
Note:  Points in the figures are connected for increasing visualization only. 
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Figure 9-3:  Simplified meat flow chain in the Khorezm region, 2004 
 
The vegetable flow chain differed considerably from the wheat flow chain, owing 
primarily to the absence of a state order for vegetables and deteriorated processing 
facilities (Figure 9-4). For example, potatoes were marketed as a raw, non-processed 
commodity (Figure 9-5). The bulk of the potato production originated from private 
farmers and households and was marketed directly by producers or wholesalers. 
Vegetable production and marketing turned out to be extremely seasonal in the 
Khorezm region (see Section 3.4). The share of vegetable import was considerably 
higher in winter and spring seasons as it is shown in Table 9-1. Export of these 
products did not occur. 
Figure 9-4:  Dynamics in the total amount of processed agricultural products 
by state processing plants in the Khorezm region over the period 
1991-2001 
 
Source: OBSELVODKHOZ, 2004.  
Note:  Points in the figures are connected for increasing visualization only. 
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Figure 9-5:  Simplified potato flow chain in the Khorezm region in 2004 
 
3.4 Price  analysis 
Price analyses showed that wheat, meat, egg, rice and sour cream prices were 5-10 % 
higher at the Urgench market as compared to the Khiva market (Figures 9-6 and 9-7). 
Differences in prices of grains and animal products in Urgench and Khiva markets 
were low, owing to the low transportation costs of these products. During the 
wheat harvest period in June-July 2003, the state price averaged 72.8 soum/kg
6, 
in contrast to the average market price of 100 soum/kg. Transportation costs to 
the market varied between 2 and 4 soum/kg. Prices for agricultural commodities 
were lower in the spring of 2004 than 2003. 
The total amount of regional rice and potato production influenced the average 
annual prices as evidenced by the highly, negative correlation (rice r=-0.89;  
potato r=-0.9) whereas for wheat this correlation was absent (r=0.2). For the other 
products, the data collected were insufficient for a reliable analysis. 
During the study period, only small price fluctuations were monitored for all 
commodities (Table 9-2), except for tomato, apple and egg (sold per piece). This 
showed a clear seasonal variation as substantiated in peaking prices during the 
winter months January, February and March. They were clearly lower during the 
summer months June, July, August and September. 
In several cases price differences were caused by product qualities. Prices of vege-
tables and fruits were lower in district markets compared to the Urgench market. 
In the Khiva market, the demand for imported fruits and vegetables of very high 
quality was, surprisingly, absent. 
Interviews with resellers revealed that they could hardly influence prices because 
of the stiff competition, except during winter when only a limited number of resellers 
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operated at the markets. Price negotiations among resellers worked only for a  
limited number of products such as tomatoes and cucumbers, which are very rare  
in winter periods. The percentage which resellers added equaled mostly the costs 
of the services rendered. 
Figure 9-6:  Difference
7 in market prices of rice, meat, wheat (a), egg and 






Note:  Points in the figures are connected for increasing visualization only.  
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Figure 9-7:  Market prices of potato, apple, onion (a), tomato, carrot (b) at 
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Table 9-2:  Variation in Urgench market prices (in soum/kg) during 
26.05.02-11.04.04 
Commodity Mean  Standard Error  Minimum  Maximum 
  -------------------------------------  soum/kg ------------------------------------
Egg
8   57  1 42  87 
Apple 420  33 124  1833 
Meat 1741  13 1533  1989 
Onion 117  9 48  501 
Potato 167  8 71  450 
Rice 466  16 253  808 
Wheat 109  1 89  130 
Tomato 684  100 78  2150 
Carrot 62  3 36  108 
Sour cream  1309  18 1094  2213 
4 DISCUSSIONS 
The annual average market prices of the monitored commodities in the Khorezm 
region depended primarily on gross production in the region, which was under 
strict surveillance of the GoU and controlled via water and land allocation. Previous 
findings also reported that the area sown to coarse grains had shrunk continuously 
in response to the state order for wheat and had resulted in keen shortages of 
feed grain (FAO, 2000). In contrast, the price of winter wheat did not follow this  
trend but remained rather low and stable and thus independent from its production. 
Winter wheat is the main cereal crop used in Uzbekistan for bread making and 
hence it is one of the rationed items in Uzbekistan. Prices of rationed items were  
subject to governmental control (FAO, 2000). After independence, domestic wheat 
cultivation became a declared policy of the GoU to satisfy domestic needs. In 
the Khorezm region, the area under wheat increased more than two-fold in less 
than 15 years: From 36.8 thousand ha in 1990 to 86.0 thousand ha in 2003 
(OBLSTAT, 2005). The low and stable wheat prices were due to the intervention 
of KhorazmDonMahsulot. This organization bought wheat at low prices from 
those farmers producing under a state order agreement. The prices offered by of 
KhorazmDonMahsulot were inflexible and could only compete with the prices  
of the dehqon markets during the harvesting periods, during which prices on those 
markets dropped. 
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The GoU has a monopoly in the operation of wheat mills. These state mills paid 
farmers according to four quality classes, but Khorezmian wheat is of notoriously  
inferior quality compared to the spring wheat produced in neighbouring Kazakhstan 
due to the high salt and mineral contents in the soil which reduces the palatability  
and quality of the crop (KIENZLER, 2005). In 2004, the average gluten content of 
Khorezmian wheat did not exceed 23 %, barely reaching the classification of 
"satisfactory" baking quality wheat. Consequently, state bakeries used to mix the 
wheat flour with that of higher quality to achieve average baking quality flour. 
Also, due to outdated machinery used during the harvest, the degree of pollution 
of the wheat is high and often the cause for a further downgrading of the quality 
(KIENZLER, 2005). The difference between government and market prices of wheat 
explained why farmers attempted to escape from state order contracts and tried 
to produce for "private" markets where quality control is much less severe. 
It is recognized that the economic reforms introduced after independence in  
Uzbekistan did not favour vegetable production and resulted in the collapse of 
this production and marketing segment (ALI et al., 2003). Hence it is no surprise 
that vegetable supplies were extremely seasonal, most likely because it was very 
costly to grow vegetables during the cold winters (ALI et al., 2003). Moreover, 
trading vegetables and fruits rendered prices unpredictable, independent of the  
product volume and not clearly subject to supply and demand. As long as the 
strong governmental control on the price elaboration of such products prevails,  
the profit margins will remain low and thus also incentives for production increase. 
This is in particular true for vegetables and fruits, of which 75 % were produced 
by dehqons (OLIMJANOV and MAMARASULOV, 2006). Likewise, the deteriorated 
and primitive post-harvest handling technologies are not conducive to an increase 
in sales for vegetable markets and their integration into production lines (ALI et al., 
2003). 
Price analysis, however, revealed a consistent difference between Khiva and  
Urgench market prices of vegetables and fruits that could be explained by the 
transporting costs of these products. In general, this price difference underlined 
the high demand for these types of products at markets in Urgench, which has 
approximately 300,000 inhabitants and is the largest urban center in the region. 
The interest of the Uzbek population for fruits and vegetables is considered a 
primary reason why this sector has nearly recovered and is approaching levels 
achieved during the SU era (ALI et al., 2003). Moreover, vegetable production also 
seems a profitable and secure source of income (BOBOJONOV et al., 2007), but 
the absence of a reliable price information system limited farmers and traders making 
better-informed decisions to increase profits further. In case farmers become aware 
of higher demand and prices for their products, and in particular for those for 
which they have a comparative advantage, their income is bound to increase. 
HAU and OPPEN (2002) argued even that better market access can promote a more  
efficient allocation and use of resources leading to increased productivity. Moreover,  Analysis of agricultural markets  179
markets offer an outlet also for hitherto subsistence-oriented farmers to sell their 
own products for much needed cash. The development of markets and enter-
prises will generate income not only for the individual households but also for 
the GoU. 
The established commodity flow chains did not include an export component, 
indicating that the commodities monitored were produced mainly for domestic 
consumption. This is in contrast to the situation during the FSU era, where  
processed vegetables and fruits, were mostly exported from the Khorezm region 
by nation-wide overarching monopolistic structures like other regions in Uzbekistan 
(OLIMJANOV and MAMARASULOV, 2006). Since the processing capacities of 
Khorezm collapsed after independence (Figure 9-4), Khorezm has no comparative  
advantage for this production and market segment anymore. In contrast, at present, 
Khorezmian traders historically competed with traders from other regions due to 
the low transport costs previously mentioned as a potential hindrance for income 
generation for farmers (FAPU/TASIC, 1996). The large quantities of imported 
potatoes and onions from Surhandarya, Kashkadarya and Samarkand regions in 
Uzbekistan, influenced the prices of potato and onions on the Urgench and 
Khiva markets. In the regional markets, these commodities were then sold addi-
tionally by resellers together with products from their own region. Hence, price 
establishment in the markets seemed not to have been so much influenced by 
local conditions but more by conditions outside the market owing to the trade- 
purchase relations in the region. Especially in rural areas, commodities were sold  
directly by farmers and dehqons at their homestead to mainly neighbors or retailers. 
An influence on price establishment due to this home-marketing could not be 
identified, which confirms previous speculations in Uzbekistan (FAPU/TACIS, 
1996). 
Rice was one out of the two products exported to other regions of Uzbekistan. 
Due to the overwhelming flat topography, Khorezm has a natural comparative 
advantage for producing paddy rice on larger areas in case of sufficient water 
supply. Due to the agro-climatic conditions, rice yields with a quality highly 
suitable for making the local plov dish, are much more possible compared to other 
regions of Uzbekistan. Consequently, rice production is highly profitable as recently 
postulated (DJANIBEKOV, 2008 forthcoming) as long as there is no fixed price for 
water (BOBOJONOV and LAMERS, 2006). 
Furthermore, meat turned out to be one of the most exported products to markets 
outside the study region, but within the territory of Uzbekistan. Livestock pro-
ducers could not sell meat directly to the consumers, but instead sold animals at 
special livestock markets. Households greatly engaged in livestock rearing and it 
was recently confirmed that this represented another chief source of income and 
consequently was a preferred means to counterbalance the generally high rate of 
unemployment in the rural areas of the Khorezm region (MÜLLER, 2006). Since Ihtiyor Bobojonov, John P. A. Lamers  180
the local meat price in Khorezm was lower than at other national markets, 
Uzgushtsutsavdo
9, another governmental organization, bought meat directly from 
farmers in the Khorezm region and exported this meat to other regions of Uzbeki-
stan. Although WALL (2006) argued that in particular cattle breeding in the Khorezm 
region has become defunct after independence, this speculation seems overly con-
servative because it left out the observations about the high involvement of the 
rural population in livestock rearing (MÜLLER, 2006) and the steadily increasing 
meat production (Figure 9-2). Moreover, the high share of exports in the meat 
flow chain is another indication that the Khorezm region, compared to the other 
national regions, has, aside from rice production, a comparative advantage of produ-
cing meat. 
Both rice production and livestock rearing in the Khorezm region are examples 
that an increased market-orientation can form a sound foundation for improving 
farmers’ efficiency in the use and allocation of agricultural resources as argued 
previously (HAU and VON OPPEN, 1992). The mobilization of such resources in  
the Khorezm region has started because of the existing differences in comparative 
cost advantages. Both the markets and the trade fuelled production generated 
welfare because Khorezmian farmers and traders responded to improved market 
access and the associated price signals with specialization first. The trend is ongoing 
and points at an intensification of these production niches. Furthermore, it can be 
expected that an increase in exchange and trade not only sparks the specialization 
in commodities, sectors and regions, but encourages the development of infrastruc-
ture and transport as well (HAU and VON OPPEN, 1992). Moreover, increased 
competition among traders may lower costs for both producers and consumers.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Despite various reforms, the GoU has kept its central grip on the marketing of 
main agricultural products, such as winter wheat and cotton. For other commodi-
ties, market prices were influenced in the first place by the produced quantities, 
which presently depend on the area allocated by the GoU. The market prices of 
products other than rice and meat were influenced strongly by the amount and 
prices of the transported commodities, in particular during winter and spring 
months. Low transportation costs between the administrative regions cushioned 
price differences between regionally produced products and those products im 
ported from other regions. The price differences between markets in the different 
districts of the Khorezm region equaled transportation expenses. 
Farmers mostly produced for regional markets and made their decisions based on 
regional market prices. Moreover, the current infrastructure and legal environment 
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were not conducive to promote the export of goods for small-scale farmers. 
Government prices were very low and a processing sector was hardly developed. 
Also, the demand for agricultural products in the Khorezm region was very limited 
and an increase in gross production may cause immediately declines in prices. 
Prices for rice and meat were substantially lower in the Khorezm region com-
pared to other administrative regions of Uzbekistan, and a regular export of both 
commodities has begun. Although at present only rice production and animal 
husbandry in the Khorezm region have this comparative advantage, the estab-
lishment of a market information system may enhance this initial step further and 
could be of vital importance in improving farmers’ knowledge on agricultural 
marketing and giving them a chance of increasing economic gains. Given the 
strong linkage between marketing and development, the improvement of markets 
and marketing is an important developmental tool for countries in transition. Yet to 
reach this level, the present trade activities need to be developed further to fully 
exploit the comparative advantages of the Khorezm region, such that all potential 
benefits of agricultural trade are realized. 
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Production of raw cotton and exports of cotton fiber in Uzbekistan are subject to a 
variety of government regulations. Among the most relevant policies are the admi-
nistrative setting of production targets, governmental price control, and taxation of 
exports on the one hand, but also significant subsidization of inputs and debt-write 
offs for cotton producers and various forms of subsidies for the processing of cotton 
fibre on the other. Additionally, an assessment of who are "winners" and "losers" 
under the current cotton market policy regime is hampered by a lack of consistent  
data. This study aims at quantifying the magnitude of distortions resulting from 
direct and indirect government interventions. We start with a graphical, partial wel-
fare analysis of the cotton market and then present a quantitative analysis for the 
years 1993 to 2004. Missing data were estimated by the author. The contribution of 
this work is that the analysis is carried out for the sequential markets of raw cotton 
and fibre. In contrast to other analyses which focus on primary cotton production 
only, this study indicates that the effects of the major cotton policies on the major 
actors involved are not at all clear. The results raise the questions whether the sector 
policies are rational, whether they are possibly counter-balanced by macro-economic 
disturbances (e.g. exchange rate fluctuations) or whether they are simply an attempt 
to shield as much labour in rural Uzbekistan as possible. 
Keywords:  Partial welfare analysis, cotton market regulations, Uzbekistan. 
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Производство хлопка-сырца и экспорт хлопкового волокна регулируются со 
стороны правительства в Узбекистане. В числе основных методов регулирова-
ния значатся, с одной стороны, административное принятие производственных 
программ, государственный контроль цен и налогообложение на экспорт, а с 
другой стороны, значительное финансирование затрат и списание долгов про-
изводителей хлопка, а также предоставление различных форм субсидий для 
переработки хлопкового волокна. Кроме того, отсутствие последовательных 
данных затрудняет определение выигравших и побежденных в условиях дей-
ствующего на рынке хлопка нормативного режима. Данное исследование на-
правлено на определение размеров искажений, ставшие результатом прямого  
либо косвенного вмешательства со стороны правительства.  Мы начинаем с 
графического, частичного анализа развития хлопкового рынка и затем пред-
ставляем количественный анализ на период с 1993 по 2004 гг. Новизна настоя-
щего исследования состоит в том, что анализ осуществляется для взаимосвя-
занных рынков хлопка-сырца и хлопкового волокна. В отличие от других ис-
следований, сосредоточенных в основном на первичном хлопкопроизводстве, 
данное исследование показывает, что воздействие главной хлопковой полити-
ки на основных участников рынка представляется не совсем ясным. Согласно  
результатам проведенного исследования возникают следующие вопросы: 
Является ли курс сельскохозяйственной политики рациональным? Уравнивается 
ли заданный курс нарушениями макроэкономических процессов ( например, 
неустойчивостью обменного курса)? Либо это всего лишь попытка трудо-
устройства как можно большего количества сельского населения Узбекистана? 
Ключевые слова:  Частичный анализ развития, регулирование хлопкового 
рынка, Узбекистан. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
The policies applied on the Uzbek markets for raw cotton and cotton fiber are 
frequently addressed and discussed in scientific studies, country analyses and 
reports from national and international organizations (SPOOR, 2004; BLOCH, 2000; 
POMFRET, 2003; IMF, 1998; IMF, 2000; WORLDBANK, 1999; GUADAGNI et al., 
2005; CER, 2005; RUDENKO, 2006; MÜLLER, 2006). Identification of the actors 
who gain and the actors who lose under the current regulations and the evalua-
tion of potential policy reforms is hampered by a lack of reliable and consistent 
data for the time since independence and an opaque system of taxes, subsidies, 
production targets, and input provisions. Crucial information like input subsidies  
or domestic fiber prices can usually not be found in publications of national 
statistical departments, or research institutes (Centre for Efficient Economic Policies 
(CEEP), Centre for Economic Research CER). Furthermore, analysis from inter-
national organizations (IMF, 1998; WORLDBANK, 1999; GUADAGNI et al., 2005) 
cover only limited periods of time and apply different methods of evaluation, for 
example, the net-transfers out of the cotton sector. Most studies indicate positive 
transfers out of agriculture via the cotton sector, but differ significantly concerning 
the magnitude of the net-transfers. 
The aim of this study is to derive a transparent and consistent outline of the policies 
related to the Uzbek cotton market and the impacts on the actors involved. The 
general idea is to use all available information, mainly from the studies mentioned 
above, but also from a variety of other sources, to merge them into a single database, 
and to derive comparable results. The nature of the problem requires the estimation 
of missing data points, which is done by applying an estimation method based 
on the works of BRITZ et al. (2004) in the context of the compilation of a complete 
and consistent database for the agricultural sector of the European Union. The 
fact that the used studies do not only differ in terms of methods but also in terms 
of data-structure, requires that the smallest common denominator of data aggre-
gation is achieved. This process is a comparatively blunt tool, however, the loss 
of detail is outweighed by the gain of a complete and consistent data set of the 
Uzbek cotton sector for the period from 1993 to 2004. 
Section 2 provides the conceptual framework of the actors involved in the cotton 
market and gives a qualitative overview on the impacts of the relevant policies 
on the interlinked partial markets by using a graphical partial welfare analysis. 
We continue in section 3 with a description of the database, how it was compiled 
and the way in which data-gaps were filled. The resulting monetary flows within 
the cotton sector, especially the net-transfers out of agriculture and the potential 
revenues for the budget of the Uzbek government, are then discussed in section 4. 
We conclude in section 5 with a summary of results and possible implications for 
further research on the topic. Marc Müller  186 
2 PARTIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS OF MARKETS FOR RAW COTTON 
AND FIBER  
Cotton is a strategic crop in Uzbekistan and its production is largely state con-
trolled. It is the dominant crop within the agricultural sector and about 32 % of 
the total cropped area between 1993 and 2005 in Uzbekistan was used for cotton  
production (FAOSTAT, 2006). The dominance of this crop is the result of a history 
of interventions dating back to the Soviet system which continues today, primarily 
in the form of output quantities determined by the government. Production targets 
are set at the national level and then broken down to regions (oblast), districts 
(rayon) and finally to the actual producers (former kolkhozes, new fermers and 
dehqons). In theory, 30 % of the target level has to be sold to the responsible  
state marketing board (Uzkhlopkopromzbyt) at state prices which are usually 
described as being well below the hypothetical world market price (WMP) for 
raw cotton. The remaining 70 % might then be sold to the same organization at  
around 20 % higher prices, which are still below the WMP, or to private processing  
facilities. Due to the fact that the state does not allow any significant private cotton  
marketing and that the production targets are usually very ambitious, the total  
produced quantity is in practice sold to governmental institutions (IMF, 2000; 
WORLDBANK, 1999; KANDIYOTI, 2001). The resulting supply of raw cotton is then 
processed into fibers and seeds. Fibers are mainly (but decreasingly) exported or 
used by the domestic textile industry. Seeds are either redirected to the agricultural 
producers for sowing purposes, or are milled to cotton oil and oil-cake. Cotton 
oil is an important food product while oil-cake is used as a fodder component in 
the animal husbandry sector.  
This study focuses on the sequential markets for raw cotton and cotton fibers.  
A simplified graphical analysis of the relevant market regulations is carried out in a 
first step in order to identify the potential effects on the actors on these markets. 
The following graphical analysis was conducted under the assumption that changes 
in quantities for exports do not affect the export price, thus treating Uzbekistan 
as a price-taking small country on the international cotton fiber market. Such an 
assumption might appear counter-intuitive given the fact that Uzbekistan is the 
second largest exporter of cotton fiber after the USA. There is, however, no empirical  
indication for effects of Uzbek export quantities on the WMP (ROSENBERG, 2001) 
in recent years (see also Figure 10-1, where a weak positive relation between the 
world market price in US$ and the export quantity in 1000 tons is shown for the 
entire decade before 2002). However, the correlation between Uzbek exports 
and world market prices was clearly negative between 1992 and 1997 when the 
share of Uzbekistan in the world-exports of cotton fiber remained between 20 % 
and 18 %. This share dropped to 14 % in 1998 and declined even further to 12 % 
until 2002, with the apparent consequence that the fiber exports of Uzbekistan had Cotton, agriculture and the Uzbek government  187
a much weaker impact – if any – on the world market. Thus, the treatment of the 
Uzbek cotton sector as a price-taker is justified for the time since 1998.  
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Source: MÜLLER, 2006. 
The partial market for raw cotton is illustrated in Figure 10-2 in a strongly simpli- 
fied manner: Domestic demand for raw cotton is represented here by the line  
Drc and the initial domestic supply is revealed by the marginal cost curve Src1. 
The domestic market is assumed to be fully competitive and open to the world 
market in this initial situation, by which the border price Pb (i.e. WMP) is deter-
mined. If producers are price takers and behave rationally, they will decide to 
produce an output level of Qg. The marginal costs equal the market price (Pb)  
and the total variable costs, represented by the grey shaded area below the marginal 
cost curve, are more than fully covered by the revenues from selling total output 
(Pb times Qg). Producer surplus is the total area above Src1 and below the dotted  
price line. Because output exceeds domestic demand, raw cotton would be  
exported, as is the case.  Marc Müller  188
Figure 10-2: Partial market for raw cotton 
Source: MÜLLER, 2006 
In comparison to this free trade situation the government decides to intervene in 
the cotton market and to decrease the domestic price administratively to Pg at 
which the domestic demand equals Qg. At this price, domestic demand is higher  
than domestic supply. To ensure the provision of the fiber producers with domestic 
raw cotton, a minimum production target is set at Qg by the government. Due to 
this system of regulations, the raw cotton sector loses the areas a and b as pro-
ducer surplus compared to the initial situation.
1 The total cost of production (the 
grey shaded area below the marginal cost curve Src1 until Qg) is the same as in 
the initial situation. Pg is below the marginal cost and the producers lose addi-
tionally  c and d, representing the production costs that are not covered by   
the earnings from selling Qg at Pg. The fiber sector on the other hand gains a and d 
as consumer surplus. The total welfare loss by comparing effects on producer and 
consumer surpluses is the combined area of -c-d. In order to mitigate the burden 
for raw cotton producers, the government implements a system of input subsidiza-
tions (e.g. for water and intermediates), thus shifting the marginal cost curve from 
Src1 to Src2. This compensates for the losses c and d and adds e as surplus to 
the welfare of producers; the demand side is not affected, but the state loses the 
combined areas of c, d, and e through the payment of indirect subsidies.  
                                           
1  Producer surplus is defined as revenues (price * quantity) minus variable costs (area under 
the marginal cost curve and to the left of the quantity line. Consumer surplus is defined as 
the value of the utility consumers receive for which they do not have to pay for. Or, in other 
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The net welfare effects of this government intervention are as follows: 
Producers of raw cotton:  -a    -b    +e 
Fiber producers:    +a    +d 
State:     -    c   -d   -e 
Net welfare change:    -b -c 
The net economic effect of this intervention is clearly negative. The intervention 
still may turn out to be rational, however, if the results are combined with the 
repercussions on the fiber market. This is shown in in the following Figure 10-3. 
The decreased price for raw cotton shifts the marginal cost curve of fiber producers 
from Scf1 to Scf2. If producers can realize the export price Pe for fiber, which 
resembles the world market price at the market EXR, they would gain the areas 
i, j and l as additional surplus. However, because of the exchange rate system, 
they can realize Pd only, which is the WMP at the official EXR and therefore 
they lose f, g, h, i, j, and k. Domestic demand for cotton fiber benefits from this 
regulation by having access to fiber at the domestic price Pd. Therefore, the 
consumer surplus increases while by f as if compared to a non-distorted foreign 
exchange market. The government finally gains the areas h and i through skim-
ming the difference between export value at market and official EXR.  
Hence, the net welfare effects on this partial market amount to: 
Producers of cotton fiber:   -f   -g   -h    -k  +l 
Domestic fiber processors  +f   
State:        +h  +i   
Net welfare effect:       -g   +i -k +l  
In contrast to the market for raw cotton, the net welfare changes have no clear 
direction because of the positive (i, l) and negative (g, k) terms. However,  
ROSENBERG (2001) shows a clear net welfare loss on the centralized export 
markets, but not for the cotton sector alone and only when taking the exchange  
rate regime into account. Marc Müller  190 
Figure 10-3: Partial market for cotton fiber 
Source: MÜLLER, 2006. 
Likewise, the impact on the governmental budget has no clear direction as the 
gains h and i (in the market for fiber) are partly or totally offset by the expenditures 
for c, d, and e (in the market for raw cotton). The net effect of the cotton market 
regulations on the governmental budget are of particular relevance, not only for 
this study, but also for the interpretation of the aims of these policies. If the govern-
ment of Uzbekistan systematically realizes losses, money is not transferred out of 
the cotton sector and hence, can not be used to finance investments to develop 
domestic industries. In this case the underlying objectives of government inter-
vention in this market would not be met and one would need to ask how such a 
seemingly irrational policy could be explained. The quantification of this item is 
therefore one aim of this study. 
3 DATABASE  
The partial market analysis in the previous section gave an outline of the data 
needed to identify the policy interventions in the sequential markets for cotton, 
particularly the effects on the governmental budget and on the surplus of pro-
ducers of raw cotton and fiber. To begin, a brief description of readily available 
time series for the observed period from 1993 to 2004 is provided below. The 
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3.1  Available data  
Statistics on total harvested area and output of raw cotton as well as on production 
and export of cotton fiber were obtained from FAOSTAT (2006). We used the 
Uzbek border price for lint and average world market prices from the same source 
by dividing total export value over total export quantity, thereby deriving the 
unit value price. Total merchandise exports in US$, total gross domestic product 
at factor cost and market prices (GDPf, GDPm), and gross agricultural product 
(GAO) in current and previous-year prices were taken from ADB (2006). The 
latter series was used to compute the GDP deflator which again served as an 
indicator for the development of domestic prices. Total governmental revenues 
until 1999 were provided by IMF (2000), from 2000 to 2004 by CEEP (various 
issues). While official exchange rates (annual averages, not last quarter averages 
as are frequently used) could also be taken from ADB (2006); the market exchange 
rates for the observation period had to be compiled from multiple sources, including 
CER (2005) and CEEP (multiple years). 
The datasets listed above were used without further processing and revealed  
already some relevant insights. With regard to the dynamics of total merchan-
dise exports and fiber exports as depicted in Figure 10-4, it can be seen that fiber 
exports lost continuously their weight in total export earnings down to a level of 
merely 13 % in 2004. But it was certainly a major source of foreign exchange 
earnings during the 1990’s, with the exception of 1996 when bad harvests did 
not allow for extensive exports. The low fiber exports indicated for 1993 might 
be explained with altered trade arrangements in the aftermath of the independence, 
but it should be mentioned that other sources provide substantially larger figures.  
The declining share of cotton since 2002 is not due to significant changes in the 
absolute export quantity of cotton fiber, but rather due to an increasing total export 
value. This development coincides with the dynamics of the exchange rates 
(Figure 10-5). The gap between market exchange rate and official exchange rate, 
which had been widened until 1999, began to narrow. The narrowing began firstly 
due to steadily increasing official rates and after 2002 due to declining market 
exchange rates. By 2004, both rates had almost converged. Consequently, the 
frequently discussed implicit taxations through the multiple exchange rate system 
and the resulting welfare losses (ROSENBERG, 2001; IMF, 2000) are apparently 
abolished, if this trend were to continue. When comparing Figures 3.1 and 3.2, it 
appears that the end of the overvaluation of the soum had caused an immediate 
response on the export markets. 
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Figure 10-4: Merchandise exports of Uzbekistan, 1993 to 2004,  










































Other merchandise exports Cotton fiber exports Share of cotton fiber  
Sources:  FAOSTAT, 2006; ADB, 2006. 
 


















Official exchange rate Market exchange rate  
Sources:  CEEP, multiple years; CER, 2005; ADB, 2006. Cotton, agriculture and the Uzbek government  193
3.2 Compiled  data 
While the datasets described in the previous section could be used immediately, 
some others required further processing. The most important information on 
domestic prices for raw cotton from 2000 onwards could be taken from 
GUADAGNI et al. (2005), but the only single source for the years before was CER 
(2005), which provided the values from 1992 to 2000 in constant prices of 1992. 
We used the relative deviations from 2000 and the first observation point from 
GUADAGNI et al. (2005) in order to obtain the prices in constant soum of 2000. 
The transformation into current soum was then done by using the GDP deflator 
computed from ADB (2006).  
Domestic prices for cotton fiber were also only available from GUADAGNI et al. 
(2005), but a comparison with the prices for raw cotton indicated that they are 
on average 4.0 times as high (with a coefficient of variation of 4 %). I used this 
factor and the compiled set of raw cotton prices to compute the fiber prices. The 
differences between domestic, border, and average world market prices are depicted 
in Figure 10-6. 


















Observed domestic price Derived domestic price
World market price Uzbek border price  
 
Sources:  FAOSTAT, 2006; GUADAGNI et al., 2005; author’s calculations. 
Note:    Domestic prices in US$/t were calculated with the official EXR. The gap between world  
 market and domestic prices would be higher when using the market EXR. 
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Domestic, state controlled fiber price and average world market prices appear to 
follow the same pattern, which is particularly remarkable as these two series origi-
nate from entirely different sources. It appears that the Uzbek government adminis-
trates the prices according to world market developments and consequently pursues 
a rational approach. However, the average world market price does not apply for 
Uzbek exports, but rather the border price, which tends to be lower and follow a 
different pattern. In fact the border price between 1999 and 2002 remained stable at 
around 1000 US$/t, regardless of the declines of world market and domestic prices, 
which could be the result of trade intervention. However, the data shown here are 
not sufficient to derive insights into the administrative processes behind the setting 
of domestic prices and into the trade regulations that influence the border price.  
3.3  Filling the gaps 
The most crucial information about production cost for raw cotton, processing cost, 
and input subsidies could not be obtained for the full length of the time period of 
interest. Again, GUADAGNI et al. (2005) provide the needed data for 2000 to 2004, 
but earlier years are missing to a larger or lesser extent. Input subsidies between 
1995 and 1997 were taken from the IMF (1998), but only as a total for wheat and 
cotton. The subsidies were derived for cotton by using the ratio between cotton and 
wheat areas as provided by FAOSTAT (2006). Concerning the variable cost, it was 
necessary to rely on publications by the International Cotton Advisory Committee 
(ICAC, CHAUDHRY, 2005 and 1997), which provided averages for several regions, 
including Asia as a whole. GUADAGNI et al. (2005) split the total variable cost per 
hectare of raw cotton into labour and other costs.
2 Together with average wages as 
provided by OBLSTAT (2002a) and CEEP (2002), and norm values for labor input 
per hectare (OBLSTAT, 2002b), it was possible to compute an average labor de-
mand of 0.58 labor force units per hectare (LF ha
-1). This figure is based on the  
assumption of 260 working days per year (52*5) and 8 hours per working day. The 
wage rate and the average labor input were then used to calculate labor cost per 
ha; other cost components and processing costs were still missing.  
Based on the work of BRITZ et al. (2004) on the compilation of a complete and 
consistent (COCO) database for the European Union, a similar, yet simplified, 
method was applied for the compilation of the database used here. The COCO 
estimation (see also BRITZ (ed.), 2005) is basically a two-step approach. In a first 
step, polynomial trends are estimated for the observed values. Trend estimates 
and the standard error of the regressions are then used in a second step to estimate 
the missing values under a set of consistency constraints. The detailed approach 
used here is described below: 
                                           
2  Labour costs are usually not treated as variable, but since picking costs have the highest 
share in total labor cost, and because pickers are mainly hired seasonal workers, it was decided 
labor would be treated as a variable input in the model. Cotton, agriculture and the Uzbek government  195
1. Step:  Estimation of trends 
The starting point was the estimation of a trend value for all incomplete cost 
data by minimizing the squared deviations between estimated (C
^) and observed 
data (C) for all years t and all series i in (1), which includes wages, labor cost per 
hectare, other variable costs, subsidies per hectare and finally processing costs, 
including marketing and procurement costs. The estimate C
^ is in contrast to 
BRITZ et al. (2004) not expressed as a polynomial trend but here as a quadratic 
function of the GDP deflator (ADB, 2006) D in (2) with α, β, and γ as parameters 
to be estimated. The decision to use D instead of time was made to correct for 
the inflation of the Uzbek soum in the observed period. 
iii
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The standard error of the regression SD is then computed for each series i. 
2. Step:  Constrained estimation 
The next step was also based on the minimization of squared deviations between 
observed and fitted values (C
*), but this time with a different objective function. 
The first term in equation (3) assures that fitted values are equal to observed ones, 
but allows for a deviation if the imposed constraints would be violated. The second 
term ensures that the residuals e between trend line and either observed (if existing) 
or fitted values (if no observation exists) are minimized in (4). The residuals are 
weighted with SD to put an additional penalty on deviations from the trend line 
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The constraints as expressed in (5) impose that the estimated cost components 
C
* divided by the different exchange rates Pr (market and official exchanger 
rate) is within a "reasonable" range. This reasonable range is either based on  
information about cost in other countries from the ICAC (X
lo for lower bound 
and X
up for upper bound) or, if such information was not available as in the case 
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To ensure that the ratio between fitted labor cost per hectare (C
*
’LABC’) and wage 
per labor force unit (C
*
’WAGE’) is close to the assumed labor demand per hectare 
(0.58 LF/ha), we included (6) in the model, in which L
lo and L
up were chosen in 
a range of +/- ten percent around the prior information of 0.58 LF/ha. 
* lo up
tt t LL L ≤≤  with 
** *
,' ' ,' ' / t t LABC t WAGE LC C =               ( 6 )  
The model including equations (1) to (6) was estimated in the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) and put to work as a non-linear optimization problem 
(NLP).  
3.4 Estimated  series 
The unconstrained estimate obtained from equations (1) and (2) displays negative 
values and deviations from the observations, while the fitted values match the 
observations and do not show any other implausible behaviors. However, only 
four missing values had to be recovered for the observed period which made this 
estimation comparatively reliable.  
The picture is different for processing costs, for which only five observations at the 
end of the period were available (Figure 10-7). In this case, it was necessary to rely 
on the information from ICAC about international costs for cotton processing. The 
unconstrained estimate clearly violates the prior information that restricts the proces-
sing cost to a narrow range around 200 US$/t. The fitted values on the other hand 
are well within the required range without actually running against the bounds. 
Figure 10-7: Estimated and recorded subsides, 1993 to 2004, in current 















































Unconstrained estimate [C^] Constrained estimate [C*]
IMF 1998 [C] Guadagni 2005 [C]
 
Sources:  IMF, 1998; GUADAGNI et al., 2005; author’s calculations. Cotton, agriculture and the Uzbek government  197
Figure 10-8: Estimated and recorded processing cost, 1993 to 2004,  





































































Bounds [Xlo, Xup] Unconstrained estimate [C^/R]
Constrained estimate [C*/R] Guadagni 2005 [C/R]  
Sources:  GUADAGNI et al., 2005; author’s calculations. 
The estimated average production cost for raw cotton can be seen in Figure 10-8. 
When comparing the average estimate C
* with the values provided by 
GUADAGNI et al. (2005) (C) and results based on MÜLLER (2006)
3, one can find 
that all three values, either expressed per hectare or per ton, cluster around 
624 US$/ha or 276 US$/t, with a coefficient of variation of 8 % in both cases. 
These results are also consistent with the figures provided by CHAUDHRY (2005) 
as average variable production cost per hectare in Uzbekistan agree with the Asian 
and global averages, while the cost per ton of raw cotton appear to be lower in 
Uzbekistan, with only Australia having lower variable cost per ton.  
                                           
3 M ÜLLER (2006) provides a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Uzbekistan in 2001 with a 
disaggregated cotton sector. The SAM entries were used to compute the displayed figures. Marc Müller  198 
Figure 10-9: Estimated and recorded raw cotton production cost, Country 





































































































































Sources:  CHAUDHRI, 2005; MÜLLER, 2006; GUADAGNI et al., 2005; author’s calculations. 
Note:   Values for Uzbekistan were calculated with the official exchange rate. 
4 QUANTIFICATION OF NET TRANSFERS FROM THE COTTON SECTOR 
Having filled the gaps in the database as outlined in the previous section, it is now 
possible to calculate some indicators for net revenues and expenditures associated 
with production and marketing of cotton in Uzbekistan. The data allow deriving 
the gross margins of the producing and processing activities in this sector. For 
the gross margins of raw cotton production, Subsidies and variable costs per hectare 
are considered, incluing acreage and produced quantities and the administrative 
price for raw cotton. The processing industry realizes a gross margin depending on 
the prices for lint and raw cotton, as well as on ginning cost and processed 
quantities. The results are displayed in Figure 10-10 as percentage of GDP at factor 
cost as obtained from ADB (2006). 
It appears that the gross margin of cotton farmers (black columns) is negative in 
five and positive in seven years. The negative values for 2000 and 2001 are likely to 
be caused by the water scarcity in those years (MÜLLER, 2006; FAO/WFP, 2002).  
Although it seems that the input subsidies can not always compensate the produc- 
tion cost, farmers nevertheless do not systematically realise negative gross margins 
from raw cotton production. This does not mean that cotton is a favorable crop 
Uzbeki-
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to produce for farmers, but it is neither a secure source of revenues for the govern-
ment of Uzbekistan. 
The gross margins for the processors of raw cotton show a clearer tendency with 
eight years in which negative values were realized. From this point of view, it seems 
that the processors carry the main burden of the cotton market regulations rather 
than the farmers. This finding is supported by the results of RUDENKO (2006),  
who found a similar pattern based on a detailed value-added-chain analysis for the 
cotton sector in the Uzbek region of Khorezm. However, it should be mentioned 
that the picture conveyed here is incomplete as neither subsidies for the ginneries  
nor gross margins from the sales of cottonseed is included. However, if one includes  
subsidies for this stage of the cotton chain, it is then necessary to adjust the net 
revenues of the government as well, so that the net transfer is not changed. 
One item not included in the calculations above was the debt write-offs for farmers; 
data are only available for 2000 and 2004 from GUADAGNI et al. (2005), and the 
significant fluctuation in the data for these two observations did not allow a 
reasonabe estimation of the values in other years as was possible with production 
costs. It was, therefore, necessary to rely on a visual examination of farmer's gross 
margins from raw cotton and the debt-write offs (Figure 10-10). It appears that 
the debt write-offs coincide with the gross margins as they are comparatively high 
in and after years were farmers realized negative gross margins, and zero otherwise. 
Figure 10-10:  Gross margins of cotton growing and processing,  
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Source: Author’s  calculations. Marc Müller  200 
It can be concluded that the government compensates the farmers for their losses, 
however, the extent of this compensation remains unknown. The relation observed 
in Figure 10-10 does not support the hypothesis that the government of Uzbekistan 
transfers significant amounts of money out of agriculture as the combined effects 
of input subsidies and debt write-offs outweigh the indirect taxation via price 
control. 
The last step along the cotton chain is the export of cotton fiber. Due to data 
limitations, it was not possible to include transaction costs in the following cal-
culations, and it was assumed that the government of Uzbekistan receives the  
full differential between border prices calculated with official and market exchange 
rates (Figure 10-11). While the grey columns in Figure 10-11 show the maximum 
potential revenues, the black columns are a hypothetical result under the simplifying 
assumptions that the official exchange rate applies and that there are no transaction 
costs.  
Figure 10-11:  Gross margins and debt write-offs, 2000 to 2004,  
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Source: GUADAGNI et al., 2005; author’s calculations. 
Governmental revenues from cotton market regulations vary between 49 % of total 
revenues (grey columns for 1999 and 2000) and -2 % (black column for 1999). 
The inclusion of debt write-offs for farmers, subsidies for ginneries, and transaction 
cost for cotton traders, would shift both, black and grey columns further down-
wards.  Cotton, agriculture and the Uzbek government  201
Likewise, the appropriate incorporation of the market exchange rate would also 
raise the production cost for raw and ginned cotton, thus having an impact on  
subsidies and debts, and finally decreasing the government revenues from the 
cotton market regulations. It is also questionable to perceive the exchange rate  
policy as a policy only for the cotton market, as it applies for other commodities as 
well.  
In summary, it can be concluded that the government revenues from cotton market 
regulations are not necessarily as high as often assumed, and cotton market regu-
lations in exceptional years may even cause budgetary losses for the government.  
Figure 10-12:  Potential governmental revenues from cotton market  
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Potential revenues at official exchange rate Potential revenues at market exchange rate  
Source: Author’s  calculations. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to generate a consistent analysis of existing cotton market 
regulations in Uzbekistan and to answer the question, who gains and who loses 
under existing policies. Although it is frequently stated that the state order system 
is meant to generate revenues for the public budgets at the cost of the agricultural 
sector, clear and distinct evidence for this statement for the period 1993 to 2004 
could not be found. Farmers are partly or perhaps even fully compensated by the 
provision with input subsidies and debt write-offs. The ginneries appear to carry Marc Müller  202 
a significant share of the burden of the regulations as calculations of their gross 
margins showed the tendency to be negative. As the ginneries are mainly owned 
by the government, that would then also cause losses for the public budget.  
The governmental revenues on the export markets appear to be tremendous with 
peaks in the late nineties, mainly because of the multiple exchange rate system. 
For 2003 and 2004, during which time the exchange rates converged, the esti-
mated revenues range between -1.5 and +1.3 percent of the total governmental  
revenues. In general, a clear tendency that the government of Uzbekistan transfers 
significant amounts of money out of the agricultural sector could not be identified 
for the observed period: if the policies are meant to generate revenues for the  
public budget by transferring money out of agriculture, then they are of questionable 
efficiency.  
An other explanation for the motivation behind the cotton market regulations 
could be that it is meant to provide a secure, although low, level of income for the 
rural population in order to mitigate negative effects occurring during the tran-
sitional stage of the economy. If this is the case, then it is also of questionable 
efficiency as the administrative setting of production targets hampers the ability of 
farmers to adapt their production systems to the requirements of a market-oriented 
economy.  
The final conclusion from the considerations above is that Uzbek cotton market 
regulations are in neither case an efficient instrument to achieve the underlying 
political goals, and that there is a clear research demand to develop strategies to 
reform the current policies-changes which incorporate the linkages and feedbacks 
between the partial markets for raw cotton and cotton fiber, and the resulting 
impacts on the governmental budget.  
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